The Nazi-Soviet Pact, 1929–41 (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
The Nazi-Soviet Pact, 1929–41
Origins of the Nazi-Soviet Pact
The signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact by German and Soviet foreign ministers Ribbentrop and Molotov on 23 August 1939 appeared to be a stunning diplomatic development—a revolutionary agreement between bitter ideological enemies. However, the pact was in many respects a logical response to the situation facing both Hitler and Stalin by the summer of 1939. It became clear that Europe was moving towards war, and Hitler was already committed to the invasion of Poland.
Hitler's strategic calculations
Hitler sought freedom to invade Poland without facing opposition from a British-French-Soviet alliance supporting Poland. Stalin's nightmare, which he wanted to avoid at all costs, was a two-front war against Germany and Japan simultaneously. What Stalin desired was for the fascist/militarist capitalists (Germany, Italy, and Japan) to fight a war against the bourgeois/democratic capitalists (Britain and France), leaving the Soviet Union safely neutral.
The pact represented a cynical calculation by both dictators. Hitler gained immediate tactical advantages for his planned invasion of Poland, while Stalin sought to position the USSR as a neutral observer of a capitalist civil war that would weaken all his potential enemies.
The pact therefore gave Hitler a free hand to invade Poland by providing the non-aggression pact and also supplied Germany with essential raw materials from Russia on highly favourable terms. For Stalin, the pact offered territorial gains in eastern Poland and the Baltic States. More importantly, it guaranteed Stalin a breathing space, allowing time to consolidate the substantial economic changes within Russia that Stalin had built on previous cooperation between the USSR and Germany—a relationship that had existed after Hitler's rise to power but had never been completely forgotten.
Stalin's approach to potential alliances
Stalin remained outwardly open to a possible military alliance with the West. He allowed Litvinov to continue negotiations with the Western democracies, and the Soviet propaganda war against the evils of Nazism continued. In March 1939, after Germany occupied Prague, France and Britain gave guarantees to Poland (which was plainly Hitler's next target) that they would go to war if Germany invaded. However, practical military assistance to Poland would require the help of the USSR, and the Poles refused to permit Soviet forces to enter their country (which was essential in order to block any German invasion).
Poland's Fatal Dilemma
Poland's refusal to allow Soviet forces to enter their territory created an impossible situation. This decision, while understandable given Poland's historical experiences with Russia, effectively made meaningful Western military assistance impossible and removed a major obstacle to Stalin's willingness to sign a pact with Hitler.
Western democracies' failure to act with urgency
Britain and France were not only hindered by Polish reluctance to cooperate with the USSR; they also completely failed to recognise the need for urgency until it was too late. The Anglo-French Military Mission appeared to operate on the assumption that urgency was not required. The mission proceeded slowly in its preparation, lacked the presence of high commanders, and travelled to Moscow by a leisurely route. In any case, it was almost certain that arriving too late would not make any difference. The fact that Litvinov, the pro-West foreign commissar, had been replaced by the hard-line Vyacheslav Molotov, should have provided a clear indication of Stalin's probable intentions.
The Anglo-French Military Mission did not reach Moscow until August 1939. By that point, it had no possibility of success because Stalin had already made up his mind; the Nazi-Soviet Pact was already being negotiated.
Stalin's justification: The speech of 1 August 1939
Stalin's speech to the Politburo on 1 August 1939 (kept secret and not published until 1999) reveals his reasoning for signing the pact with Germany. This speech demonstrates Stalin's cynical strategic calculation and his belief that he could manipulate the capitalist powers into mutually destructive conflict.
Stalin's Strategic Reasoning: The Politburo Speech of 1 August 1939
In this secret speech, Stalin outlined his logic for accepting Germany's proposal:
If the USSR accepted Germany's proposal and signed a non-aggression pact with her, Germany would attack Poland, and intervention by France and Britain would become inevitable. In these conditions the USSR would have a strong possibility of remaining on the sidelines in the conflict, and could reckon on successful entry into war at a later stage.
