England’s Relations with Foreign Powers, 1509–29 (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes

England's Relations with Foreign Powers, 1509–29

Introduction

England's foreign policy between 1509 and 1529 operated within a rapidly changing European landscape. Several factors complicated diplomatic decision-making during this period. The political situation across Europe remained unstable, with alliances shifting frequently as monarchs pursued competing territorial and dynastic ambitions. From 1517 onwards, the Protestant Reformation began to reshape religious and political relationships between states. Meanwhile, the expansion of Ottoman power under Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent in the 1520s posed a direct threat to Christian Europe, particularly through renewed campaigns in the Balkans and the siege of Vienna. This Ottoman pressure created widespread anxiety among European rulers, especially Charles V, who bore responsibility for defending Christendom's eastern frontier.

The challenge of establishing an effective foreign policy

England's limited resources and strategic position

Henry VIII had secured military victories against France and Scotland in 1513, which brought him short-term benefits. These campaigns satisfied his desire for martial adventure, enhanced his popularity with the English public, and earned him respect among European rulers. However, these achievements did not mark the beginning of a new era of English greatness on the continent. The military expeditions proved extremely expensive, consuming the financial surplus that Henry VII had carefully accumulated during his reign. Moreover, the territorial gains were disappointing. England captured Tournai and Therouanne, but these proved to be modest prizes. Tournai was dismissively described as an 'ungracious doghole', reflecting its limited strategic and economic value.

England's geographical position meant that the Habsburgs could potentially use their possessions in Spain and the Netherlands to threaten England's scattered continental holdings or launch attacks on northern France. However, whenever diplomatic focus shifted to the Italian peninsula—where much of the period's military conflict took place—England found itself relegated to a peripheral role.

Wolsey's survival as Henry's chief minister depended on his ability to maintain and enhance the king's international reputation while delivering further diplomatic or military successes. This created constant pressure to achieve results despite England's limited capacity for independent action.

The transformation of European power relationships (1515–1519)

Before Wolsey could devise a solution to England's strategic difficulties, the European balance of power underwent dramatic transformation through a series of royal deaths. King Louis XII of France died in 1515, Ferdinand of Aragon in 1516, and Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I in 1519. These deaths brought a new generation of young, ambitious monarchs to power who were determined to compete personally with Henry VIII for pre-eminence in European affairs.

The deaths of Ferdinand of Aragon and Maximilian I allowed their grandson Charles to inherit an unprecedented accumulation of territories and titles. At just sixteen years old, Charles became King of Spain (inheriting both Castile and Aragon), Duke of the Netherlands (through his Burgundian inheritance), and eventually Holy Roman Emperor. His lands stretched from the Americas through western and central Europe down into North Africa and included significant portions of Italy. This vast empire meant that Henry could not possibly compete with Charles on equal terms in terms of territorial extent or military resources.

Wolsey's strategic response

Recognizing England's inability to wage war as an equal partner alongside these new continental giants, Wolsey devised an alternative strategy. He positioned England as a peacemaker between France and the Habsburgs, offering English diplomatic mediation as a service to European stability. This approach had several advantages:

• It allowed England to play a role in European affairs despite limited resources
• It enhanced England's prestige as an honest broker
• It gave Wolsey personal prominence as the architect of peace

However, Wolsey remained careful not to ignore Henry's continuing desire for military glory. The king particularly wanted opportunities to compete with Francis I, whom he regarded as a personal rival. This meant that Wolsey's peace policy needed to be flexible enough to accommodate occasional military ventures without completely abandoning the peacemaker role.

The Treaty of London (October 1518)

Origins and diplomatic context

Pope Leo X, who had assumed the papacy in 1513, issued a call for a general crusade to halt the expansion of Ottoman power in Eastern Europe. The Ottoman Turks had emerged as the dominant Muslim power in the eastern Mediterranean by the fifteenth century. After conquering Constantinople in 1453, they had continued expanding their control around the Eastern Mediterranean and into south-east Europe. By the 1520s, Ottoman forces were threatening the heart of Christian Europe.

While there was little realistic prospect of European monarchs uniting for a crusade, Wolsey recognized an opportunity to place England at the centre of European diplomacy. Rather than focusing narrowly on organizing military action against the Ottomans, he proposed a much broader diplomatic initiative. He called upon the major powers of Europe to settle their differences with one another and commit to living under 'universal peace'.

Terms and structure of the treaty

Over two dozen countries eventually signed the treaty, which committed them to avoid warfare or risk being attacked by all other signatories. This created a crude form of balance of power across Western Europe, designed to prevent the type of destructive conflicts that had plagued Italy since 1494. The treaty represented an attempt to establish a collective security system that would make aggression too costly for any single state to contemplate.

Assessment and immediate impact

Historian Susan Doran described the Treaty of London as 'a glittering success' because it brought immediate fame to Henry VIII, upstaged the Pope's authority, and dispelled England's diplomatic isolation. Henry and Wolsey attempted to perform their roles as power-brokers in European politics throughout the following years. The treaty reached its highest point as an expression of English foreign policy, temporarily positioning the crown at the centre of continental diplomacy.

However, historian T.A. Morris offered a more measured assessment. Writing in 1998, he acknowledged that the Treaty of London did not endure and has consequently been dismissed by some as merely an exercise in egotism. Nevertheless, he argued that Wolsey was probably sincere in his aims and had temporarily outflanked the Pope in his role as European peacemaker. If the prominence and prestige of the English crown were the primary objectives of foreign policy, then the treaty represented a genuine achievement.

