The Suez Crisis (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
The Suez Crisis
Background to the crisis
By mid-October 1956, Britain faced a deteriorating position in Egypt following Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal. Prime Minister Anthony Eden, who had replaced Churchill in 1955, determined to take action against what he viewed as a direct threat to British interests in the Middle East. The canal represented both a strategic asset and a symbol of British imperial power, with two-thirds of Europe's oil passing through it.
The Suez Canal's strategic importance cannot be overstated. Its control over Europe's oil supply made it a vital economic lifeline for Britain and Western Europe. The canal also represented one of the last tangible symbols of Britain's imperial reach in the Middle East, making its loss particularly significant from both practical and psychological perspectives.
The Sèvres plan
In mid-October, Britain agreed to a secret plan with France and Israel, known as the Sèvres plan. Under this arrangement, Israel would attack Egypt across the Sinai Peninsula, providing Britain and France with a pretext to occupy the Suez Canal under the guise of separating the combatants and protecting the waterway.
The plan contained several obvious flaws that should have been apparent to Eden and his advisers:
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The notion that collusion between Britain, France and Israel could remain secret was extraordinarily naïve. Such a conspiracy involving three governments was bound to be exposed.
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Britain's Arab allies in the region, including Iraq and Jordan, would inevitably view an attack coordinated with Israel as a betrayal. This would undermine Britain's carefully constructed network of pro-British regimes.
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The USA remained firmly opposed to military intervention. This posed a serious threat because the Treasury had warned Eden that sterling was too fragile for Britain to act without American financial backing. The pound's international position depended on US support.
Critical Flaws in the Sèvres Plan
Despite clear warnings from multiple sources, Eden proceeded with a plan that had fundamental weaknesses:
- Impossible secrecy: A three-nation conspiracy could not be kept hidden
- Alienation of allies: Arab nations would view cooperation with Israel as betrayal
- US opposition: America's financial power meant Britain could not act independently
These flaws would prove decisive in the operation's failure.
Despite these warnings, Eden pressed ahead with the operation.
The invasion of Egypt
On 29 October, Israeli forces invaded Sinai and quickly overran Egyptian positions. The following day, Britain and France issued an ultimatum demanding that both Israel and Egypt cease fighting and withdraw to positions ten miles from the Suez Canal. Egypt was additionally required to permit Anglo-French forces to occupy positions along the canal. Both sides were given twelve hours to comply, after which Britain and France would intervene militarily.
Israel naturally agreed to the ultimatum, as anticipated. Egypt, as expected, refused. Nasser responded by blocking the Suez Canal, the exact outcome Eden had claimed to want to prevent.
On 31 October, the Royal Air Force bombed Egyptian airfields. The Anglo-French invasion force, which had assembled at Malta, set sail towards Egypt on 1 November, though it would not arrive until 6 November. On 5 November, Anglo-French paratroopers landed in Egypt.
Timeline of Military Operations
The invasion unfolded rapidly over just one week:
- 29 October: Israeli forces invade Sinai
- 30 October: Britain and France issue ultimatum (12-hour deadline)
- 31 October: RAF bombing of Egyptian airfields begins
- 1 November: Invasion force departs Malta
- 5 November: Paratroopers land in Egypt
- 6 November: Main invasion force arrives
Despite this swift military action, political pressure would force an equally rapid withdrawal.
From a purely military perspective, the operation succeeded. Involving 45,000 British troops, the invasion force occupied twenty miles of the canal, and casualties remained light.
International opposition and financial pressure
The political response, however, proved catastrophic for Britain. Within Britain itself, opinion divided sharply. Most Conservative MPs and the majority of the public (according to opinion polling) supported Eden's action. Labour MPs condemned the invasion, as did the USSR.
Eisenhower's condemnation carried far greater weight. The American president felt genuine anger at Eden's deception. He had consistently opposed the use of force and resented being misled by his closest ally. In the United Nations, most countries, including several Commonwealth members, similarly criticised the Anglo-French action. An American resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire passed by 64 votes to five (Britain, France, Israel, Australia and New Zealand). Only by exercising its veto power on the Security Council could Britain block UN demands for an immediate ceasefire.
