Government Reforms (Edexcel A-Level History): Revision Notes

Government Reforms

Introduction: the power vacuum after Stalin's death

When Stalin died in 1953, the Soviet Union faced a major political crisis. Stalin's authority had been unique and personal, based on his reputation and willingness to use terror rather than on formal positions within the Party or state. This meant that when he died, there was a power vacuum – no clear successor with the same level of authority.

This created a dangerous situation. Without a strong leader, the Soviet Government risked falling into chaos. The new generation of leaders, particularly Khrushchev and Malenkov, recognised that they needed to reform the system. They aimed to shift power away from any single individual and ensure that both the Party and the state had independent authority. This would prevent the kind of personal dictatorship that Stalin had established.

The leadership struggle, 1953–1955

Three contenders for power

After Stalin's death, three main figures competed to become the next Soviet leader. Each had their own powerbase (source of political support):

Georgy Malenkov was rumoured to be Stalin's preferred successor. He became Premier of the Soviet Union (head of the government) immediately after Stalin's death. Malenkov believed that the Soviet state was more important than the Communist Party, and this was where his support came from.

Lavrentiy Beria had been head of Stalin's political police and was responsible for implementing Stalin's terror. As deputy Premier in Stalin's final years, Beria's powerbase was the MVD – the Soviet secret police force.

Nikita Khrushchev became Secretary of the Central Committee when Stalin died. Unlike the other two, he had no role in the state government. His powerbase was the Communist Party itself. He was popular within the Party and known as the 'apparatchik's apparatchik' (the ultimate Party official).

Key figures

Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971) came from a poor background, having worked as a miner in Ukraine before joining the Bolsheviks in 1918. He served in the Red Army during the Civil War and developed a close relationship with Stalin in the 1930s. Despite publicly supporting Stalin's terror, Khrushchev later came to believe that reform was essential to improve living standards and end widespread terror. He had great faith in the communist system, viewing his own rise from poverty to leadership as evidence of Soviet superiority. He remained committed to Soviet socialism throughout his life.

Georgy Malenkov (1902–1988) came from a wealthier farming family and became a Stalin ally in the 1920s. He played a significant role in the downfall of Yezhov in 1938 and was promoted to the Politburo in 1941. After the power struggle with Khrushchev, he was eclipsed by the end of 1955 and eventually expelled from the Party in 1961 for his role in the Great Terror.

Early government reforms

Stalin left behind a successful but problematic legacy. He had transformed the Soviet Union into a military and industrial superpower, but his personal rule created a major political problem. The new leaders needed to address this by ensuring that the Party and state had real power independent of any individual leader.

Beria's reforms of the MVD

One of the first priorities was to reduce the power of the MVD, which Stalin had used as a weapon against both the Party and the state. Beria led these reforms, partly to reassure his rivals that he would not use the secret police against them as Stalin had done.

Beria reported to the Presidium (the Party's top decision-making body) that the Gulag system had become inefficient and unmanageable. Since the late 1940s, there had been increasing numbers of uprisings in the camps. He introduced several important reforms:

• March 1953: An amnesty was granted to non-political prisoners serving short sentences
• April 1953: The amnesty was extended to include some counter-revolutionaries (people accused of opposing Soviet power)
• May 1953: A Party commission was established to investigate past executions. This commission rehabilitated 4,620 communists who had been executed based on forced confessions (meaning they were officially declared innocent)
• The MVD lost much of its economic power. Previously, it had used Gulag labour to build factories, power stations and mines. These projects were ended, and responsibility was transferred to Soviet economic ministries

Beria's reforms of the republics

Under Stalin, the Soviet republics had been dominated by central Soviet institutions. In June 1953, Beria introduced two measures to make republican governments more representative:

• All senior Party officials had to speak the language of the republic where they worked
• All official publications had to be available in the languages of the republics as well as Russian

These reforms aimed to give the republics more autonomy and cultural recognition.

Beria's fall

Despite reforming the MVD, Beria's rivals still feared that he would use the secret police to terrorise and execute them as Stalin had done. Khrushchev and Malenkov organised a plot to remove him from power.

The trial and execution served two purposes: it removed a major contender for power and further restricted the MVD's authority whilst restoring power to the Party.

After Beria's arrest, Khrushchev and Malenkov ruled together as a duumvirate (joint leadership) from mid-1953 to the end of 1954. However, they continued to compete for ultimate power.

Khrushchev's early government reforms

Whilst working with Malenkov, Khrushchev pursued reforms designed to achieve two goals: enhancing his own power and strengthening the Party at the expense of Malenkov and the state.

Personnel changes

Khrushchev used his position as Secretary of the Central Committee to replace Stalin's supporters with people loyal to him. Between 1953 and 1956, he replaced:

• Around half of the regional Party secretaries
• 44 per cent of the Central Committee members

This secured his position within the Party by ensuring that the top levels were filled with people who supported him and backed reform.

Khrushchev's anti-bureaucracy campaign

Having consolidated his position within the Party, Khrushchev launched a direct attack on Malenkov's powerbase in the state. He proposed cutting bureaucracy (excessive government administration) by transferring power from the Soviet Government to republican governments.

Khrushchev's reforms, combined with the apparent success of his agricultural Virgin Lands Scheme, meant that Malenkov lost the Premiership in February 1955. The new Premier, Nikolai Bulganin, was one of Khrushchev's key allies, further strengthening his position.

De-Stalinisation

Both Khrushchev and Malenkov wanted to end key aspects of Stalin's rule – a process known as de-Stalinisation. They aimed to 'humanise' Communism by ending Stalin's use of terror, improving Soviet citizens' standard of living and enriching Soviet culture with new novels, plays and art forms.

