Sample Answer for The relationship between the US and South Vietnam

Source A

From a message from President Eisenhower to President Ngo Dinh Diem of the Republic of Vietnam, 22 October 1960. The White House made this message public on 25 October 1960.

Dear Mr President During the years of your independence it has been refreshing for us to observe how clearly the government and the citizens of Vietnam have faced the fact that the greatest danger to their independence was Communism. You and your countrymen have used your strength well in accepting the double challenge of building your country and resisting Communist imperialism. In five short years since the founding of the Republic, the Vietnamese people have developed their country in almost every sector. At the same time Vietnam's ability to defend itself from the Communists has grown. I also know that your determination has been a vital factor in guarding that independence while steadily advancing the economic development of your country. Although the main responsibility for guarding that independence will always, as it has in the past, belong to the Vietnamese people and their government, I want to assure you that the United States will continue to assist Vietnam in the difficult, yet hopeful, struggle ahead.

Source B

From a news conference given by President Kennedy to journalists, 7 February 1962.

Journalist: Could you tell us what the situation is in Vietnam? How deeply are we involved in what seems to be a growing war and what are our forces doing

President Kennedy: There is a war going on in South Vietnam, and I think that last week there were over 500 killings, as well as assassinations and bombings and the casualties are high. As I said last week, it is a guerrilla war of increasing ferocity. The United States, since the end of the Geneva Accords and the setting up of the South Vietnamese government as an independent government, has been assisting Vietnam economically to maintain its independence. It has sent training groups out there, which have been expanded in recent weeks, as the attacks on the government and the people of South Vietnam have increased. We are out there helping with training and transportation. We are assisting in every way we can the people of South Vietnam who, with the greatest courage, are attempting to maintain their freedom.

Source C

From a confidential note from Presidential advisor, Ambrose Galbraith, to President Kennedy, 4 April 1962.

The following considerations influence our thinking on Vietnam:

We have a growing military commitment. This could expand step by step into a major, long drawn-out indecisive military involvement.

We are backing a weak and ineffectual government and corrupt leader.

There is consequent danger we shall replace the French as the colonial force in the area and bleed as the French did.

The political effects of some of the measures which pacification requires, or is believed to require, including the concentration of population, relocation of villages, and the burning of old villages, may be damaging to those associated with it.

We fear that at some point there will be a major political outburst about a new war into which the Democrats have led the USA.

In the light of the foregoing I urge the following: We should reduce our commitment to the particular present leadership of the government of South Vietnam and resist all steps which commit American troops to combat action.

Source A makes the argument the US-South Vietnam relations were going smoothly as a result of the brave actions of Diem to protect his nation from Communism while developing it further. It is somewhat valuable when examining the relationship between the USA and South Vietnam (SV) as the message was sent from one President to another. The fact the President Eisenhower wrote this message is very telling of the relations – since he had gone back on his predecessor's policy of containment, this letter provides insight into the new doctrine he had brought to his government. Indeed, during this period the nature of the US SV's relationship was more diplomatic than militaristic, while the Eisenhower ministration had provided $400m in economic aid for development until 1961 they did not commit any troops. This, alongside with the emphasis on optimistic development in the source as exemplified in the 'challenge of building your country', shows how Eisenhower viewed American bilateral relations as being laid on a foundation of economic cooperation. This source is valuable in informing us of the reasons for their close economic relationship. At the time, the fact that Eisenhower had claimed that 'Vietnam's ability to defend itself from Communism has grown' which is a valuable insight when examining US-SV relations as it was this belief by the US during the Eisenhower's presidency which kept the development of troops back. It is evident that the reluctance of Eisenhower to aid SV militarily rested on his assumption that as long as the US helped them develop economically and further their nation's ability to resist the north with their own resources – the situation in Indochina would play out favourable to US interests.

However, the fact that the message was made public by the white house 3 days after it was sent also makes it clear that this was likely a publicity stunt. As the Viet Cong's foundations were laid in October of 1560 (after the Paris Peace Agreement that ended the Vietnam War of Independence outlawed the stationing of communist troops in South Vietnam) – this was likely a pre-emptive message to warn North Vietnam of the dangers of attacking as a US ally and therefore has less value as a tool for exacting the nature of US-SV relations in private. But perhaps the least valuable part of the source is Eisenhower's claim that 'Vietnamese people have developed their country in almost every sector' as the government of President Diem was an ineffective one. Diem was incompetent, autocratic and a nepotist who appointed his own brother Nhu as the prime minister to the detriment of the country. In fact SV had gone backwards since democracy when it came to the promotion of tolerance – with the Buddhist majority in the country being oppressed greatly by Diem who was a Roman Catholic. In fact, the government of Diem had conducted the 'Pagoda Raids' which led to the burning and destruction of many Buddhist Temples and this had become major news in the West to the disdain of the USA since even the Communists in the North had respected the Buddhists in the country against their own ideology. This put a very tense strain on US-UV relations between 1960 and 62, despite what Eisenhower would claim as the clear distaste for Human Rights by the government of Diem contrasted with the relative tolerance by Ho Chi Minh in the north.

Thus overall, it is evident that the source is not very convincing as the message acts as a public reinforcement of a relationship that was considered not very important to Eisenhower militarily.

