Divisions and Contenders for Power: Bukharin and the Right (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
Divisions and Contenders for Power: Bukharin and the Right
The emergence of the Right faction
Following Lenin's death in 1924, the moderate wing of the Bolshevik Party coalesced around three senior figures: Nikolai Bukharin, Alexei Rykov, and Mikhail Tomsky. This grouping, known as the Right, advocated continuing the New Economic Policy and opposed rapid industrialisation. For a period, these men allied themselves with Stalin against the Left Opposition led by Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev. Bukharin in particular developed an exceptionally close working relationship with Stalin, often described as the Duumvirate (a partnership of two leaders). However, this alliance ultimately proved fatal. Bukharin's growing popularity within the Party aroused Stalin's jealousy and suspicion, setting the stage for the eventual destruction of the Right faction.
The Duumvirate refers to the close working partnership between Bukharin and Stalin during the mid-1920s. This alliance gave both men considerable power, but it was Stalin who ultimately used this partnership to eliminate his erstwhile ally once Bukharin's popularity threatened his position.
The Right's support for Stalin against the Left Opposition was rooted in genuine ideological disagreement about economic policy and the pace of revolutionary change. Yet this political choice handed Stalin enormous power, which he would later use to eliminate his former allies. All three leaders of the Right shared certain vulnerabilities: they attempted to remain on good terms with multiple factions, they underestimated Stalin's ruthlessness and ambition, and they delayed forming alliances against him until the opportunity had passed.
Nikolai Bukharin (1888-1938)
Character and personality
Bukharin possessed a distinctive combination of intellectual brilliance and personal warmth that made him both respected and genuinely liked within Bolshevik circles. Rank-and-file Party members regarded him as simultaneously impressive and approachable. His reputation as an outstanding intellectual and theoretician was matched by his popularity with ordinary Politburo colleagues and Party members alike. Lenin famously praised him as the Party's favourite, though this description also hinted at a certain naivety. Bukharin cultivated friendly relationships across factional lines, maintaining connections with both Left and Right groupings. This openness and cooperative spirit reflected his personality but also revealed a political weakness: he could be naive and fundamentally lacked the capacity for intrigue and ruthless factional manoeuvring that characterised the power struggle after Lenin's death.
Political strengths
Bukharin's position within the Party rested on several strong foundations. He enjoyed sustained popularity throughout Party ranks and maintained a close relationship with Lenin that lasted for years. During the 1920s, he worked as a close associate of Stalin, earning considerable respect from the General Secretary. His reputation as the finest theoretician in the Party gave his political positions intellectual weight. More specifically, he had developed particular expertise in economics and agricultural policy at precisely the moment when debates about peasantry and economic development dominated Party discussions. These were not peripheral concerns but lay at the heart of Bolshevik governance, giving Bukharin's voice substantial authority.
Political weaknesses
Bukharin's Fatal Flaws:
Bukharin's desire to maintain good relations with everyone and avoid factional in-fighting meant he possessed no dedicated power base - no group of loyalists who would support him unconditionally in a political crisis. This proved disastrous because the post-Lenin era was defined by factional struggle.
He made the catastrophic error of seriously underestimating Stalin, failing to recognise that his close associate was also his rival and that Stalin's popularity within the Party was significantly less than his own - a difference that made him a target for Stalin's envy and hostility.
Bukharin also made tactical mistakes in the timing of his political alliances. By the time he recognised Stalin's danger and attempted to forge an alliance with former opponents Zinoviev and Kamenev, it was far too late. Stalin had already consolidated sufficient power to isolate and defeat them.