As Leninists, both men rejected the cult of personality that had developed around Stalin. They wanted to shift focus away from Stalin as a heroic individual leader and towards the achievements of the Communist Party and the Soviet people.

Understanding the cult of Stalin

The cult of Stalin referred to the use of art, photography, books, newspapers and speeches to emphasise Stalin's genius. According to the propaganda of the 1930s, Stalin was personally responsible for every major Soviet victory since Lenin's death. This cult aimed to win the loyalty of the Soviet people and ensure that Stalin's authority was independent of the Party and state.

The early stages of de-Stalinisation

The process of ending the cult of personality and widespread terror began immediately after Stalin's death, though initial steps were small:

• Plans to turn Stalin's country house (dacha) into a museum celebrating his life were abandoned
• The annual Stalin prizes were cancelled
• For the first time since the 1930s, there were no official celebrations of Stalin's birthday
• Newspapers stopped constantly quoting from Stalin's works and began quoting Marx and Lenin instead

The Secret Speech (February 1956)

Khrushchev wanted to go beyond quietly dismantling Stalin's cult and formally criticise Stalin's rule. However, this was extremely risky. Stalin was widely respected as a founder of the Soviet system, so criticising him could undermine the authority of both the Soviet Union and Communism itself. Many senior Communists still respected Stalin and feared that criticisms would reflect badly on them because they had helped implement his policies.

Khrushchev spoke for four hours, delivering a profound critique (detailed criticism) of Stalin's rule. He focused on several key points:

The cult of personality: Khrushchev argued that Stalin had abandoned collective leadership and established himself as a dictator. In doing so, Stalin had placed himself above the Party and robbed the Party of its leading role.

Stalin's mistakes: Without the wisdom of the Party to guide him, Stalin made serious errors, such as purging the Red Army immediately before the Second World War.

Stalin's crimes: Khrushchev revealed that Stalin had committed enormous crimes, particularly during the terror when he ordered the deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocent people. He revealed the true scale of the terror, which Stalin had concealed from the Party, and quoted Lenin's Testament, which had criticised Stalin and also been kept secret.

What Khrushchev did not criticise: Significantly, Khrushchev did not attack Stalin's policies of industrialisation or collectivisation, or any aspect of communist ideology. He consistently argued that the foundations of the Soviet system remained sound.

Impact of the Secret Speech

Many Party delegates were profoundly shocked by Khrushchev's revelations. Stalin had been widely loved and respected in the Party. Some accounts suggest that some delegates suffered heart attacks during the speech, whilst others took their own lives after learning the full scale of Stalin's crimes.

Ending terror

Another crucial aspect of de-Stalinisation involved dealing with the legacy of Stalin's terror. In May 1954, Khrushchev and Malenkov established a special commission to review the cases of political prisoners in the Gulags. Initially, progress was slow – only 4,620 of the 113,739 political prisoners were released in the first year.

However, following the Secret Speech, the process accelerated dramatically. In June 1956 alone, 51,439 prisoners were released, including 26,155 political prisoners. The commission also reviewed cases of political prisoners who had been executed. By 1961, half of those executed under Stalin had been rehabilitated.

The problems of de-Stalinisation

Khrushchev's criticisms of Stalin created serious difficulties both within the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe.

Khrushchev's retreat

Critics within the Party argued that de-Stalinisation had destabilised the government. Stalinists believed the reforms had gone too far, whilst some moderates accused Khrushchev of reforming too quickly.

Khrushchev responded by backtracking. He agreed with his critics that the Soviet people were 'not ready' to know the full truth about Stalin. A series of measures followed:

• June 1957: The Central Committee issued a statement to the Party revising Khrushchev's speech
• October 1957: The editors of the Soviet magazine 'Questions of History' were disciplined for publishing revelations about Stalin's terror
• Mid-December 1957: Khrushchev secretly authorised the establishment of a Special Commission, headed by Leonid Brezhnev, to suppress anti-communist activities
• New Year's Eve 1957: Khrushchev's speech acknowledged that all communists were 'Stalinists'

By the end of 1957, radical de-Stalinisation had come to a halt.

Democratisation and decentralisation (1957)

Despite the problems with de-Stalinisation, Khrushchev continued with political reform in 1957, introducing measures to reduce the size and power of the central Party.

Democratisation

Democratisation was designed to increase workers' participation in government. However, it did not involve new elections. Instead, Khrushchev introduced two main measures:

Expansion of Party membership: Membership grew from 6.9 million in 1954 to 11 million in 1964. This made the Party more democratic as a greater proportion of its members (60 per cent by 1964) were workers or peasants.

Fixed terms for senior Communists: Khrushchev introduced regular turnover to ensure that senior officials were replaced periodically. As a result, two-thirds of regional Secretaries and Presidium members were replaced between 1957 and 1961.

Decentralisation

To decentralise the Party, Khrushchev took several steps:

• He abolished some of the central ministries overseeing the economy
• He devolved power to 105 newly created economic councils
• He moved the Ministry of Agriculture away from Moscow to make it 'closer to the fields'

The Anti-Party Group (1957)

Discontent over Khrushchev's reforms and the problems created by de-Stalinisation led to an attempt to overthrow him. In June 1957, a majority of the Presidium, led by Malenkov, voted to replace Khrushchev.

Khrushchev argued that only the Central Committee had the authority to remove him from his position as Party leader. Since he had a majority of support in the Central Committee, Khrushchev survived the attempted coup and sacked his opponents. He consolidated his position further in March 1958 by taking over the position of Prime Minister in addition to his existing Party offices.

Significance of the 1957 coup attempt

The attempted coup of 1957 was significant for the development of Soviet government for two main reasons:

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