Relations with the USA: Vietnam (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
Relations with the USA: Vietnam
Wilson's diplomatic dilemma
The Labour government confronted three major foreign policy challenges between 1964 and 1970. Although Britain was not militarily involved in the Vietnam War, America expected British support. Wilson faced a delicate balancing act: the United States provided substantial financial assistance to Britain, making it necessary to tread carefully between offering diplomatic support without committing troops. The war was unpopular at home, particularly among sections of the Labour Party, and Wilson feared that sending troops would provoke a damaging split within his own party. No foreign policy operates in isolation, and this period brought additional pressures, including another attempt to join the European Economic Community and the need to manage Britain's declining status as a world power. The withdrawal of troops from territories east of Suez highlighted this decline, as did Wilson's inability to curb Ian Smith's activities in Rhodesia.
The Triple Pressure on Wilson: Wilson had to navigate three competing demands simultaneously: maintaining American financial support, avoiding a Labour Party split over Vietnam, and managing Britain's declining imperial status. This created a diplomatic tightrope that would define much of his foreign policy between 1964 and 1970.
American escalation and British positioning
The number of American soldiers fighting in Vietnam escalated during the early 1960s. By the time Wilson became Prime Minister, President Johnson was deeply committed to achieving a military conclusion. During Wilson's early visits to America, he attempted to broach the subject of Vietnam. Johnson wanted assurance of British support, while Wilson wished to provide it without triggering domestic opposition. The war was unpopular at home, not only with certain sections of society but also with members of the Labour left. Johnson wanted British soldiers deployed in Vietnam, but Wilson was not prepared to commit troops. However, he was prepared to assist in other ways, seeing himself as an honest broker who could help end the war through diplomacy.
Britain's role as Geneva co-chair
Britain had co-chaired the Geneva Conference alongside the USSR. Wilson believed this gave him a special relationship with the Russians, who were not actually fighting in Vietnam. He calculated that he could negotiate with them and that the two countries could collaborate to broker a deal ending the war. His position as co-chair prevented both direct military involvement and strong public support for America, while allowing him occasionally to criticise American action publicly.
The Geneva Conference Status
Britain's position as Geneva Conference co-chair was crucial to Wilson's strategy. This status gave him:
- A diplomatic framework for mediation attempts
- Justification for not providing direct military support to America
- Permission to occasionally criticise US actions publicly without breaking the alliance
- A perceived channel to Soviet and North Vietnamese leadership
However, this same position would ultimately undermine his credibility as a neutral mediator.
Early peace initiatives, 1965
Wilson made several attempts to broker a peaceful settlement. In March 1965, his first action was to arrange a meeting between the USSR and the USA in London, but the Americans did not attend and the initiative produced no results. In June 1965, Wilson suggested that a group of Commonwealth Prime Ministers should visit major capital cities to search for a peace formula, but this also failed. To conclude 1965, Wilson sent Harold Davies, a junior minister and frequent visitor to Vietnam, to the North Vietnamese capital, Hanoi, to deal directly with Ho Chi Minh. Davies was refused access.
Pattern of Failed Initiatives: All three 1965 attempts shared a common outcome – they failed to produce meaningful negotiations. The Americans didn't attend the London meeting, the Commonwealth mission was rejected, and Harold Davies was denied access to Ho Chi Minh. This pattern revealed the fundamental obstacle: neither side was ready to negotiate while they believed military victory was achievable.
The Moscow visit, 1966
A visit to Moscow in 1966 brought Wilson no nearer a settlement. He attributed this failure to Russia's inability to influence events in Vietnam. Throughout Wilson's diplomatic efforts, he deserves recognition for keeping British troops out of the conflict while not jeopardising US financial support. He navigated the risk of a split in the Labour Party over whether to send troops.
The Kosygin negotiations, February 1967
The Vietnamese New Year (Tet) in February 1967 brought a four-day truce and renewed hope for negotiations leading to a longer ceasefire. The Soviet premier, Alexei Kosygin, was visiting Britain at this moment, providing what appeared to be an ideal opportunity to open discussions. Wilson's contact was Chet Cooper, a former chief of the CIA who was acting on behalf of President Johnson. Over the course of several days, Wilson's inability to direct any peace initiatives became apparent, as his efforts to steer a course towards ending the conflict failed.
The phase A/phase B plan
Wilson and Kosygin had been discussing a plan that would operate in two phases. The proposal, known as 'phase A/phase B', would first allow America to stop bombing and then, in a second phase, halt the movement of North Vietnamese troops into South Vietnam, preventing America from adding to their troop numbers.
The Phase A/Phase B Proposal – Detailed Terms
The plan consisted of two carefully sequenced phases:
Phase A:
- (a) The United States would stop bombing North Vietnam as soon as they received assurance that infiltration from North Vietnam to South Vietnam would stop.
Phase B:
- (b) Within a few days (the exact period to be agreed between the two sides before the bombing stopped), the United States would stop further augmenting their forces in South Vietnam, and North Vietnam would stop infiltration and movement of forces into the South.
The key feature was the sequence: American bombing would stop first, followed by mutual de-escalation. This sequencing would later become the point of contention with Washington.