Biography and fate
Born in 1888, Bukharin had opposed making peace with Germany in 1918, instead supporting a revolutionary war to spread communism. During the Civil War, he backed war communism (the system of grain requisitioning and state control), but subsequently supported the New Economic Policy when Lenin introduced it in 1921. Throughout the mid-1920s, Bukharin and Stalin functioned as joint rulers of the USSR, combining their influence against the Left Opposition. Bukharin consistently opposed Trotsky and later broke with Stalin over economic policy, particularly rejecting Stalin's programme of Socialism in One Country and forced collectivisation. This split led to his political marginalisation. In 1928, Bukharin found himself outmanoeuvred by Stalin, and from this point his influence declined steadily. He was expelled from the Central Committee in 1937 and executed in 1938 after a show trial during Stalin's Great Terror.
Alexei Rykov (1881-1938)
Character and political temperament
Rykov belonged to the moderate wing of the Party, though he maintained consistent loyalty to Lenin despite frequent disagreements with the Party leader and the more radical Bolsheviks. His political temperament was fundamentally conciliatory rather than confrontational. In policy matters, he aligned more closely with Bukharin and Tomsky's moderate positions than with radical proposals. As Chairman of Sovnarkom (the government), he aspired to play a unifying role, attempting to bridge factional divides rather than dominate through factional victory. This moderate and conciliatory approach shaped both his political career and his ultimate vulnerability.
Political strengths
Rykov commanded widespread respect within the Party as an 'Old Bolshevik' - someone actively involved in revolutionary work since the movement's early days before 1917. He had demonstrated considerable administrative ability in implementing war communism during the Civil War and managing the complex transition to NEP afterwards. His experience in government gave him practical expertise that complemented Bukharin's theoretical knowledge.
Most significantly, he received extensive support from Sovnarkom (the Council of People's Commissars, which functioned as the Soviet government), which appointed him Deputy Chairman in 1923 and promoted him to Chairman in 1924. This placed him at the head of the governmental apparatus, theoretically giving him substantial institutional power.
Political weaknesses
However, Rykov's position was far weaker than it appeared. His conciliatory nature meant he functioned more as a mediator than a political fighter. Among the moderate leaders, he was overshadowed by Bukharin's superior ability and popularity. Though he held senior government positions, these were largely ceremonial within the context of collective leadership, and he crucially lacked an independent power base - a group of dedicated supporters who could defend his position in factional struggles. His policy of imposing heavy taxes on vodka production was theoretically sound from a social perspective but politically unwise, arousing intense opposition from sections of the Party. Like Kamenev and Zinoviev, Rykov had argued against Lenin over revolutionary tactics in 1917, and this past disagreement with the revered founder was used against him politically. Most damagingly, he underrated Stalin's threat until it was too late to organise effective resistance.
Biography and fate
Born in 1881, Rykov had supported the idea of coalition with other Socialist parties in 1917, placing him temporarily at odds with Lenin's position. He served as Commissar of the Interior from 1917 to 1918 and became a member of the Politburo. Between 1924 and 1930, he led Sovnarkom, making him Lenin's successor as Head of Government (though this role was increasingly subordinate to Stalin's Party position). Initially Stalin's ally against Trotsky, Rykov subsequently joined Bukharin's right-wing group and supported NEP. After Bukharin's fall, Rykov was removed from the Politburo and all other official positions. He was executed in 1938 following a show trial.
Mikhail Tomsky (1880-1936)
Character and working-class background
Unlike most senior Bolsheviks who came from middle-class or intellectual backgrounds, Tomsky was the son of a factory worker and maintained long-standing connections with the trade union movement. He belonged to the relatively few 'Old Bolsheviks' who possessed a genuine working-class background, giving him a particular reputation for authenticity within a party claiming to represent the proletariat. Despite these working-class origins, his political views were decidedly moderate rather than radical. He cultivated a reputation for plain speaking and direct communication, eschewing elaborate theoretical arguments for straightforward political positions.
Political strengths
Tomsky's standing in the Party derived from multiple sources. He commanded respect for his long record as an Old Bolshevik and his working-class credentials made him popular within a party ideologically committed to proletarian leadership. His position as chief spokesman for the trade unions gave him a strong institutional base within the Party structure. From 1920, he served as General Secretary of the Red International of the Trade Unions (also called Profintern), a communist rival to the Social Democratic International Federation of Trade Unions, established by the Comintern in 1921 with headquarters in Amsterdam. He was elected to the Central Committee and the Politburo in 1922. These roles gave him substantial organisational influence. Furthermore, he was a natural political ally of moderate leaders like Rykov and Bukharin, strengthening the Right faction's cohesion.
