Stalinism, Politics and Control: International Relations (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes

Stalin and International Relations, 1929–41

Cooperation with Germany, 1929–32

The USSR and Germany established diplomatic and military ties through the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo, which consolidated earlier agreements. This partnership intensified dramatically between 1929 and 1932, marking the most extensive period of Soviet-German military collaboration. The arrangement proved mutually beneficial: the Soviet Union gained access to German technical knowledge for industrial modernisation and weapons manufacturing, while Germany exploited Soviet territory to circumvent the military restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles.

Stalin negotiated agreements with German armaments manufacturers to secure advanced weaponry. The vastness of Russian territory allowed the German Army (Reichswehr) to conduct military activities forbidden under Versailles.

By 1931, Germany and Russia negotiated the continuation of the Berlin treaty. However, the Soviet-German relationship began deteriorating. Trade between the two countries slowed markedly in the early 1930s, and political tensions emerged as Germany's domestic situation transformed.

The changing policies of the Comintern (Communist International) affected relations. After the 1928 Comintern Congress, Stalin directed attacks against democratic socialist movements, labelling them 'social fascists'. This meant the German Communist Party (KPD) should not cooperate with the German Social Democratic Party (SPD).

During 1933 and 1934, the 'Rapallo period' of cooperation with Germany ended as Stalin explored collective security and improved relations with Western democracies. Even then, despite the ideological divide between Nazism and communism, Stalin kept options open for a possible return to cooperation with Germany.

Assessing Stalin's foreign policy

Stalin's foreign policies during the 1930s were complicated and contradictory. Some historians suggest Stalin pursued a 'zig-zag' policy, frequently changing direction according to circumstances. An alternative interpretation argues Stalin maintained a single-minded obsession with security; the tactics were unpredictable, but the overall strategic objective remained constant.

Soviet entry into the League of Nations, 1933–34

The Soviet Union shifted away from diplomatic isolation during 1933. Diplomatic relations were established with the United States, representing a notable departure from previous policy. An American Embassy opened in Moscow, allowing US diplomats to operate within the USSR rather than depending on the 'Riga Watchers' who previously reported on the Soviet Union from nearby Latvia.

US diplomatic recognition proved important in opening the way for the USSR to join the League of Nations, and the personal diplomacy of Foreign Commissar Maksim Litvinov played a central role.

Key figure: Maksim Litvinov

Maksim Litvinov served as Foreign Commissar and was well established by 1933 as the 'acceptable face' of the Soviet regime. His long experience of the West, combined with his polished social background, gave him credibility with Western diplomats. A visit to Washington by Litvinov in November 1933 finalised the agreement to re-open formal relations.

Apart from skilful diplomacy, a pressing issue pushed the two powers towards recognition: both Stalin and the Americans worried about the rise of Japan, the country that had invaded Manchuria in 1931 and seemed set for further militaristic expansion. Bringing the USSR into the League of Nations appealed to the Western powers as a desirable step towards strengthening collective security against threats of Japanese or German aggression.

Fears of Japanese aggression

Russia had been deeply involved in the Far East from the 1890s, with the building of the Trans-Siberian Railway and expansionist Russian ambitions in Manchuria, to exploit the weakness of the Chinese empire. Japan also had ambitions in Manchuria and fought a war against China from 1894 to 1895. This rivalry led to the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, settled by American mediation in 1905.

The continued rise of Japanese military power, and Japan's occupation of Manchuria in 1931, represented a substantial concern for Stalin, and also for the Western powers, especially the United States.

Pacts with France and Czechoslovakia, 1934–35

Stalin responded slowly to Hitler's rise; he did little to protest against the repression of the German KPD by the Nazi regime, and he was willing to continue military and naval cooperation with Germany. But he did seek to find new allies, in addition to gaining US recognition and entering the League of Nations.

