Indian Independence (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
Indian independence
Context: the decision to withdraw
By 1945, Britain faced a turning point regarding India. Churchill believed that retaining India remained essential for both economic and military reasons. However, Attlee's government took a different view. The new Labour administration recognised that the financial burden of maintaining the Raj had become unsustainable. The costs of controlling India, combined with Britain's desperate need for American financial assistance after the war, made withdrawal increasingly necessary. Attlee himself committed to granting Indian independence, though he hoped this could occur swiftly and before international opinion, particularly from the United States, turned against Britain for attempting to maintain its imperial grip.
The contrast between Churchill's and Attlee's views on India reflected a fundamental shift in British policy. While Churchill remained wedded to traditional imperial thinking, Attlee's pragmatic approach recognised that Britain's post-war economic crisis made the cost of empire unsustainable.
The situation in 1945-6
Attlee's vision
Attlee envisaged an independent India that would choose to remain within the Commonwealth. His hope centred on India maintaining voluntary ties with Britain, seeking guidance and leadership freely rather than through compulsion. This approach offered Britain potential advantages: the burden of stationing large numbers of troops in India would end, yet Britain might still rely on the Indian army to protect British interests elsewhere in Asia. However, achieving this outcome proved far more difficult than Attlee anticipated.
Deepening political divisions
Two major obstacles blocked the path to a united, independent India:
Congress Party - the predominantly Hindu nationalist party - had no interest in pledging friendship with Britain through Commonwealth membership. Instead, Congress leaders spoke openly about launching a mass insurrection to expel Britain 'lock, stock and barrel'. Congress won most non-Muslim seats in the 1945-6 elections and controlled eight provinces.
Muslim League - the political organisation representing Muslim interests - had strengthened enormously during the war years. Relations between Congress and the Muslim League deteriorated sharply, with worsening tensions offering little prospect of achieving a united India. Rising prices and delays in demobilisation after the war aggravated existing unrest, which intensified during the 1945-6 national and provincial elections. The Muslim League won the vast majority of Muslim seats in the Legislative Assembly.
Electoral Results 1945-6
The election results clearly demonstrated the deep political divide:
- Congress Party: Won most non-Muslim seats and controlled eight provinces
- Muslim League: Won the vast majority of Muslim seats in the Legislative Assembly
These results made the prospect of a unified independent India increasingly unlikely.
Muslim League leaders argued that continuing British rule would be preferable to falling under a Congress monopoly of power. This stance reflected deep communal mistrust between Hindus and Muslims.
Britain's declining hold on India
By 1946, Britain's ability to maintain control had weakened dramatically. British military presence had declined to just 64,000 servicemen compared with 389,000 Indian soldiers. More Indian officials replaced Europeans in the administration, leaving only 500 British civil servants and 500 police officers.
Both Muslims and Hindus formed opposing armed bands, and communal hatred made the situation increasingly dangerous. Viceroy Lord Wavell warned that the Indian government might prove unable to suppress a major insurrection.
Britain faced the real prospect of civil war between India's 255 million Hindus and 92 million Muslims, a conflict Britain lacked the resources to prevent or contain. The dramatically reduced British presence meant that Britain simply could not maintain order if large-scale violence erupted.
Discussions, 1946-7
Early attempts at negotiation
Attlee wanted Indians to devise their own solution to independence rather than having Britain impose terms. In 1945, Wavell convened a conference bringing together India's main politicians, but Congress and Muslim League leaders failed to reach agreement.
In March 1946, the government dispatched a Cabinet mission to India. This mission rapidly concluded that Indians were unlikely to reach agreement without British involvement and assistance.
The Cabinet mission plan (May 1946)
The British mission produced its own plan in May 1946. This proposal envisaged:
- Indian provinces forming themselves into groups
- Muslim provinces clustering together into a form of Pakistan, though without full sovereignty
- An all-India federal government controlling foreign policy, defence and communications
- Provincial governments managing all other matters
For a period, this scheme appeared potentially acceptable to both Congress and the Muslim League.
