The Russian War Effort (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
The Russian War Effort
Russia's involvement in the First World War
In June 1914, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo by a Slav nationalist triggered a diplomatic crisis. The assassination represented a protest against Austria-Hungary's control over Slav populations, and the Austro-Hungarian government held Serbia responsible. Russia, which harboured ambitions in the Balkan region and identified with Serbia as a fellow Slav nation, became drawn into the escalating conflict. Pan-Slavism (the belief that Slav peoples should unite under Russian leadership as the pre-eminent Slav nation) exercised considerable influence within Russia and gained strength during July 1914 as the Tsar mobilized forces to support Serbia. When Germany declared support for Austria-Hungary, Russia rapidly entered a state of war with Germany. Although Russia's allies, Britain and France, also declared war, they concentrated their military efforts on the Western Front, leaving Russia to confront German and Austro-Hungarian armies largely alone on the Eastern Front.
When Nicholas II committed Russia to war in 1914, the decision enjoyed widespread public approval and benefited from a surge of anti-German feeling. The social and political unrest that had characterized Nicholas's reign diminished temporarily. After the State Duma voted to approve war credits (raising taxes and securing loans to finance military operations), it dissolved itself, declaring opposition to burdening the nation with political disputes during wartime. St Petersburg shed its Germanic name and adopted the Slavonic designation 'Petrograd'. Russian forces assembled with remarkable speed, with the rapid mobilization surprising German commanders, who had expected a slower Russian response.
Early military setbacks
The initial burst of national solidarity rapidly dissipated following defeats at German hands. The catastrophic Battle of Tannenburg in East Prussia during August 1914 resulted in 300,000 Russian soldiers killed or wounded, with thousands more captured. A subsequent defeat at the Masurian Lakes in September compelled the Russian army into temporary withdrawal from East Prussia. Although Russian troops achieved greater success in operations against Austria-Hungary in the south, it became evident that the conflict would not conclude quickly as initially anticipated. Reports of military incompetence began circulating, inflaming discontent within the Russian capital.
Between 1914 and 1917, the Russian government managed to mobilize approximately 12 million men, drawn predominantly from the conscripted peasantry, yet proved incapable of adequately supplying them. The difficulties of the opening years intensified steadily. Soldiers departed for combat not merely without appropriate weaponry but also without basic warm clothing and waterproof footwear.
During 1914, the infantry possessed only two rifles for every three soldiers. By 1915, Russian artillery units faced restrictions of two to three shells per day owing to ammunition shortages. Throughout these early stages, soldiers frequently resorted to using weapons scavenged from fallen comrades simply to continue fighting.
The Brusilov offensive and deteriorating morale
By the time of the Brusilov offensive (a Russian attempt to advance westwards from Ukraine and penetrate Austro-Hungarian positions in June 1916), shortages in equipment and munitions had been partially addressed. Nevertheless, the depletion of experienced officers killed during earlier combat, persistent heavy casualties, and a worsening economic and political situation within Russia itself produced a collapse in morale, resulting in 1.5 million desertions by the close of that year.
A government report from October 1916 documented the deteriorating atmosphere within the army. Relations between ordinary soldiers and officers had become severely strained, leading to incidents of bloodshed. Soldiers in rear units proved particularly troublesome, openly accusing military authorities of cowardice, intoxication, and treason. The report noted that complete demoralization appeared underway, with soldiers demanding peace negotiations long overdue but never forthcoming. Officers sometimes refused to command their units against enemy forces through fear of being killed by their own men.
Disputes over the organization of the war effort
The period between 1914 and 1917 also witnessed disputes regarding the coordination of the war effort. In July 1914, the Tsarist government established 'military zones' wherein all civilian authority ceased and military commanders assumed control. This arrangement faced opposition from liberal zemstva (elected local government councils) who considered the government insensitive to popular needs and believed civilians should exercise a substantial role in managing the war. The zemstva had formed a 'Union of Zemstva' to supply medical facilities that the state appeared to neglect, whilst factory owners and businessmen established a Congress of Representatives of Industry and Business (incorporating representatives from the dumas and workers' organizations) to coordinate production.
During June 1915, zemstva and municipal dumas combined to establish Zemgor (the All-Russian Union of Zemstva and Cities). This body asserted the authority to assist the Tsar's government in prosecuting the war. Nicholas, however, rejected it, and Zemgor evolved into a focus for liberal opposition.
Nicholas received an opportunity to institute political reforms and preserve his position by transferring responsibility for the war effort to a civilian government. In August 1915, over half the Fourth Duma deputies (Kadets, Octobrists and Progressives) organized themselves into a Progressive bloc and demanded that the Tsar replace his ministers and create a 'government of public confidence'. They effectively requested a constitutional monarchy wherein they would possess a commanding voice. Had Nicholas II demonstrated greater political astuteness, he might well have accepted this opportunity, but he declined to contemplate such measures.
Nicholas II assumes military command
Following defeats in Galicia on the Austro-Hungarian front during September 1915, the Tsar made the disastrous decision to assume the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army and Navy and, 'with firm trust in Divine mercy and unshakeable confidence in ultimate victory', to proceed to the front line. Although this move possessed overtones of courage and dedication, Nicholas had already forfeited the confidence and support of the Russian General Staff and lacked the military expertise to reverse the war effort. His new role simply rendered him more directly responsible for the ongoing disasters afflicting his troops and state.
Nicholas also distanced himself from political developments in Petrograd, where Rasputin interfered in political appointments and policy determinations. Rumours circulated widely that Rasputin maintained an affair with Alexandra, who as a German faced accusations of sabotaging the Russian war effort. Between 1915 and 1916, numerous ministerial changes occurred, including four Prime Ministers, four Foreign Secretaries of Defence, and four Interior Ministers, prompting opponents to characterize Rasputin's actions as ministerial leapfrog.
Mikhail Rodzianko, President of the Fourth Duma, cautioned Nicholas regarding Rasputin's unpopularity and the damage inflicted on the Tsarist cause, but without success. During an attempt to rescue the monarchy's reputation, Prince Yusupov (a nephew by marriage to the Tsar) murdered Rasputin in December 1916. Nicholas's correspondence with Alexandra, whom he addressed with terms of endearment such as 'my own lovebird', revealed greater anxiety regarding the children's measles than shortages of bread. In a message dated 25 February 1917, Alexandra wrote about 'young boys and girls running about and screaming that they have no bread'. Nicholas attempted to reassure his wife that 'this will all pass and quieten down'.
Key Points to Remember:
- Russia entered the First World War in 1914 driven by Pan-Slavism and alliance commitments, experiencing initial enthusiasm that rapidly evaporated following catastrophic defeats at Tannenburg and the Masurian Lakes.
- Despite mobilising 12 million soldiers between 1914 and 1917, the government failed to provide adequate equipment, resulting in chronic shortages of rifles, ammunition, warm clothing and footwear, with morale collapsing and 1.5 million desertions by late 1916.
- Disputes emerged between military authorities seeking control through 'military zones' and civilian organisations (zemstva, businessmen, the Progressive bloc) demanding greater involvement in war coordination, with Nicholas rejecting reform proposals.
- Nicholas II's decision to assume personal military command in September 1915 made him directly responsible for ongoing defeats whilst distancing him from Petrograd, allowing Rasputin's damaging political interference to intensify until his murder in December 1916.