The Gulf of Tonkin Incident and The 1964 Election

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The Gulf of Tonkin Incident: Key Notes

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident was a significant event that took place in early August 1964 and played a crucial role in escalating U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. This incident involved alleged attacks by North Vietnamese forces on two U.S. Navy destroyers, the USS Maddox and the USS Turner Joy, in the Gulf of Tonkin, located off the coast of North Vietnam. The details of the incident and how it was reported and interpreted had far-reaching consequences for U.S. foreign policy and military engagement in Vietnam.

On August 2, 1964, the USS Maddox was conducting a signals intelligence patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin when it reported being attacked by three North Vietnamese torpedo boats. The Maddox fired back, and with the help of aircraft from the nearby carrier USS Ticonderoga, it managed to drive off the attacking boats. This initial engagement was followed by a second reported attack on August 4, involving both the Maddox and the Turner Joy. However, the details of the second attack were murky and later came into question. There was considerable confusion about whether this second attack actually occurred, as the radar and sonar readings were ambiguous and may have been false alarms.

President Lyndon B. Johnson's reaction to the Gulf of Tonkin Incident was swift and decisive. Johnson, who was already looking for a way to demonstrate U.S. resolve and support for South Vietnam, saw the incident as an opportunity to take a stronger stance against North Vietnam. On August 4, just hours after the reported second attack, Johnson went on national television to address the American public. He declared that North Vietnam had engaged in "open aggression on the high seas" and vowed to take all necessary measures to protect U.S. forces and interests in the region. Johnson's speech was designed to rally public and political support for a more aggressive policy in Vietnam.

Following Johnson's address, his administration quickly drafted the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which was presented to Congress on August 5, 1964. The resolution was deliberately broad, giving the president the authority to take "all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." Essentially, it provided Johnson with a blank check to use military force in Vietnam without a formal declaration of war. Congress overwhelmingly approved the resolution on August 7, with only two senators voting against it.

The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution had profound implications for U.S. involvement in Vietnam. It marked a significant escalation of the conflict, as it allowed Johnson to increase American military presence and operations in Vietnam without seeking additional approval from Congress. This newfound authority led to a dramatic increase in U.S. troop deployments and combat missions. By 1965, Johnson had authorised the deployment of combat troops, marking the official beginning of direct American involvement in the ground war in Vietnam.

Johnson used the Gulf of Tonkin Incident and the subsequent resolution as a means to justify and legitimise a major escalation of U.S. military efforts in Vietnam. He argued that strong action was necessary to stop the spread of communism in Southeast Asia and to protect American credibility and interests. This policy was rooted in the Domino Theory, which posited that the fall of South Vietnam to communism would lead to the spread of communism throughout the region.

As U.S. involvement in Vietnam deepened, Johnson faced increasing challenges and criticisms. The initial public and political support for the war effort began to wane as the conflict dragged on, and the number of American casualties rose. The credibility of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident itself came under scrutiny, with reports suggesting that the alleged second attack may never have happened. This led to questions about the legitimacy of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the broader U.S. strategy in Vietnam.

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What is the Modern Day View of the Incident? What can YOU use in Your essays?

Today, many people look back on President Lyndon B. Johnson and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident with a lot of criticism. Historians and experts believe that the incident was exaggerated or even possibly made up to justify sending more U.S. troops to Vietnam. (In 1963 there were 16,000 US troops in Vietnam, by 1965, there were nearly 185,000). Evidence has shown that the second reported attack on the USS Maddox and USS Turner Joy might not have happened at all. This leads many to think that the Johnson administration used this event to gain support from Congress and the public for the war.

Critics argue that Johnson used the Gulf of Tonkin Incident as a political move. By making North Vietnam look like the bad guys, Johnson was able to get the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed. This resolution gave him the power to use military force in Vietnam without officially declaring war. Many see this as an overreach of presidential power and a key moment when the government lost public trust. The lack of honesty and the resulting escalation of the Vietnam War, which caused many deaths, have damaged Johnson's legacy.

People today also focus on the consequences of this escalation. The Vietnam War became very unpopular in the United States, leading to widespread protests and deep divisions within society. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident is often mentioned as an example of how false information can lead to major political and military decisions with long-lasting effects.

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Johnson vs Goldwater - The 1964 Elections

During his 1964 campaign against Barry Goldwater, Johnson positioned himself as the more moderate candidate. Goldwater was known for his aggressive stance on communism and willingness to use nuclear weapons, which many Americans found alarming. To differentiate himself and appeal to voters who feared further military escalation, Johnson emphasised that he would not send American boys to fight in Vietnam, suggesting a more restrained approach.

"We are not about to send American boys nine or ten thousand miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves" - Lyndon B Johnson during his 1964 Presidential campaign

Many students will argue that Johnson stating the above quote and then going on to deploy even more troops, give the go-ahead for Operation Rolling Thunder, and continue military spending on Vietnam is a massive contradiction and a show of just how weak Johnson was as a leader. However, the truth is more complicated than that. There were a myriad of factors behind Johnson going back on his promise and escalating involvement. (Keep in mind as well that Johnson was inexperienced and often influenced by his advisors).

Gradual Escalation

After the election, Johnson faced increasing pressure to take decisive action in Vietnam. Despite his campaign rhetoric, the situation on the ground deteriorated. The South Vietnamese government was unstable and ineffective, and the Viet Cong were gaining strength. Advisors, including Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara, pushed for a more robust military response to prevent a communist takeover.

Johnson initially escalated involvement through increased bombing campaigns and the deployment of military advisors. However, as the situation worsened, he felt compelled to send combat troops. In March 1965, Johnson authorised the deployment of the first U.S. combat troops to Vietnam, marking a significant escalation.

Balancing Domestic and International Pressures

Johnson's decision to escalate involvement was also influenced by the need to maintain domestic and international credibility. Domestically, he wanted to avoid being seen as weak on communism, which could undermine his Great Society programs. Internationally, he sought to reassure allies and deter adversaries by showing that the U.S. was committed to containing communism.