In December 1932, the USSR negotiated a non-aggression pact with Poland; this was made into a ten-year agreement in 1934. A similar non-aggression pact was signed with France in November 1932; this formed the basis of a Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance, negotiated in December 1934 and signed in May 1935.

France proved a willing partner in this new diplomatic approach. The French worried about the rise of Nazism, especially following Hitler's public announcement of German rearmament in March 1935.

The Franco-Soviet Pact was quickly followed by a similar pact between the USSR and Czechoslovakia, in which the USSR gave an undertaking to intervene militarily if Czechoslovakia was attacked by 'a third party' (that is, Germany), as long as the French did also. Czechoslovakia was encouraged into the pact by France, who had a traditional policy of seeking allies in Central Europe, and also by Britain, whose foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, visited Moscow in 1935. From the Russian side, the smooth diplomacy of Litvinov was very influential, and Stalin put pressure on the French Communist Party to support the pact.

In 1934 and 1935, Stalin took further steps towards supporting collective security; the hard-line policy enforced on the Comintern from 1928 was scrapped. Stalin announced a new official policy to support broad-based 'popular fronts' in other countries. Soviet communism was to cooperate with democratic socialists in the fight against fascism. Stalin announced this new line in Pravda in 1934. It became official policy at the Comintern Congress in Moscow in 1935.

Source analysis: Karl Radek on Soviet foreign policy

Karl Radek was an experienced revolutionary who had been an ally of Trotsky in the 1920s but had reconciled with Stalin in 1930. In an article published in January 1934, Radek articulated the Soviet position on foreign policy:

Soviet intervention in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39

Stalin's new approach to international affairs and collective security received a serious setback in March 1936, when Hitler's forces occupied and remilitarised the Rhineland, directly contravening the terms of the Versailles treaty. The passive response of Britain and France to Hitler's calling the bluff of Versailles weakened Stalin's faith in the value of the Franco-Soviet Pact of 1935.

In March 1936, Hitler ordered German troops to march into the Rhineland, territory that had been declared a de-militarised zone at the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. France and Britain did not intervene; Hitler's remilitarisation of the region succeeded.

George Kennan argued in Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin that "from the moment of the German entry into the Rhineland, Stalin must have reckoned that it was only a matter of time before he must either fight Hitler or make a deal with him."

Germany's remilitarisation of the Rhineland set the context for Stalin's reaction to the Spanish Civil War, which began in July 1936, when right-wing army officers led by Francisco Franco launched a nationalist rebellion against the Spanish Republic. Both fascist Italy and Nazi Germany sent military support to the Francoists. The Popular Front government of France wanted to prevent the Civil War in Spain from becoming internationalised; in August 1936, France proposed a general agreement on non-intervention in Spain.

At first, Stalin went along with this policy but was anxious about what he perceived as French and British weakness in combating fascism. In September 1936 Stalin took the decision to intervene in Spain.

This intervention was implemented on a large scale and rapidly, with hundreds of Soviet 'advisers' sent to Spain, backed by troops, tanks and aircraft. The intervention was political as well as military; Soviet forces operated independently of the Spanish Republican government, and Soviet political agents followed orders from Moscow, not from Madrid.

Politically, Soviet priorities in Spain focused on internal feuds and rivalries against left-wing elements in Spain opposed to the domination of Soviet communism. Stalin was seemingly concerned with internal security, driven by a fear of a revolutionary idealism he could not directly control. Many of the Soviet personnel who served in Spain were repressed after returning home.

Soviet feuds and rivalries with left-wing elements in Spain

Another reason for Stalin's changed policies in Spain from 1937 was disillusionment with France and Britain. The Western democracies did little to prevent the victory of the Francoists in Spain. They also showed growing suspicion of Stalin's intentions in Spain. Liberal public opinion in the West admired the willingness of the USSR to intervene in Spain; but, on a governmental level, Soviet intervention exacerbated fear and dislike of Soviet communism, weakening the prospects for future collaboration.