The UN vote revealed Britain's diplomatic isolation. With only four other nations supporting its position out of 69 voting members, Britain found itself opposed not only by its Cold War adversaries but also by many Commonwealth nations and traditional allies. This unprecedented isolation demonstrated how far British influence had declined.
On 5 November, the USSR issued threats that it might launch missile attacks on London and Paris if the invasion proceeded. Eden's government dismissed these warnings as bluffing. The real pressure came from Washington. In early November, US financial measures triggered a run on the pound and a rapid drain on Britain's gold and dollar reserves. The USA made clear it would offer no financial support until Britain withdrew completely from Egypt.
The Decisive Role of American Financial Pressure
While Soviet threats received attention, the truly devastating blow came from American economic measures. The US government's refusal to support sterling triggered:
- A run on the pound
- Rapid depletion of Britain's gold and dollar reserves
- The threat of devaluation and economic collapse
This financial pressure proved far more effective than any military threat in forcing Britain's withdrawal. It exposed Britain's fundamental dependence on American economic support for maintaining its international position.
The collapse of the Suez operation
On 6 November, Anglo-French forces landed in Egypt. Military success appeared within reach. However, Egypt and Israel, under intense American pressure, agreed to a ceasefire, removing all justification for the invasion.
Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold Macmillan, who had initially supported the operation, now warned Eden that Britain faced financial ruin if the USA implemented its threats. The pound's vulnerability meant Britain could not sustain its position without American backing. Macmillan convinced Eden that continuation of the Suez operation would lead to sterling's devaluation and the destruction of Britain's international financial position. Eden decided to sacrifice Britain's Middle Eastern policy to preserve sterling's value.
Eden announced Britain would support a Canadian proposal for a United Nations Emergency Force to garrison the canal and ordered a ceasefire. France had little choice but to follow Britain's lead.
Eisenhower insisted on complete Anglo-French withdrawal before the USA would offer any financial assistance. American pressure proved so effective precisely because Britain had determined not to devalue the pound. On 28-29 November, Macmillan persuaded a demoralised Cabinet (with Eden now absent through illness) that Britain must withdraw unconditionally from Egypt.
The Suez failure and Eden's resignation
Eden, whose health had deteriorated throughout the crisis, resigned in January 1957. Given the Suez debacle, his resignation appeared inevitable. Most contemporaries, and most historians since, have viewed Suez as an unqualified disaster.
Michael Foot, a Labour MP at the time, wrote in 1975: "Instead of opening the Canal, it was blocked; instead of saving British lives and property, they had been put at Nasser's mercy; instead of toppling Nasser, he was enthroned; instead of keeping the oil flowing, it was soon to be rationed; instead of winning friends, we had lost them... the expedition had achieved the exact opposite of the government's declared intention."
The Complete Failure of British Objectives
Michael Foot's 1975 assessment systematically demonstrated how every stated objective of the Suez operation was reversed:
Stated Objective → Actual Outcome
- Open the Canal → Canal blocked
- Protect British lives and property → Put at Nasser's mercy
- Topple Nasser → Nasser enthroned as Arab nationalist hero
- Keep oil flowing → Oil rationed
- Win friends → Lost allies and international prestige
This comprehensive failure illustrates how badly Eden misjudged both the military operation's consequences and international reaction.
These charges remain difficult to refute. Eden had overestimated Britain's power and fatally misjudged America's reaction to military action. As a result, he achieved none of his objectives. Nasser emerged from the crisis as the pre-eminent leader of Arab nationalism, while Britain's prestige suffered serious damage.
Questions of responsibility have generated debate. Eden's ill-health throughout the crisis may have impaired his judgement. Some historians have attempted to shift blame more widely. Macmillan, who strongly supported the operation initially but then lost confidence, appears to deserve some criticism. However, few British politicians anticipated the intensity of American reaction. The US government attracted blame from many Conservatives for abandoning its closest ally. Yet the notion of "American perfidy" distorts the record. Eisenhower had consistently opposed the use of force. Ultimately, the fatal errors were British, and most of them were Eden's.
The question of responsibility extends beyond Eden alone. Harold Macmillan's role remains particularly controversial—he enthusiastically supported the operation initially, providing crucial Cabinet backing, but then reversed position when financial disaster loomed. This reversal, while pragmatic, raises questions about his judgement. However, the fundamental miscalculation about American reactions must ultimately rest with Eden as Prime Minister.
