The End of the Raj (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
The End of the Raj
Mountbatten and the decision for partition
Lord Louis Mountbatten arrived in India in March 1947 as the new Viceroy with authority to make decisions on the spot. Historian Piers Brendon (2007) characterised Mountbatten as possessing contradictory qualities: reckless, flamboyant, egotistical and vain, yet also possessing the dynamism and flair to extract what he could for Britain in the circumstances of 1947. Despite initial hopes that a settlement preserving Indian unity might be achieved, Mountbatten rapidly concluded that partition (the division of British India into two separate states) represented the only means of preventing civil war.
Mountbatten's establishment of close relations with key Indian leaders proved crucial to the partition process. His rapport with Jawaharlal Nehru, though possibly facilitated by his wife's intimate relations with the Congress leader, enabled him to secure the reluctant consent necessary for partition to proceed.
Mountbatten established a close rapport with Jawaharlal Nehru, though some historians attribute this achievement more to Mountbatten's wife, who developed intimate relations with the Congress leader. Nehru gave his reluctant consent to partition. In June 1947, both Congress and Muslim League leaders approved Mountbatten's plan. Believing further delay would be disastrous, Mountbatten pressed ahead, abandoning any prospect of an Anglo-Indian defence treaty in the process. By mid-August 1947, the plan had been pushed through.
The partition plan of 1947
The partition plan contained several provisions and ambiguities:
Two Dominions: India and Pakistan would become separate Dominions (self-governing territories within the British Commonwealth).
Provincial choice: Each Indian province could choose which Dominion to join.
The princely states problem: Nothing was specified about how the 565 princely states (semi-autonomous territories ruled by Indian monarchs under British paramountcy) would be integrated into the two new Dominions.
Border uncertainties: The frontiers in border areas remained unclear. Partition would inevitably leave large religious minorities within both India and Pakistan.
The partition plan's most significant weakness lay in its treatment of the princely states and border areas. The lack of clarity about how 565 princely states would be integrated, combined with uncertain frontiers, guaranteed future conflicts and left millions of people as religious minorities in territories dominated by another faith.
Mountbatten displayed his powers of persuasion in cajoling the princely states to accede to one country or the other. However, he failed in Hyderabad, which India seized in 1948, and Kashmir, where the Hindu ruler eventually took his largely Muslim subjects into India, creating a source of lasting conflict.
Implementation and independence
The Indian Independence Bill passed through Parliament and received royal assent on 15 August 1947. The Raj was over. Control of India and Pakistan passed out of British hands. The Labour government hailed the emancipation of one-fifth of the world's population, emphasising the continuity and amity of relations with both new states. The government claimed that everything had proceeded according to plan and that nothing resembled the leaving of the Raj.
The consequences of partition
The human cost of partition proved catastrophic. Britain's rushed withdrawal contributed to inter-communal violence on a massive scale. Approximately one million people died in ethnic cleansing, whilst 13 million became refugees. Thousands of villages were reduced to ashes. The new borders left tens of millions of people as religious minorities in territories dominated by another faith, precipitating mass population movements.
The Humanitarian Crisis of Partition
The scale of violence and displacement following partition represented one of the largest forced migrations in human history:
- Approximately 1 million deaths from ethnic cleansing
- 13 million people became refugees
- Thousands of villages destroyed
- Entire religious communities forcibly displaced across new borders
A Punjabi magistrate's observation captured the bitter irony: "You British believe in fair play. You have left India in the same condition of chaos as you found it."
Historiographical debate: success or failure?
The case for British success
Most historians, echoing contemporary opinion, argue that Britain faced little choice but to quit India, and many commend the speed of withdrawal. The alternative would have imposed an intolerable burden on Britain: the possibility of civil war and the endangering of Britain's relationship with the USA and the Muslim world. Given the depth of Hindu-Muslim antagonism, there existed no alternative to partition. The fact that India and Pakistan remained within the Commonwealth served as a symbol of British success.