Cooper was confident that President Johnson would approve the proposal and allowed Wilson to take a written document outlining it to Kosygin that evening. The message was sent to Washington for confirmation. When no response came, it was sent a second time. Despite this, Cooper remained confident that positive news was imminent and went to the theatre. His viewing was interrupted when he returned to the embassy, where he discovered that Washington was working on an alternative to phase A/phase B.
Washington's intervention
Wilson had attended a reception at the Soviet embassy, where he handed the document to Kosygin, who received it positively, and left the next day on a trip to Scotland. At Number 10, Wilson, Cooper and David Bruce (one of Johnson's most trusted diplomats) congratulated themselves on their diplomatic success. Then Washington issued new instructions. These instructions fundamentally changed the nature of phase A/phase B: it was not America but North Vietnam that was to make the first move by stopping the movement of forces into the South.
The Critical Reversal
Washington's changed instructions completely reversed the sequence of the plan:
- Original plan: America stops bombing first, then both sides de-escalate
- Revised plan: North Vietnam stops infiltration first, then America stops bombing
This reversal made the plan unacceptable to North Vietnam and destroyed the carefully negotiated compromise. The timing was devastating – Wilson had already presented the original plan to Kosygin, creating a diplomatic embarrassment.
The explanation for this reversal appears to have been Wilson's second description of the plan, although David Bruce suggested it may have been the third version. Wilson had come close to brokering an end to the Vietnam War, or at least to creating conditions where a truce could be discussed. The Vietnamese New Year truce provided an ideal opportunity to begin discussions for peace. Wilson wanted to be the figure who brokered the deal, but America was unwilling to accept it.
Wilson's reaction
In his 1971 autobiography, written with the benefit of hindsight, Wilson expressed his anger at Washington's intervention:
"I was furious, I hope I can say icily so, though as the evening wore on the language in which I expressed myself was less and less parliamentary. The Americans who were with me in Downing Street were equally angry. I said that there could be only three possible explanations. One, which I was reluctant to believe, was that the White House had taken me – and hence Mr Kosygin – for a ride. Two, the most likely, that the Washington hawks had staged a successful take over. Three – and here I paraphrase – that the authorities in Washington were suffering from a degree of confusion about a possible and unfortunate juxtaposition of certain parts of their anatomy, one of which was their elbow."
The group at Downing Street were furious and flabbergasted by the new instructions from Washington.
Historical interpretation
Ben Pimlott explains effectively the difficulty Wilson faced in attempting to reach a settlement. Both the USA and the USSR/North Vietnam believed they could win through force, and Britain was perceived as being too close to America to negotiate honestly. Pimlott argues:
"[A] war in which both sides are heavily committed and both expect to win is not one that can be ended by diplomatic means, especially if, as in the case of Britain and its representatives, the diplomatist is known to be in league with one side."
This interpretation highlights the structural obstacles to Wilson's mediation efforts, regardless of his diplomatic skill or commitment.
Pimlott's Key Insight: The historian Ben Pimlott identified the fundamental flaw in Wilson's mediation strategy: Britain was perceived as too aligned with America to be trusted as a neutral broker. When both sides in a conflict believe they can achieve military victory, diplomatic solutions become nearly impossible – especially when offered by a party seen as allied to one side. This structural problem, not Wilson's personal abilities, explains the repeated failures.
Assessment of Wilson's Vietnam policy
Relations between the UK and the USA did not turn sour following the failed Kosygin negotiations, but they were not the same afterwards. Wilson's record on Vietnam is difficult to assess. On one hand, he successfully kept British troops out of the conflict despite American pressure. On the other hand, his attempts to broker peace repeatedly failed, and his close relationship with the United States damaged his credibility as a neutral mediator in the eyes of North Vietnam and the Soviet Union.
The policy had domestic consequences. Wilson's refusal to commit troops was popular with approximately three-quarters of voters, and he was seen as tough and decisive in resisting American pressure. However, his public criticism of American actions, permitted by his Geneva co-chair status, risked endangering the financial support Britain received from across the Atlantic. The policy also threatened to create a split within the Labour Party between those who wanted stronger opposition to US policy and those who supported maintaining the Atlantic alliance.
Wilson's premiership demonstrated the limitations of Britain's influence as a mediating power. Despite his efforts and his special relationship claim based on the Geneva Conference role, he could not overcome the fundamental reality that both sides believed they could achieve military victory. The Kosygin episode illustrated how Britain's perceived alignment with America undermined any prospect of effective mediation, while simultaneously showing that Britain lacked sufficient leverage with Washington to influence American policy decisions at crucial moments.
Key Points to Remember:
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Wilson faced conflicting pressures: American expectations of support, domestic opposition to the war, and Labour Party divisions over foreign policy.
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Britain's role as Geneva Conference co-chair gave Wilson a framework for attempted mediation, but this position also prevented direct military support for America.
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Multiple peace initiatives failed between 1965 and 1967, including meetings in London and Moscow, a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' mission, and Harold Davies's visit to Hanoi.
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The February 1967 Kosygin negotiations came closest to success with the phase A/phase B plan, but Washington's changed instructions at the last moment undermined the agreement.
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Wilson successfully kept British troops out of Vietnam while maintaining financial support from America, though this balancing act strained both the Anglo-American relationship and Labour Party unity.
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The fundamental obstacle to Wilson's mediation was Britain's perceived alignment with America, which undermined credibility with North Vietnam and the USSR, combined with the fact that both sides believed they could achieve military victory.