The Peace Treaties (HSC SSCE Modern History): Revision Notes

The Historical Debate and Present-Day Assessment

Introduction to the ongoing debate

The peace treaties ending World War I have sparked heated debate since they were signed. Even a century later, historians continue to disagree about whether the peacemakers succeeded or failed in their task. This ongoing controversy reflects the complexity of the settlement and its long-term consequences for international relations.

Major historical perspectives

Douglas Newton: Failure to support German democracy

Australian historian Douglas Newton examined British policy towards the Weimar Republic in his 1997 work. His central argument focuses on how the Allied powers failed to support Germany's transition to democracy.

Newton's key points include:

• The Big Three leaders (Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George) recognised that Germany's natural advantages meant no military defeat would permanently weaken the country
• This made it even more important to ensure Germany developed a strong, stable democracy
• Instead, the harsh treatment Germany received at the Paris Peace Conference undermined the new democratic government
• By mid-1919, German democrats who had signed the Armistice were being labelled as the November criminals rather than heroes
• The British government's dislike of German socialism contributed to their hard-line approach, despite the fact that German socialists were committed to democratic methods
• There was a striking contradiction in British policy: they had fought to destroy Prussian militarism and establish German democracy, but then refused to support that democracy once it was achieved

Margaret MacMillan: Defending the peacemakers

Canadian historian Margaret MacMillan offers a more sympathetic view of the peacemakers in her 2001 book Peacemakers and subsequent articles. Her main arguments challenge simplified accounts that blame the Treaty of Versailles directly for World War II.

MacMillan's perspective includes:

On the causes of World War II:

• It is too simplistic to say the peace treaties led directly to the Second World War
• Hitler did not go to war because of Versailles, though he exploited the treaty for propaganda purposes
• The treaty was widely criticised within Germany, giving Hitler useful material for his nationalist rhetoric
• Blaming Versailles for World War II ignores two decades of decisions and actions by many different countries and leaders

On the peacemakers' achievements:

• They worked under enormous pressure and time constraints
• They needed to move quickly to establish a framework for international order before Europe descended into chaos
• Despite facing the intractable force of nationalism, they achieved significant results
• Many decisions were being made on the ground by local forces, limiting what the peacemakers could control
• Rapid demobilisation meant Allied military power to enforce decisions was shrinking

MacMillan provides a balanced assessment that acknowledges real problems with the settlement while defending the peacemakers against oversimplified criticism.

Robert McNamara and James Blight: The missing spirit of reconciliation

Former American Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara and historian James Blight, writing in their 2001 book Wilson's Ghost, identified a fundamental failure at the Paris Peace Conference.

Their main arguments include:

• The peacemakers failed to deal with the root causes of the war, partly because there was no consensus on what those causes actually were
• Contradictory forces were at work, making it difficult to achieve coherent goals
• The peacemakers ignored warnings about pursuing a vindictive peace
• What was really missing at Versailles was a spirit of reconciliation
• Creating reconciliation would have required the Allies to empathise with their former enemy
• President Wilson expressed high ideals in his statements before the conference
• Wilson's determination to establish the League of Nations before finalising the treaty was commendable
• However, McNamara and Blight dismiss the League as mere token multilateralism – a symbolic gesture rather than genuine international cooperation

William Keylor: Allied disunity as the key failure

Professor William Keylor, writing in his 2011 book The Twentieth-Century World and Beyond, identifies post-war Allied disunity as the major factor explaining the ultimate failure of the Treaty of Versailles.

Keylor's main arguments include:

On Allied disunity:

• After the peace conference, the three victorious powers – Britain, France and the United States – failed to maintain a united front
• The United States abruptly withdrew from European involvement
• Britain developed misgivings about the harsh settlement they had helped create
• These factors hamstrung efforts to enforce the peace settlement properly
• Only a continuation of the wartime alliance and ongoing troop presence in the Rhineland would have effectively deterred Germany
• Instead, France was left alone with the burden of enforcing the Treaty

On French concerns:

• Keylor is sympathetic to France's need for reparations
• Neither the United States nor Britain offered financial assistance to France
• French security concerns were legitimate given their vulnerability to future German aggression

However, Keylor describes the furore over Article 231 as the myth of war guilt – German propaganda rather than genuine historical understanding.

Sally Marks: The propaganda campaign against Versailles

Diplomatic historian Sally Marks, writing in her 2013 article in the Journal of Modern History, emphasises the role of German propaganda in creating negative perceptions of the Treaty of Versailles.