The Cabinet mission plan represented a compromise solution that attempted to balance Muslim demands for autonomy with Congress's desire for a strong central government. The plan's temporary acceptance by both parties suggested that agreement might still be possible.
Breakdown and violence (July-August 1946)
In July, Nehru rejected the scheme on the grounds that it would deprive India of a strong central authority. The Muslim League also withdrew its support and called for 'direct action' to establish a united Pakistan.
Direct Action Day (16 August 1946) triggered a wave of serious violence. Muslim mobs had already attacked in Punjab, where security forces did little to protect panic-stricken Hindus. Jinnah's call for direct action increased Hindu casualties substantially. Hindus and Sikhs retaliated, and inter-communal massacres spread across northern India. Thousands died in Calcutta alone.
The Collapse of Negotiations
The rejection of the Cabinet mission plan and the subsequent Direct Action Day marked a critical turning point. The violence demonstrated that:
- Political negotiations had reached a deadlock
- Communal tensions had escalated to the point of mass violence
- Britain's ability to maintain order was severely limited
- A unified independent India was becoming increasingly impossible
Final British decisions (December 1946-February 1947)
When Wavell returned to Britain in December 1946, he warned the Cabinet that civil war between Hindus and Muslims could erupt at any moment. He stated that Britain could not maintain control beyond March 1948, and possibly not even until then. Wavell suggested that Britain might need to declare its intention to remain in India for fifteen more years and reinforce the army with four or five additional divisions. Given Labour's commitments and Britain's economic crisis, this approach was politically impossible.
Britain's deteriorating economic position in 1946-7 forced Attlee's government to accelerate the pace. Attlee favoured announcing that Britain would transfer power in India no later than June 1948. Strong opposition came from Wavell, who believed withdrawal should follow the model of a military evacuation from hostile territory. The Cabinet, however, felt certain that orderly transfer of power remained possible and that such a policy would prove more acceptable to both India and Britain.
Confident that power could be transferred in an orderly fashion, Attlee took two decisive steps in February 1947:
- He announced that Britain would leave India no later than June 1948
- He replaced Wavell as viceroy with Lord Mountbatten, the former supreme Allied commander in South-East Asia during the war (1943-5)
Attlee's choice of Mountbatten reflected his desire for an orderly transfer of power. As a successful military commander with recent experience in Asia, Mountbatten brought both prestige and practical knowledge to the role. His appointment signalled that Britain intended to manage the transition actively rather than simply abandoning India.
Key figure: Lord Mountbatten of Burma (1900-79)
Lord Mountbatten served as the last British Viceroy of India and oversaw the transfer of power in 1947. Born as the son of Prince Louis of Battenberg and Princess Victoria of Hesse-Darmstadt (Queen Victoria's granddaughter), he entered the Royal Navy in 1913. During the Second World War, he became supreme Allied commander in South-East Asia (1943-5), retaking Burma from the Japanese. As viceroy in India in 1947, he presided over the transfer of power to India and Pakistan. He later died in Ireland, killed by an IRA bomb.
Remember!
Key Points to Remember:
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Attlee's government committed to Indian independence due to economic pressures and the mounting costs of maintaining the Raj, despite Churchill's 1945 belief that Britain should retain India
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The 1945-6 elections demonstrated deep political divisions: the Muslim League won most Muslim seats while Congress dominated non-Muslim constituencies, making a united India increasingly unlikely
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Britain's military and administrative presence in India had declined sharply by 1946 (only 64,000 British servicemen versus 389,000 Indian soldiers), severely limiting Britain's ability to maintain control
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The May 1946 Cabinet mission plan temporarily appeared acceptable to both Congress and the Muslim League, but collapsed in July when Nehru rejected it, leading to Direct Action Day and widespread communal violence in August 1946
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In February 1947, Attlee announced Britain would leave India by June 1948 and appointed Lord Mountbatten as viceroy to oversee the transfer of power in an orderly manner