The emergence of Communist dictatorship 1917–1941 (AQA A-Level History): Model Answers
Using your understanding of the historical context, assess how convincing the arguments in these three extracts are in relation to the development of the Soviet economy in the years 1921 to 1941.
[30 marks]
Extract A
The Russian economy was certainly in need of rescue in 1921, but by 1924 it had already begun to revive. From 1924, industrial reconstruction proved rapid and recovery was even more marked in agriculture. Further change from 1928 set new priorities and by 1932 the regime could boast some real achievements. Gross industrial production actually surpassed the targets set by the first five-year plan and the value of machinery more than quadrupled. These were impressive results and while the industrialisation drive continued unrelentingly, agriculture was also transformed as peasants were brought under administrative control and collectives established. The greatest economic spurt occurred during the three good years of 1934–36. Thereafter, investments were channelled into armaments, but although agriculture lagged behind, with a major crop failure in 1936, the Soviet economy was in a strong position on the eve of war. By 1941 the USSR had closed the gap with the West and Stalin's forced pace of industrialisation would undoubtedly contribute mightily to Soviet victory.
Adapted from GL Freeze, Russia: A History,1997
Extract B
After the failure of the NEP which had only managed to restore agricultural and industrial production to its 1913 level by 1928, the first three five-year plans increased industrial output considerably. This was because they brought many new resources, including the labour of former peasants, into the industrial system and used the powers of the state to direct those resources into a few chosen areas. All other aspects of the economy were downplayed or neglected: agriculture, housing, retail trade, services and consumer industries. This could not last: even industrial workers needed those neglected sectors of the economy, without which their work and lives suffered. Even some heavy industries – chemical and electric, for example, were relatively neglected with damaging cumulative effects. The problem was that the planned economy was not really 'planned' at all.
Construction projects were launched before anyone knew whether they could be completed, or if they would be needed when they were. Russia's seemingly impressive economic development of the 1930s was lop-sided and unsustainable.
Adapted from G Hosking, Russia and the Russians, 2001
Extract C
The NEP, permitting small-scale capitalism after 1921, proved successful and was popular with workers and peasants, but it was ideologically unsound. Capitalism had to be destroyed by a state-led industrialisation drive. However, this could only be achieved through high levels of economic coercion directed at the ordinary workers and farmers and it worked far better in theory than in practice. Coordinating planning and meeting targets could only be achieved by imposing harsh penalties. There are numerous examples of over-optimistic planning which created a constant tension between planners and producers. The pressure to meet targets meant that every failure was liable to be interpreted as an act of economic sabotage. What on paper appeared an effortless statistical picture of growth was, in practice, a constant cycle of crisis and undisguised militaristic coercion. By 1941 Stalin's Soviet Union had a record of extraordinary violence against the very men and women, in factories and fields, who struggled to put the economic plans into reality.
Adapted from R Overy, The Dictators: Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia, 2004
Level 5 Answer:
Within extract A, Freeze presents an overly-positive view on the soviet economy, despite acknowledging impressive achievement. Freeze's first argument centres around the introduction of Lenin's NEP, brought about to solve the crisis of war communism which he makes clear indication of in by stating it was 'in need of rescue in 1921'. Freeze makes the convincing statement that by '1924 it had already begun to revive' as the NEP indeed achieved initial restoration, cereal production increasing 23% from 1920 to 1923. However, Freeze's argument that 'industrial production proved rapid' and recovery was even marked in agriculture' appears less convincing considering the NEP was short-term in it its success – especially in agriculture – as, by 1927, grain production was 75% of 1926, agriculture was still extremely backwards (farms using wooden ploughs) and, whilst grain production had been at 12 million tonnes in 1013, under the NEP the figure barley surpassed 3 million. Freeze's next argument centres around the impressive industrial growth achieved under Stalin's Five-YearPlans beginning in 1928, and considering that electricity output had increased 300% and coal/iron output doubled during the first plan, Freeze's assertion that it 'could boast some real achievements' seams very convincing. However, once again, Freeze seams to ignore the failures; due to unrealistic high targets, none of the first five-year-plans targets were actually achieved, despite Freeze arguing 'gross industrial production' 'surpassed the targets'.
Moreover, he also glosses over the failures met with Stalin's process of collectivisation, only mentioning that 'agriculture lagged behind', which seems to not emphasise the fact that, by 1941, the USSR was still producing less grain that under the NEP. Finally Freeze returns to a more convincing argument that the 'Soviet economy was in a strong position on the eve of war' as industrialisation (which had increased three-fold by 1941) had indeed strengthened the economy whilst the 3rd FYP laid the foundations for war. Whilst the USSR did indeed 'close the gap with the west' as it overtook Britain in iron and steel production by 1946, the economy still faced issues of uneven industrial development and a continued focus on quantity over quality. Overall, Freeze's argument to emphasises the real economic achievement but fails to acknowledge the negatives.