Marks's key arguments:

• Condemnation of the Versailles Treaty continues relentlessly
• The peacemakers certainly made mistakes, and the Treaty was a bundle of compromises
• However, the German campaign against Versailles was primarily a propaganda exercise
• The reality was that the Treaty was too gentle to restrict Germany for long but severe enough to enrage it permanently
• This created a dangerous situation that frightened France and the weak new states neighbouring Germany
• The Treaty never actually functioned as it was designed to

William Mulligan: The patchwork of improvements

William Mulligan offers a more optimistic interpretation in his 2014 book The Great War for Peace. He argues that subsequent international agreements compensated for the shortcomings of the World War I peace treaties.

Mulligan's main points include:

The 1922 Washington Conference:

• Concluded in February 1922
• Provided a framework for managing international relations
• Helped stabilise the Asia-Pacific region

The 1925 Locarno Conference:

• Created opportunities for Germany to enter the international order
• Based on principles of arbitration rather than punishment
• Represented a shift towards negotiation and compromise

Changing attitudes by 1925:

• War came to be viewed as a tragedy rather than a crime
• The concept of war guilt receded
• Greater emphasis was placed on the common suffering experienced during World War I
• This negotiated approach led to a more optimistic international mood than in 1919

The 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact:

• Signed by 47 countries
• Renounced war as an instrument of national policy
• Represented the culmination of increasing optimism in the late 1920s
• Combined with economic improvement to create hope for lasting peace

Jürgen Tampke: Challenging conventional wisdom

Writing in his 2017 book A Perfidious Distortion of History, Jürgen Tampke offers the most revisionist interpretation of the Treaty of Versailles. He directly challenges the view that the treaty caused Germany's economic problems and the rise of Nazism.

Tampke's controversial arguments include:

On the treaty's impact:

• The claim that Versailles crippled the German economy is bad history
• The assertion that it led to the collapse of Weimar democracy and the rise of Nazism is also incorrect
• Problems existed with the treaty, but these were not the fault of the peacemakers

On German reactions:

• Germans wilfully misinterpreted the Fourteen Points
• They used reparations and Article 231 as part of a long propaganda campaign against the treaty
• German politicians exploited Article 231 to blame everything that went wrong on Weimar
• The reparations issue was political rather than economic

On who really lost:

• France was actually one of the losers from the Treaty of Versailles
• The French saw the benefits of the peace settlement disappear one by one
• As Tampke puts it, France having won the war they lost the peace

The centenary assessment

One hundred years after the Paris Peace Conference, historians have attempted to provide a balanced assessment of what the peacemakers achieved and where they failed.

What the peacemakers got right

The creation of the League of Nations:

• President Wilson made this a priority from the beginning
• He insisted the Covenant of the League of Nations be designed before finalising other treaty terms
• This represented the first genuine attempt to create permanent international machinery for maintaining peace
• Despite its ultimate failure, the League established important precedents for future international organisations

Protection of minority rights:

• The peacemakers attempted to protect minorities in newly created European nations
• Governments were required to sign treaties guaranteeing minority rights
• This represented recognition that national self-determination created new problems for ethnic minorities
• Though imperfectly implemented, this established important principles for international human rights

Where the peacemakers failed

Contradictory approach to imperialism:

• Imperialism was condemned in the defeated powers
• However, it was accepted and even expanded for the victorious powers
• German colonies were relabelled as League mandates
• These were then distributed among Britain, France, Japan and other Allied powers
• This hypocrisy undermined the moral authority of the peace settlement

Failure to support Weimar democracy:

• The Allied powers repeatedly humiliated the Weimar government
• This weakened domestic support for democracy in Germany
• Far-right nationalist groups swiftly resurged
• Democratic politicians were branded as traitors for accepting the treaty
• The Allies failed to recognise that a stable German democracy was in their own interests

Taking the spoils:

• Allied powers prioritised their own gains
• They often denied reasonable requests from other nations
• This created resentment among smaller Allied powers
• It also contradicted Wilson's idealistic rhetoric about fairness and self-determination

Allied disunity after the conference:

• The United States withdrew from European affairs
• Britain focused on imperial concerns
• France was left alone to enforce the treaty
• Without unified Allied support, the treaty could not function as designed
• This meant the Treaty of Versailles was never fully implemented

What sort of peace would have been preferable?

The mixed results of the World War I peace settlement raise important questions about whether the Allied approach was the best option available.

The "fight to the finish" approach:

• The Allies pursued total victory rather than negotiated peace
• This created a settlement imposed on defeated powers
• Many questions in Europe and internationally remained unresolved
• The League of Nations existed but was it strong enough for future challenges?

Possible benefits of negotiated peace in 1917:

• It might have saved the Provisional Government in Russia
• There may have been no Bolshevik Revolution
• Right-wing forces in Germany might not have resurged
• A peace based on compromise rather than victory might have been more sustainable
• It could have better addressed the root causes of the conflict

Remember!