Source B makes the argument that the US-SV relations have been heightened to a very limited form of military cooperation by Kennedy but remain largely economic in nature. The source is very convincing when examining the initial American response to the breakout of the Vietnam War and the reluctance of the USA to commit troops to Diem in order to repel the northern assault. The fact that the conference was delivered by Kennedy only a year after the assumed office and with the memory of the Cuban Missile Crisis (CMC) from a few months earlier still in mind provided a valuable context to the reason for heightened involvement in South Vietnam. Kennedy's approach to levelling up US-SV relations can be seen as an outcome of his campaign promise to be harder on Communism as well as the distrust he had left behind for Communists from the CMC. Furthermore, as the tone of his answer is very matter-of-factly, it becomes more valuable as it is clear that he seeks to keep the American public informed of the US entanglement in SV. This also provides another reason for the reluctance of the USA to commit troops as of yet because it took place in Oregon and New York after the CMC and had created public pressure against foreign intervention for President Kennedy. In terms of the content of the source, it is valuable when examining the belief Kennedy held in the early stages of the war which shaped his relationship to SV. He believed that he was 'assisting in every way we can', when he provided economic and advisory aid to Vietnam in order to advise Diem in the war – most of whom had fought in the Philippines and had experience of guerrilla warfare as well as ammunition and money.

However, the information provided in Source B is made less valuable by the fast paced war in Vietnam and the American escalation during the later part of the Kennedy administration. As a response to the assassination of high-ranking generals of the SV Army, ARVN, including General Nguyen which the Viet Cong claimed responsibility for – the USA was already involved in ground operations with the CIA directing a counter-attack of bombings and assassinations in North Vietnamese cities. In fact the suicide bombings in Hanoi in Dec 1961 and Jan 1962 would not have been possible without the cooperation of the CIA with SV. This clearly shows that by this time, the US had already committed to supporting Vietnam more directly in their war with the North and Kennedy had ordered the Joint Chiefs to draw up OPLAN 34A in order to destroy the forces of North Vietnam. This clearly shows that in secret Kennedy had committed himself to the preservation of SV at all costs and the military connection of the US to the Vietnam War was in the process of being ramped up with the groundwork being laid for the eventual bombing operations that would come after 1962. In fact it is obvious that the emphasis of support to Vietnam who possess 'the greatest courage' was likely an attempt by Kennedy to manufacture consent for further intervention in Vietnam and the purpose of the highly publicised nature of a top-secret US involvement in SV (which would jeopardise relations with communist countries) was an attempt by the President to lay the public groundwork for the troop deployment which would begin in April.

Overall, Source B is somewhat valuable as despite the covert escalations of US presence in Vietnam Kennedy was largely honest about the level and justifications for the US-SV relations.

Source C, which provides the disadvantages of US-SV relations through the political capital necessary to achieve US aims is perhaps the most valuable source when looking at US-SV relations. As the note was confidential advice from one of the President's advisors, its contents are plain, free of propaganda and actual in order to ensure that the decision taken by Kennedy was grounded on reality rather than hope. This makes it very convincing, as the tone of the note is incredibly pessimistic about the future of the conflict and the relations between the US and South Vietnam are examined without emotional attachment on the basis of purely politics.

Galbraith had foreseen all of the problems which the US would face – showing the reason for the retrained support offered by the USA between 1960-62. The reluctance of the USA to commit troops had been drawn from Galbraith's analysis of the French intervention – which had become costly that the USA had to foot 50% of the bill by the end, only to end in the humiliation of the battle of Dien Bien Phu – where he feared US soldiers would 'bleed as the French did'. This is what happened, as by the conclusion of the war almost 58,000 Americans had died in Vietnam – a fate that was avoided in this period as the brunt of the NV attack was directed to the ARVN which engaged them. In fact, the reluctance to support Diem's projects outright were clear in the price they'd have to pay as Galbraith even foresaw the consequences of relocating 4m villagers into 3000 hamlets in the Strategic Hamlets Program as the resulting famine and societal collapse pushed many in SV to join the Viet Cong. This makes clear why the USA did not take these steps in 60-62, as the communists were seen as aggressors throughout the conflict, especially with the Tet Offensive in 1961 which created a horrible image for Vietnam and rallied the South Diem for the time being.

However, while the note laid out the realities of committing to SV, since the advice was not heeded by Kennedy and his successors it has little value in assessing the relationship that developed in the face of this adversity. The note was passed to Kennedy on 4 April 1962 – but despite this advice only a few weeks later the first US soldiers would be flown into SV, showing that even the advice of the note became outdated within a few weeks as the US ignored the fact that they are 'backing a weak and ineffectual government'. That consideration is particularly valueless as Kennedy publicly absolved Diem of his sins and legitimised his governance when he hosted the President and his wife in the White House in May 1962. Kennedy had committed himself to upholding the SV regime, which he viewed as a necessary evil able to keep the North at bay through dictatorial focus. The Americans in this period even valued the fact that Diem had rounded up and killed 120,000 Communists in the 'White Terror'. Thus Galbraith's involvement in Indochina was only accelerating throughout 1962. The fact that this came despite his warning of a 'major political outburst' further makes the source less valuable as the large protests directed at the Republican president Nixon and the conflict undermined both parties equally – providing another reason for understanding why Kennedy ramped up support for SV by 1962 as there was largely bipartisan support (and thus bipartisan blame-sharing) for the war.

Overall, this source is very valuable as despite the fact that Kennedy did not heed Galbraith's advice – the strategic concerns laid out here show why he was initially against more involvement.

Examiners Comment:

This is a Level 5 response. This response has a clear focus on the question throughout and assesses the content of each source individually for its value. There are a range of comments on different aspects of provenance such as author, date and purpose and whilst some comments are less developed, there is an excellent awareness of specific contextual knowledge surrounding the sources. There are clear references to the limitations of each source and crucially, the response focuses precisely on the relationship between the USA and South Vietnam in these years and makes precise judgements regarding the value of each source.