The collapse of universal peace and the choice between Habsburg and Valois

Charles V's election as Holy Roman Emperor (1519)

The entire framework of the Treaty of London began to look decidedly unstable when Charles was officially elected as Holy Roman Emperor in 1519. This election completed his dominance over Europe and transformed the diplomatic situation. Charles now ruled the Netherlands, Spain, and controlled the imperial title, with his lands virtually encircling France. This geographical position threatened to choke any efforts by Francis I to expand French power or win military glory through territorial conquest.

The Treaty of London's call for 'universal peace' could not survive this fundamental clash of interests. England faced a dilemma. Remaining neutral would mean accepting irrelevance in European affairs, but choosing either side carried substantial risks.

Support for the Habsburgs (1520–1525)

Attempting to maintain neutrality

Henry and Wolsey initially tried to preserve England's image as a neutral power-broker by arranging meetings with both sides. In June 1520, Henry met Francis I at the Field of the Cloth of Gold, an extravagant diplomatic meeting designed to demonstrate Anglo-French friendship. However, Henry also conferred with Charles twice—both before and after the French meeting—indicating that he was keeping his options open.

Ultimately, Henry could not afford to remain shackled to a peace treaty that was obviously collapsing. Nor could he accept the loss of prestige that would result from standing on the sidelines during a major Franco-Habsburg war. England would need to choose a side.

Reasons for supporting Charles V

Of the two competing powers, Spain offered more attractions for a potential English alliance. Henry remained married to Catherine of Aragon, who was Charles's aunt, creating a family connection between the two rulers. More importantly, Henry still harboured dreams of making substantial territorial gains in France. An alliance with Charles, whose lands surrounded France, offered the best prospect for achieving these ambitions.

In 1522, England declared war on France, despite Wolsey's reservations about the costs and risks involved. This marked the end of England's peacemaker role and the beginning of direct military involvement in the Habsburg-Valois conflict.

Military campaigns and their limited results

Once again, English military action on the continent achieved minimal results while consuming substantial financial resources. Imperial forces achieved a major success in 1525 when they captured Francis I himself after the Battle of Pavia in Italy. Henry believed this crushing French defeat had removed any obstacle to his long-held ambition of reviving England's claims to the French throne. He called upon Charles to help him exploit the victory by dividing France into an English zone and a Spanish zone, effectively ending French independence.

Support for France (1525–1529)

Disappointment with the Habsburg alliance

The results of English support for Charles in the early 1520s deeply disappointed both Henry and Wolsey. It appeared that Charles had used England primarily to distract France from Habsburg objectives, without providing England with meaningful benefits. Henry felt particularly aggrieved that Francis's crushing defeat at Pavia should have cleared the way for England to press its claims in France, yet Charles refused to assist.

Henry lacked the financial resources to raise an army capable of taking independent military action against France. This left Wolsey searching for an alternative diplomatic strategy that would restore England's influence in European affairs.

The League of Cognac (1526)

Wolsey joined negotiations between France, the Pope, Venice, and Florence to create an anti-Habsburg alliance known as the League of Cognac in 1526. This represented a complete reversal of England's previous alignment. Wolsey still hoped to play the peacemaker by using these negotiations to pressure Charles into adopting more reasonable policies toward other European powers.

However, events soon dragged England into direct warfare against Charles. While Wolsey was attempting to use England to chart a middle course between France and Spain, Henry's personal circumstances created insurmountable difficulties for maintaining neutrality.

The divorce issue and its diplomatic consequences

England and France concluded a formal alliance in 1527. By 1528, both countries were at war with the Habsburgs. However, England's military contribution proved as ineffectual as in previous continental campaigns.

The Battle of Landriano and the Treaty of Cambrai (1529)

In June 1529, Charles once again defeated the French at the Battle of Landriano. This Habsburg victory brought the latest phase of warfare to an end. At the last moment, Wolsey managed to ensure that England would be included in the resulting peace settlement. The Treaty of Cambrai was signed in August 1529, formally ending the war.

A fortnight after the Treaty of Cambrai, Wolsey fell from power. His inability to secure the royal divorce, combined with years of expensive foreign policy initiatives that had yielded few tangible benefits, destroyed his political position. England's foreign policy between 1509 and 1529 thus ended with limited achievements and the collapse of the minister who had directed it throughout most of this period.

Historiographical debates on Wolsey's foreign policy aims

Historians have offered competing interpretations of Wolsey's underlying objectives in conducting England's foreign relations. These debates reflect broader questions about whether foreign policy was driven by idealistic goals or by personal and dynastic ambitions.

J.J. Scarisbrick challenged Pollard's views in his influential 1968 biography of Henry VIII. Scarisbrick argued that Wolsey frequently pursued policies that directly contradicted what the Papacy wanted. He doubted whether Wolsey harboured serious ambitions to become Pope. Instead, Scarisbrick suggested that Wolsey sought peace primarily because warfare was expensive. Wolsey's strategy involved allying England with the strongest European power, calculating that no other country would dare to attack such a formidable coalition.

Key dates

Year	Event
1515	Death of Louis XII of France; accession of Francis I; French victory at Battle of Marignano
1516	Death of Ferdinand of Aragon; Charles inherits Spanish throne
1518	Treaty of London establishing 'universal peace'
1519	Death of Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I; Charles V elected Holy Roman Emperor
1520	Field of the Cloth of Gold diplomatic meeting between Henry VIII and Francis I
1522	England declares war on France in alliance with Charles V
1525	Battle of Pavia; Francis I captured by imperial forces; Charles V refuses to support Henry's territorial ambitions in France
1526	League of Cognac formed as anti-Habsburg alliance
1527	England and France form alliance against Charles V
1528	England and France at war with the Habsburgs
1529	Battle of Landriano; Treaty of Cambrai; Wolsey falls from power