World Affairs and Relations with Europe (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
World Affairs and Relations with Europe
Wilson's engagement with global diplomacy: the Vietnam peace initiative
During the mid-1960s, Wilson attempted to position Britain as a mediator in the Vietnam War, demonstrating his government's continued aspirations to play a role on the world stage. Wilson delivered a document to Soviet Premier Kosygin at a reception hosted by the Soviet embassy, and Kosygin received it positively before departing for Scotland the following day.
At Number 10, Wilson, Foreign Secretary George Brown, and the diplomat David Bruce believed they had achieved success. However, Washington then issued revised instructions that altered the nature of the diplomatic effort. The change centred on which party should initiate action: rather than the United States making the first move, North Vietnam was now expected to halt troop movements into South Vietnam before negotiations could begin.
Phase A and Phase B: These terms referred to different approaches to peace negotiations in Vietnam. Phase A involved the United States making the first move toward de-escalation, while Phase B required North Vietnam to halt troop movements before any American action. Washington's shift from Phase A to Phase B fundamentally undermined Wilson's diplomatic initiative.
Wilson had outlined different approaches to peace negotiations. The second approach (which may have been the third, according to Bruce) had brought the possibility of peace discussions closer. Wilson aimed to broker an agreement and establish a truce, but American intervention prevented this outcome.
Impact on Anglo-American relations
Wilson's frustration with Washington's handling of the initiative was evident. In his 1971 autobiography, he recalled:
"I was furious, I hope I can say icily so, though as the evening wore on the language in which I expressed myself was less and less parliamentary. The Americans who were with me in Downing Street were equally angry."
This quote reveals the depth of Wilson's anger at being undermined by Washington's policy reversal. His use of "less and less parliamentary" language suggests he was extremely frustrated by what he perceived as American deception.
Wilson suggested that the White House had allowed him to engage with Kosygin under false pretenses, though he acknowledged alternative explanations: Washington hawks may have orchestrated a takeover, or confusion within the American administration about their position had caused the confusion.
UK-US relations remained intact but cooled following this episode. The incident revealed both Wilson's determination to pursue independent diplomatic initiatives and the limitations Britain faced when American policy shifted unexpectedly.
Britain's second application to join the EEC
Economic and political context
Wilson's administration pursued membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) during the mid-1960s. Several factors drove this policy shift:
Economic pressures: Britain's economy struggled throughout the period, and the Commonwealth was not providing the trade and markets the country needed. EEC membership offered access to a large European trading zone that could benefit British economic performance.
Commonwealth difficulties: The Rhodesia crisis strained relations within the Commonwealth, diminishing the organization's value to Britain. Wilson, despite his earlier attachment to Commonwealth connections, recognized that Britain's future lay within a European community rather than in maintaining traditional imperial relationships.
Reduced domestic opposition: By late 1966, there was less resistance from both the Conservative right and Labour left compared to earlier debates about European integration. This created a more favorable political environment for an application.
The diplomatic campaign
Toward the end of 1966, George Brown attended a NATO ministerial meeting in Paris. To his surprise, he secured an audience with President Charles de Gaulle of France. Brown later described the meeting as friendly, though de Gaulle refused to support Britain's entry into the Common Market.
De Gaulle's "Two Roosters" Analogy
Brown recounted de Gaulle's position using a memorable analogy: de Gaulle suggested he faced the same challenge as someone attempting to manage two roosters in one farmyard with ten hens. He explained that he had experienced considerable difficulty persuading the five existing EEC members (the "hens") to follow France's lead, and he was unwilling to create further complications by admitting Britain (another "rooster").
This metaphor illustrated de Gaulle's view that France and Britain would compete for leadership within the EEC, destabilizing the organization.
Despite this unpromising encounter, Wilson and Brown toured all six member countries to build support for British membership. France proved the most difficult to persuade. Wilson returned from France having failed to change de Gaulle's position, though the other member states appeared more receptive after de Gaulle employed his diplomatic skills.
Parliamentary debate and approval
Wilson ensured full parliamentary debate on the EEC application. Without rushing his colleagues, he secured a statement date of 2 May 1967, announcing the government's intention to begin the application process.
The parliamentary debate extended over three days and concluded with a vote approving the application by 488 votes to 62. Wilson characterized this as a "centrepiece vote on a matter of public policy for almost a century," reflecting his view of the decision's historical importance.
One week after the vote, de Gaulle issued a statement outlining France's opposition to British membership. His reasoning encompassed several concerns:
De Gaulle's Key Objections to British Membership:
- British economic vulnerability: The pound faced increasing pressure, raising doubts about Britain's economic stability.
- Fear of institutional change: De Gaulle worried that the EEC would transform beyond recognition if Britain joined.
- Anglo-American relations: Britain's close relationship with the United States and the Commonwealth suggested divided loyalties.
De Gaulle elaborated that the EEC would disintegrate if other members attempted to impose UK membership on France. He also noted that London had demonstrated insufficient interest in the Common Market, implying that Britain's orientation remained toward the Commonwealth and America rather than Europe.
De Gaulle's veto
The final rejection came in November 1967, one week following the devaluation of sterling - a timing that emphasized Britain's economic difficulties. The British press termed this a "velvet veto", indicating its inevitability despite attempts to soften the blow.
Wilson had pursued the application despite recognizing the likely outcome. The initiative served multiple purposes: it allowed him to demonstrate to pro-European members of both parties that he had made a genuine attempt, while the predictable failure avoided splitting his cabinet and party over European integration. As one analysis suggested, Wilson prioritized maintaining cabinet unity and party management by proceeding with an application he knew would probably fail.
Significance and assessment
The failed EEC application illustrated Britain's uncertain international position during the 1960s. The country sought to maintain influence through both Atlantic and European relationships, yet found itself unable to secure entry to the European community. De Gaulle's opposition reflected genuine French concerns about Britain's economic health, political orientation, and potential to disrupt the existing EEC structure.
Wilson's Political Strategy
Wilson's handling of the application demonstrated his political pragmatism. Rather than avoiding the European question or forcing an internal confrontation within the Labour Party, he pursued an application that united his cabinet while knowing it faced French opposition. This approach preserved party unity while establishing Labour's pro-European credentials for future attempts.
The episode also confirmed the limitations of British diplomatic influence. Despite Wilson and Brown's efforts to build support among EEC members, France held effective veto power, and Britain's economic difficulties undermined its negotiating position. The timing of the veto, immediately following devaluation, underscored how economic weakness constrained Britain's foreign policy options.
Key Points to Remember:
- Wilson attempted to mediate in Vietnam by delivering a message to Kosygin, but Washington's change from Phase A to Phase B undermined the initiative and cooled UK-US relations.
- Britain's second EEC application (1967) was driven by economic difficulties, Commonwealth tensions over Rhodesia, and recognition that Britain's future lay in Europe rather than imperial connections.
- George Brown met de Gaulle, who used the "two roosters and ten hens" analogy to explain his opposition to British membership.
- Parliament approved the application by 488 to 62 on 2 May 1967, but de Gaulle vetoed British entry in November 1967, citing concerns about the British economy, UK-US relations, and potential EEC disruption.
- Wilson likely pursued the application knowing it would fail, using it to maintain party unity while demonstrating commitment to European integration for future attempts.