The consequences of Suez
Historians have debated whether Suez represented a watershed moment or merely exposed trends already underway. The crisis can be interpreted as separating the years when Britain's survival as a world power seemed possible from the years that witnessed the rapid end of Empire and the scaling down of Britain's global role.
Immediate consequences
The cost of Suez to British standing in the Middle East proved substantial. Pro-British regimes in the region suffered embarrassment and weakening. Jordan felt compelled to denounce its treaty with Britain. British influence in Iraq faded, and in 1958 a government similar to Egypt's came to power there. Britain's international prestige suffered a severe blow. The Suez venture demonstrated that Britain was no longer a major world power unless it acted in concert with the USA.
The Exposure of British Dependence
Suez's most significant revelation was Britain's complete dependence on American support. The crisis demonstrated that:
- Britain could not sustain major military operations without US financial backing
- Sterling's vulnerability gave Washington veto power over British foreign policy
- Britain's great power status existed only with American permission
This dependency would shape all subsequent British foreign policy decisions.
The Commonwealth had shown itself less susceptible to British guidance than many had imagined. For Egyptian leader Nasser, successfully defying Britain and "twisting the lion's tail" delivered a hard blow to British self-esteem. His success encouraged Arab nationalists and anti-colonial nationalists throughout the developing world.
Alternative interpretations
Other historians have characterised Suez as little more than a melodramatic episode that merely exposed underlying trends in Britain's declining power. Evidence for this interpretation includes:
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Eden's departure had relatively little impact on British politics. The Conservative Party won the 1959 election.
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Relations with the USA were quickly restored. Eisenhower (and later President Kennedy) remained anxious to employ Britain in the struggle against the USSR. This meant maintaining Britain's Middle Eastern position. With American assistance, Britain continued to dominate several sheikhdoms on the fringe of the Arabian peninsula.
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Many Britons had begun questioning the nature of Britain's world role before Suez occurred. Viewing accelerated colonial withdrawal after 1957 as a direct consequence of the 1956 humiliation oversimplifies the situation. Suez arguably did not trigger an imperial collapse but merely gave momentum to movements already in motion.
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Britain continued to aspire to great power status after 1956. It possessed nuclear weapons, and the Commonwealth remained a global organisation, albeit one without real authority.
The Continuity Argument
Historians emphasising continuity over change point to several factors:
Political continuity: The Conservative Party remained in power and even won the 1959 election, suggesting Suez did not fundamentally alter British politics.
Restored relations: Anglo-American relations recovered quickly, with the US continuing to rely on Britain in the Cold War context.
Pre-existing decline: Britain's imperial decline predated Suez. Colonial independence movements were already gaining momentum, and Britain's economic weakness was apparent before 1956.
Continued aspirations: Britain retained nuclear weapons and continued to view itself as a major power, suggesting Suez did not immediately transform British self-perception.
Assessment
The debate reflects genuine uncertainty about Suez's long-term impact. What remains clear is that the crisis exposed Britain's dependence on American support, damaged British prestige in the Middle East and internationally, and encouraged nationalist movements challenging British imperial authority. Whether Suez caused Britain's imperial decline or simply revealed its extent remains contested, but the crisis undeniably marked a moment when Britain's limitations as a world power became apparent to both international observers and the British public.
Key Points to Remember:
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The Sèvres plan involved secret collusion between Britain, France and Israel to invade Egypt, despite obvious flaws including the impossibility of maintaining secrecy, alienation of Arab allies, and US opposition.
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The military operation succeeded, but political opposition from the USA and UN, combined with devastating financial pressure on sterling, forced Britain to withdraw unconditionally by late November 1956.
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American financial pressure proved decisive because Britain prioritised defending sterling's value over maintaining its Middle Eastern position; the USA refused support until complete withdrawal occurred.
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Eden resigned in January 1957; historians debate whether blame rests primarily with Eden for misjudging American reactions, or should be shared with Macmillan and others who supported then abandoned the operation.
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Suez's consequences remain debated: some historians view it as a watershed marking Britain's decline as a world power, while others argue it merely exposed trends already underway, noting that relations with the USA recovered quickly and Britain retained some Middle Eastern influence.