Hosking, in extract B, provides a generally convincing, yet perhaps overly negative picture of the economy. Hosking begins by addressing the 'future of the NEP', which indeed was not managing to secure the economy in the long-term despite its revitalisation after the civil war. Hosking's argument continues to acknowledge the considerable 'increased industrial output' of Stalin's five-year-plans, which is convincing knowing that industrial production had increased three-fold by 1941, yet also notes how these plans were used to direct resources into a 'few chosen areas', which holds value knowing that Stalin's aim was always to develop heavy industry in order to 'catch up' with the USA. Hosking's continues to point out the 'neglected' areas of consumer goods and housing which never received attention despite the promise of the second five-year-plan to double the output of lighter industries including consumer items. However, housing perhaps depicts the plans too negatively in his discussion of the neglect of 'chemical and electric' industries, as production nonetheless doubles during the second five-year-plan of 1933-37. Moreover, mentions of 'construction projects' also take on a negative association for Hosking considering that many, like Magnitogorsk that funded the largest blast furnace in the world, led to great Soviet success. Overall, Hosking's general argument that 'Russia's seemingly impressive' growth was 'lop-sided and unsustainable' is generally convincing, definitely for the fasted process of collectivisation, yet it also presents the achievements as less than they really were.
Within extract C, Overy's argument is partially convincing yet is also arguably overly-negative, focusing on how the soviet economy negatively effected the people such as workers and peasants. Overy's opening discussion on the NEP proving 'successful' and 'popular with workers and peasants' seems very unconvincing considering that, whilst the NEP may have revived the economy in the short term, it was a constant source of trouble for ordinary people – excluding the Kulaks and the NEP men who thrived off the private enterprise. Various 'scissors crisis' (as termed by Troskey) occurred during the NEP as prices of goods rose from the cities, causing peasants to hold back their grain whilst they waited for grain prices to rise.
The workers, too were dissatisfied; unemployment was on a high, despite working better working conditions, and they resented being led by single managers in factories. However, Overy does note the NEP as 'ideologically unsound', which is convincing considering Lenin was facing opposition from within the party, many viewing the return of private trade a betrayal of socialism. Overy continues with the assertion that 'capitalism had to be destroyed', which was indeed the principle Stalin led with when he aimed to introduce his new centralised command economy – what he donned the 'Great Break' from the past – at the 15th Party congress in 1927. Overy's following argument focuses on the 'economic coercion' of 'ordinary workers and farmers' which seems partially valid; during Stalin's process of collectivisation there were incentives given to peasants such as tax breaks and better quality land if they followed the system, however many of the peasants were also forced by violent methods such as shock brigades, something which Overy only points out near the end of their argument. Overy neglects to mention that propaganda alongside 'economic' coercion also played a key role in getting workers on board. For instance, Alexey Stakhanov – who repordely mined 14x his quota in 1935 – was hailed as the model proletariat and used in various campaigns to promote industrialisation. Many workers responded to this propaganda, making Overy's argument that it worked 'better in theory' seem too dismisive. Where Overy's argument does seem convincing is in Narodniks, where many peasants revolted via arson and killing their livestock (which halved from 1928-32). Overy's discussion of 'harsh penalties' seems convincing as failures to meet the targets of the five-year-plan would often lead to arrest or worse, and many over-exaggerated figures to prevent this, indeed causing a 'cycle of crisis' as Overly puts it considering the famine in Ukraine (1932) caused around 5.7 million deaths due to over enthusiastic reporting.
Overall, Overy's arguments about the soviet unions 'extraordinary violence' in 'factories and fields' has value, especially mass agriculture, but also presents worker response and industrial success as overly negative.
This is a Level 5 response
This script shows an understanding of the overall interpretation of each of the sources. The answer is well-focused and presents a balanced assessment of the extracts, using good contextual knowledge. The script also deploys material across the time frame of the question, with reference to both the 1920s and the 1930s. The precision of the evaluation of Extract A is evident in the assessment of the impact of the NEP to 1927, as well as the balanced assessment of the impact of the Five Year Plans. The focus on the issue of the development of the Soviet economy is maintained throughout. Good contextual knowledge is evident in the challenge made to Extract C, using Stakhanov and worker enthusiasm. The sustained focus and balance of the answer shows good understanding of the extracts and a secure historical context.
Mark scheme
L5: 25–30 marks
Shows a very good understanding of the interpretations put forwards in all three extracts and combines this with a strong awareness of the historical context to analyse and evaluate the interpretations given in the extracts. Evaluation of the arguments will be well-supported and convincing. The response demonstrates a very good understanding of context.
L4: 19-24 marks
Shows a good understanding of the interpretations given in all three extracts and combines this with knowledge of the historical context to analyse and evaluate the interpretations given in the extracts. The evaluation of the arguments will be mostly well-supported, and convincing, but may have minor limitations of depth and breadth. The response demonstrates a good understanding of context.
L3: 13-18 marks
Provides some supported comment on the interpretations given in all three extracts and comments on the strength of these arguments in relation to their historical context. There is some analysis and evaluation but there may be an imbalance in the degree and depth of comments offered on the strength of the arguments. The response demonstrates an understanding of context. 13–18
L2: 7-12 marks
Provides some accurate comment on the interpretations given in at least two of the extracts, with reference to the historical context. The answer may contain some analysis, but there is little, if any, evaluation. Some of the comments on the strength of the arguments may contain some generalisation, inaccuracy or irrelevance. The response demonstrates some understanding of context.
L1: 1-6 marks
Either shows an accurate understanding of the interpretation given in one extract only or addresses two/three extracts, but in a generalist way, showing limited accurate understanding of the arguments they contain, although there may be some general awareness of the historical context. Any comments on the strength of the arguments are likely to be generalist and contain some inaccuracy and/or irrelevance. The response demonstrates limited understanding of context.