El Alamein and the Significance of North Africa (HSC SSCE Modern History): Revision Notes

El Alamein and the Significance of North Africa

Hitler's Mediterranean strategy

After the fall of France in 1940, Hitler developed a strategy to pressure Britain from multiple directions. He hoped to create a firm alliance with Spain under Franco, Vichy France, and Italy. This coalition would then be able to apply pressure on British interests in the Mediterranean region.

However, Hitler's attempts to build this Mediterranean alliance failed. Franco proved extremely frustrating to deal with. Whilst Franco would agree to Hitler's proposals in principle, he would then raise numerous practical objections that prevented any real cooperation. Hitler later complained that negotiating with Franco was like "chewing rocks". Mussolini also proved surprisingly uncooperative, frequently springing surprises on his German partner.

Mussolini's Egyptian campaign and Italian failures

Despite the weak nature of the Axis alliance, Mussolini ultimately drew Hitler into the Mediterranean theatre. However, this was not to achieve German strategic objectives, but rather to rescue Mussolini's own failed ambitions in the region.

In 1940, Mussolini decided to take advantage of what he perceived as British weakness following the fall of France. Believing Britain was finished, he launched campaigns to conquer both Egypt and Greece. Mussolini showed great enthusiasm for the Egyptian campaign and tried to drum up domestic support for it. However, his military high command had serious reservations about going to war with Great Britain in 1940.

By the end of May 1941, Britain controlled virtually all of Italian East Africa and had reconquered French and British Somaliland.

Rommel and the Afrika Korps

The scale of the Italian disaster forced Hitler to intervene. In February 1941, he dispatched Erwin Rommel to save the situation. Hitler remained reluctant to commit significant resources to North Africa, as he saw the Mediterranean as a sideshow compared to his main focus on preparing for the invasion of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Italian collapse had to be brought under control.

Even before his troops were fully in place, Rommel launched an aggressive attack against the British. He forced them all the way back into Egypt and even captured the British General O'Connor. However, he was unable to dislodge British forces from Tobruk, whose port facilities he desperately needed for supplies. By late May 1941, the offensive had stalled, and a deadlock developed along the Egyptian frontier. There followed a pause in hostilities.

Strategic dilemma for Germany

The Mediterranean theatre presented a fundamental dilemma for German strategy. For Hitler, this region had always been intended as a sideshow. His main military preparations focused on the planned invasion of the Soviet Union. Hitler was simply not interested in North Africa or the Mediterranean, which reveals his limitations as a strategist. He never fully appreciated the strategic importance of the Middle East and remained very reluctant to seize the opportunities that presented themselves.

Logistical challenges

The logistical difficulties in North Africa were immense. Tripoli served as the only major Axis port in North Africa, yet it was located 1,300 miles from Alexandria in Egypt. This distance was more than twice that from the pre-war Polish border to Moscow. Moreover, Tripoli had limited capacity as a port and could not have supported a major military effort.

The fighting across North Africa took place in a very narrow coastal band rather than involving huge flanking movements. Supply problems so severely hampered both the Axis and Allied armies in 1940-41 that they essentially operated as expeditionary forces rather than as fully supported military campaigns.

The North African campaign 1941-1942

During 1941-42, the campaign in North Africa swung back and forth. The turning point would come through the British ability to resupply their forces in Egypt, which ultimately shifted the balance of power during 1942.

In May 1942, Rommel initiated a fresh offensive. Following the usual pattern of advance and retreat, German troops achieved a tremendous victory in late May when they captured Tobruk. This success inflicted terrible casualties on the British and resulted in:

• Capture of 35,000 British prisoners
• Seizure of vast quantities of fuel, food, and drinking water
• A major boost to German morale

The battles of El Alamein

El Alamein served as the gateway to Alexandria and therefore held crucial strategic importance. The battles fought here would prove to be turning points in the North African campaign.

First Battle of El Alamein (July 1942)

The First Battle of El Alamein took place in July 1942. The battle ended with British forces holding their ground but unable to push the Germans back. The familiar pattern returned, with supplies proving to be the decisive factor. The Germans simply could not sustain their offensive and lacked the resources to continue pushing forward.

At this critical point, supplies began pouring into Egypt to support British forces. American Sherman tanks arrived in large numbers, significantly strengthening British armoured capabilities.

British leadership changes

Following the embarrassments of the previous month, Churchill decided to shake up the military leadership in North Africa. In mid-August 1942, he made two crucial appointments:

Second Battle of El Alamein (October 1942)

Montgomery launched his attack with overwhelming force on 23 October 1942 in what became the Second Battle of El Alamein. This battle would mark a crucial turning point in the North African campaign and, more broadly, in the entire war.

Despite these advantages, the British suffered terrible casualties during the battle. They lost four times as many tanks as the Germans. However, Rommel could not afford to take even the losses he sustained. The difference in resources and capacity to replace losses proved decisive.

By November 1942, Rommel was in retreat. That retreat proved to be a masterpiece of military skill. Combined with Montgomery's characteristic caution, Rommel's tactical brilliance allowed German forces to escape back into Libya. The question now became whether the British would seize the initiative and drive the Germans completely out of North Africa.

Operation Torch

Rommel's position deteriorated further when Operation Torch was launched. This marked the first major Allied joint operation, bringing American forces into the North African theatre alongside the British.

The German response to Operation Torch was to pour troops into Tunisia in an attempt to hold the territory. The Allies, having successfully landed in November 1942, found themselves bogged down in Tunisia as German resistance stiffened.

By March 1943, Great Britain and the United States had assembled overwhelming strength and began the final push toward victory in North Africa. Rommel remained unable to secure adequate supplies. Hitler, who had refused to see the potential of the Afrika Korps throughout the campaign, attempted to reinforce it too late. Only after the Allies had already established a dominant position did Hitler try to reverse the situation, but by then it was futile.

Strategic significance of North Africa

The North African campaign held enormous strategic significance for the European war. Historian David Thomson explained that the victory in North Africa:

Churchill captured the significance of the El Alamein victory in his famous speech at the Mansion House on 10 November 1942. For the British people, who had endured years of defeats and setbacks, El Alamein represented their first permanent victory. Churchill declared:

The combination of the British victory at El Alamein and the success of Operation Torch meant that from late 1942 onwards, Germany would be on the defensive rather than advancing.

From the American perspective, the success of Operation Torch had one significant drawback. It meant there would not be a cross-channel invasion of Europe in 1942, and American commanders feared it would also prevent such an invasion in 1943. Resources committed to the Mediterranean theatre would not be available for the direct assault on German-occupied France that American strategists preferred.