Political weaknesses
Tomsky's Blindness to Stalin's Threat:
Tomsky's intense hostility toward Trotsky blinded him to the greater danger posed by Stalin. In 1926, his alliance with Stalin, Rykov, and Bukharin to purge left-wingers from the Party handed massive institutional power to Stalin, who used this authority to eliminate all opposition including, eventually, Tomsky himself.
His power base in the trade unions made him an obvious target for Stalin's jealousy and suspicion. Any leader with an independent institutional base represented a potential threat to Stalin's dominance. Additionally, Tomsky's support for NEP became a vulnerability when the grain crisis of 1927 struck the Soviet economy. Stalin exploited economic difficulties to discredit NEP's defenders, arguing that their policies had failed and more radical measures were necessary. Like the other Right leaders, Tomsky underestimated Stalin's ruthlessness until resistance was no longer possible.
Biography and fate
Born in 1880 to a working-class family, Tomsky rose through the trade union movement to become its national leader from 1920 onwards. He fell out with Lenin over the role of trade unions under NEP, believing they should retain more autonomy than Lenin wished to permit. After being politically rehabilitated, he was elected to the Politburo in 1922 and served as one of the pall-bearers at Lenin's funeral in 1924, symbolising his status as a senior Party figure. Throughout the mid-1920s, he remained hostile to the Left Opposition and allied himself firmly with Bukharin's faction. When Stalin turned against the Right, Tomsky was expelled from the Politburo in 1930. Unlike many of Stalin's victims, he avoided immediate execution. However, facing inevitable arrest during Stalin's Great Terror in 1936, he committed suicide to avoid being killed in a show trial.
The vulnerability of the Right
The Shared Fatal Flaws of the Right Faction:
The leaders of the Right faction shared common characteristics that explain both their initial political success and their ultimate destruction:
- All three were respected Old Bolsheviks with substantial experience and genuine revolutionary credentials
- All three initially underestimated Stalin, viewing him as a useful ally against the more theoretically sophisticated and obviously threatening Trotsky - this misjudgement proved fatal
- Their moderate political temperament, which emphasised party unity and consensus rather than factional victory, left them ill-equipped for the ruthless power struggle that developed after Lenin's death
- None possessed the type of independent power base that could protect them once Stalin moved against them: Bukharin lacked organisational support despite his popularity; Rykov's governmental positions were ceremonial; and Tomsky's trade union base became a target rather than a defence
By the time they recognised Stalin's danger and attempted to build alliances against him (particularly the belated rapprochement with Zinoviev and Kamenev), Stalin had already accumulated sufficient power to isolate and defeat them. The grain crisis of 1927 and the perceived failure of NEP gave Stalin the political justification he needed to discredit the Right's policies and remove its leaders from power. All three would eventually perish in Stalin's Great Terror of 1937-38.
Key Points to Remember:
- The Right faction (Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky) represented the moderate wing of the Bolshevik Party and initially allied with Stalin against the Left Opposition, inadvertently strengthening his position
- Bukharin was the Party's most respected theoretician and Lenin's favourite, but his popularity aroused Stalin's jealousy and his political naivety left him without a genuine power base when factional struggle intensified
- All three Right leaders fatally underestimated Stalin's ambition and ruthlessness, recognising the danger too late to organise effective resistance or build alternative alliances
- Despite holding senior positions (Rykov led the government, Tomsky controlled the trade unions), these roles provided ceremonial status rather than real power in the Party-dominated Soviet system
- The Right faction's support for NEP became a political liability during the 1927 grain crisis, allowing Stalin to discredit their policies and justify their removal from power, ultimately leading to their execution in 1937-38