Arguments for Success
Supporters of Attlee's policy emphasise the pragmatic necessity of rapid withdrawal. They argue that:
- Britain had no realistic alternative given the depth of communal tensions
- Delay would have risked full-scale civil war
- Maintaining control would have damaged Britain's international relationships
- Both new nations remaining in the Commonwealth demonstrated successful decolonisation
The case for failure
However, critics of Attlee's policy present a compelling counter-argument. Attlee can be accused of leaving India with minimal honour. Britain's precipitate withdrawal contributed directly to the appalling inter-communal violence. From Britain's perspective, Attlee achieved none of his initial aims. India was divided; Britain secured no defence agreement with India or Pakistan. Britain had hoped that partnership would succeed trusteeship and that commercial cooperation would continue. None of this materialised. Partition alienated both Pakistan and India from Britain and entrenched enmity between the two new states.
Arguments for Failure
Critics highlight that the rushed withdrawal:
- Left India in chaos with minimal British honour
- Directly contributed to mass violence and displacement
- Failed to achieve any of Britain's strategic objectives
- Resulted in no defence agreements with either new nation
- Destroyed hopes for continued commercial cooperation
- Created lasting enmity between India and Pakistan
Burma
With the loss of India, Britain possessed little further strategic interest in Burma. Much of Burma had been occupied by Japan during the Second World War, and an embarrassing number of Burmese had collaborated with the Japanese. British rule had always been resented in Burma. Even positive British efforts, such as railway building, public health work and agricultural improvements, gained little favour.
Britain spent very little on Burma. The capital, Rangoon, had only one public library, which spent £10 per year on books. Attlee, appreciating the prohibitive cost of maintaining Burma under imperial control without Indian troops, concluded that accommodation with the strong Burmese nationalist movement was necessary. Thus, by January 1948, Burma had been granted independence. It opted to leave the Commonwealth.
Burma's path to independence differed significantly from Ceylon's. The combination of wartime Japanese occupation, widespread Burmese collaboration with Japan, and deep-seated resentment of British rule meant that Burma had no interest in maintaining Commonwealth ties after independence.
Ceylon
The Ceylonese pursued independence through cooperation rather than violent resistance, achieving some success. In 1931, a Commission led by Lord Donoughmore recommended a constitution whereby the governor would rule with the aid of a Ceylonese-dominated State Council. This council was elected by universal suffrage (voting rights for all adults), making Ceylon the first Asian colonial nation to obtain such a franchise. In 1942, ministers became, in effect, part of the governor's Cabinet.
Following the war, Britain introduced full internal self-government. Ceylon gained independence in February 1948. The country (which later changed its name to Sri Lanka) remained within the Commonwealth and agreed to a defence treaty with Britain.
Ceylon's Peaceful Path
Ceylon's approach to independence demonstrated that cooperation could succeed where conflict might have failed. Key milestones included:
- 1931: Donoughmore Commission established universal suffrage, making Ceylon the first Asian colony with such rights
- 1942: Ministers integrated into governor's Cabinet
- 1948: Full independence achieved whilst maintaining Commonwealth membership and defence ties with Britain
This contrasted sharply with the violent partition of India and Burma's complete break from the Commonwealth.
Remember!
Key Points to Remember:
- Mountbatten arrived in March 1947 and rapidly concluded that partition was necessary to prevent civil war, securing Nehru's reluctant consent by June 1947.
- The partition plan created two Dominions (India and Pakistan) but left the status of 565 princely states and border areas unclear, guaranteeing future conflict.
- Partition resulted in catastrophic violence: approximately one million deaths, 13 million refugees, and widespread ethnic cleansing between August 1947 and 1948.
- Historians debate whether rapid withdrawal represented success (avoiding civil war, maintaining Commonwealth ties) or failure (leaving chaos, achieving no British aims, abandoning India dishonourably).
- Burma gained independence in January 1948 and left the Commonwealth, whilst Ceylon gained independence in February 1948 and remained within it as Sri Lanka.