Foreign Policy under Eisenhower (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes

Foreign Policy under Eisenhower

Eisenhower's approach to the Cold War

When Dwight D. Eisenhower won the 1952 presidential election, he and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, presented themselves as determined anti-Communists. During the campaign, they had criticized the Democrats and President Truman for being insufficiently tough on Communism, particularly in light of McCarthyism and the atmosphere of suspicion that gripped America in the early 1950s.

Eisenhower and Dulles advocated for a policy of 'roll back' rather than mere containment. Roll back meant actively pushing back Communist influence rather than simply preventing its spread. They also spoke of 'massive retaliation', a strategy that would base American defense primarily on nuclear weapons rather than conventional forces. This approach reflected the belief that the threat of overwhelming nuclear response would deter Communist aggression more effectively than traditional military means.

The domino theory

Domino theory refers to the belief that if one state fell to Communism, neighbouring states would quickly follow, like a row of falling dominoes. Eisenhower articulated this theory in the early 1950s, and it became a deeply held conviction that would later justify extensive US involvement in the Vietnam War. The theory suggested that Communist expansion must be stopped at every point, as each loss would trigger further losses across entire regions.

From rhetoric to reality

Despite the aggressive rhetoric during the campaign, the reality of Eisenhower's foreign policy proved more cautious. The Korean War had demonstrated that Communism was indeed a global threat requiring active opposition. However, the conflict also showed the dangers of escalation and the unwillingness of the major powers to risk World War III. The dismissal of General MacArthur by Truman for wanting to expand the war into China had signaled America's commitment to containment rather than unlimited confrontation.

Consequently, while Eisenhower's policies maintained a tough anti-Communist stance and sustained McCarthyism's influence, his administration ultimately continued the policy of containment established by Truman. The three major powers demonstrated through their actions that they would not risk global nuclear war, even as Cold War tensions intensified.

Eisenhower and Khrushchev

Khrushchev's new leadership

In 1955, Nikita Khrushchev succeeded Joseph Stalin as leader of the Soviet Union. His approach to relations with the West combined elements of conciliation with provocative actions. Khrushchev attempted to reduce Western European fears about German rearmament and sought to build relationships with Middle Eastern nations. To strengthen the Soviet bloc militarily, he established the Warsaw Pact in 1955.

Signs of thaw

Khrushchev pursued several policies that suggested a softening of Soviet positions:

• He returned a naval base to Finland
• He reduced the Red Army by half a million personnel
• In May 1955, he signed the Austrian peace treaty, which finally ended the four-power occupation of Austria
• Austria became an independent neutral state, marking the first time since the Second World War that the Soviet Union had surrendered occupied territory
• He agreed to discussions with the United States on agricultural cooperation and the peaceful application of atomic energy

Eisenhower's skepticism

However, Eisenhower remained unconvinced by these gestures. He interpreted Khrushchev's policies as a new leadership style rather than a fundamental change in Soviet objectives of expansion. Events in Hungary would seem to confirm this assessment.

Hungary (1956)

Relaxation and rebellion

In 1956, Khrushchev implemented a policy of relaxing the strict controls that Stalin had imposed on Eastern European nations. When moderate Communists in Hungary, led by Imre Nagy, threatened to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, Khrushchev's response proved decisive and brutal. Soviet tanks entered Hungary, crushed the rebellion, removed Nagy, and installed a more compliant leader, Janos Kadar.

Western non-intervention

Despite appeals from the Hungarian rebels, the US government did not intervene. A more moderate government in Hungary aligned with the West might have helped 'contain' Soviet influence, but the risks of direct intervention appeared too high. The United States also faced distraction from the simultaneous Suez crisis unfolding in the Middle East.

The Hungarian uprising demonstrated the limits of Western commitment to 'roll back' and the harsh reality of Soviet control over its sphere of influence.

The Berlin crisis (1958-59)

Ongoing tensions over Germany

Khrushchev encountered persistent problems regarding Germany. The West refused to recognize the legitimacy of the East German state. American and French forces in West Berlin conducted espionage (spying) and sabotage operations against the East. Khrushchev attempted to force Western recognition of East Germany by threatening to give East Germany control over the West's access routes to West Berlin.

In November 1958, he issued an ultimatum: the West must negotiate a settlement on West Berlin within six months or face serious consequences. However, when it became apparent that the West would stand firm, Khrushchev retreated in March 1959.

The U-2 incident and Paris Summit

Khrushchev and Eisenhower held their first summit meeting in September 1959. Although the atmosphere proved surprisingly cordial, they made no substantive progress on resolving the Berlin question. Khrushchev hoped for a breakthrough at the Paris summit scheduled for May 1960.

Just before the Paris meeting, however, the Soviet Union shot down a U-2 American spy plane and captured its pilot, Gary Powers. Eisenhower was compelled to acknowledge the plane's espionage mission. Khrushchev, feeling humiliated, refused to attend the summit.

This incident severely damaged US-Soviet relations and demonstrated how fragile the thaw in the Cold War remained.

The Suez crisis (1956)

The crisis unfolds

In July 1956, Egyptian leader Gamal Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, the vital trade waterway providing a faster route between the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. Britain and France, particularly angered by this action, joined with Israel in invading the Canal Zone.

The United States did not support this intervention. Eisenhower forced Britain and France to withdraw by applying financial sanctions. He sought to maintain positive relations with Arab nations, calculating that the Western world needed their oil supplies and their alignment against the Communist bloc. Eisenhower reacted angrily that Britain, France, and Israel had acted without consulting or informing him.

Results of the Suez crisis

The crisis demonstrated conclusively that Britain and France no longer functioned as world powers and had become heavily dependent on the United States. It also marked a turning point in American involvement in the Middle East.

However, the Anglo-French actions reminded Egypt and Syria of Western colonial attitudes, pushing them closer to the USSR. Both the United States and Soviet Union subsequently sold increasing quantities of weapons to their respective allies in the region, intensifying Cold War competition in the Middle East.

China (1949-60)

The Chinese Civil War and US policy

The United States had supported Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalists in their civil war against Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party between 1945 and 1949. However, by 1949, the US had abandoned Chiang, who fled with thousands of followers to the island of Taiwan. American policymakers feared that Mao's success would encourage other Asian countries to follow China's Communist path.

The United States refused to formally recognize the People's Republic of China (PRC). Instead, America maintained diplomatic relations exclusively with the Republic of China government in Taiwan, recognizing it as the sole legitimate government of China. Following the Civil War, US interest in China appeared to diminish, though the Korean War would dramatically alter American attitudes.

Mutual hostility

Relations between the US and China were characterized by deep mutual antagonism:

The United States interpreted the Korean War as evidence that Chinese-sponsored Communism pursued expansionist goals and threatened American security. America became convinced that China intended to support revolutionary movements throughout the world.

China viewed the Korean War as proof of American aggression, demonstrating that the United States wanted to establish a military presence on the Asian mainland and would likely attack China itself.

Deteriorating relations after Korea

Relations continued to worsen following the Korean War. The United States implemented harsh policies designed to isolate and contain China:

• Imposed a trade embargo on China
• Successfully kept China excluded from the United Nations
• Established military bases in Taiwan
• Strengthened its military presence in the region
• Signed the US-Taiwan Defense Treaty in 1954

Mao responded angrily to the US-Taiwan Defense Treaty. Communist China shelled the Chinese Nationalist islands of Quemoy and Matsu during the following year, which lay very close to the Chinese mainland. Eisenhower publicly suggested he was considering the deployment of atomic weapons to protect Taiwan. Mao, both furious and humiliated, backed down.