Stalin argued that the choice was clear: the USSR must accept the German proposal and send back the Anglo-French mission. The first advantage, he stated, would be the destruction of Poland right up to the gates of Warsaw.
Stalin emphasised that war breaking out between the German Reich and the capitalist Anglo-French bloc was in the interests of the USSR, the homeland of workers. The USSR must do everything possible to help the war last as long as possible to ensure the exhaustion of both sides.
Outcome of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 23 August 1939
The Nazi-Soviet Pact appeared to be a master stroke by Stalin, offering several immediate advantages:
- It gave him protection from war against Germany at a time when the USSR was militarily weak (as would be demonstrated later in 1939 during the 'Winter War' with Finland).
- It gave him the breathing space he wanted in order to concentrate on internal affairs.
- It enabled substantial territorial gains for the USSR, and the destruction of Poland; 20 years earlier the Red Army had been halted on the Vistula in the first Russo-Polish War.
- With Hitler's invasion in the West in 1940, Stalin was able to seize control of the Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
- Stalin could look forward to the prospect of a long war in which Britain, France and Germany would all be economically and militarily exhausted, as had happened between 1914 and 1918.
Stalin's miscalculations
Stalin's optimism about the consequences of his deal with Hitler was based on two faulty assumptions. His first miscalculation concerned the strength of the French Army and the nature of modern warfare. He believed that the coming war would last for years, similar to the war of 1914–18. The rapid fall of France in June 1940 was a nasty surprise for Stalin, putting Hitler in complete control of Western Europe, with the German war machine not weakened and exhausted, but stronger than ever.
Stalin's Critical Errors in Judgment
Stalin made two fundamental miscalculations that would prove disastrous:
First Miscalculation: He expected a long war of attrition similar to 1914–18. Instead, France fell in just six weeks in June 1940, leaving Hitler's forces stronger than ever and in control of Western Europe.
Second Miscalculation: He believed he could trust Hitler to honour the pact. From June 1940, Stalin strictly observed all terms, ensuring prompt payment in gold and continuing shipments of foodstuffs and raw materials to Germany. However, by October 1940, Hitler had already begun preparing to invade the USSR.
Stalin's second miscalculation concerned whether he could trust Hitler. From June 1940, knowing he was in a weak position, Stalin strictly observed all the terms of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Trade agreements were further developed; the USSR always paid promptly and in gold. Trainloads of foodstuffs and raw materials continued rolling west into Germany. However, by October 1940, Hitler had already begun preparing to invade the USSR in 1941. Allied intelligence services picked up evidence of this and sent private warnings to Stalin, but he refused to believe them. When the invasion came at 03:15 on 22 June 1941, the Soviet Union was badly unprepared to defend against it. The 'triumph' of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact turned into a disaster.
Soviet military weakness and the Winter War, 1939–40
Soviet forces invaded Finland in November 1939. Despite having much larger forces, the war went badly for the USSR at first, partly because Stalin's purges had weakened the Red Army. A peace agreement was signed in Moscow in March 1940, with 10 per cent of Finland's territory ceded to the USSR. When Germany invaded Russia in 1941, war between Finland and the USSR resumed in what became known as the Continuation War, which lasted until an armistice was agreed in September 1944.
The Winter War exposed serious weaknesses in the Red Army's combat effectiveness following the purges of military leadership in 1937–38. This poor performance further encouraged Hitler to believe that the Soviet Union would be an easy target for invasion—a belief that would have profound consequences when Germany launched Operation Barbarossa in 1941.
Key chronology
1938
- September: Exclusion of the USSR from Four-Power Conference at Munich
1939
- March: British and French guarantees to Poland
- April: Polish-German non-aggression pact of 1934 ended
- May: Litvinov replaced by Molotov as Foreign Commissar
- Aug: Anglo-French military mission to Moscow; Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact signed in Moscow
- September: Invasion of Poland by German and (later) Soviet armies; new German-Soviet border agreed by Molotov and Ribbentrop
1940
- June: Soviet occupation of the Baltic States
1941
- June: Nazi-Soviet Pact broken by German invasion of USSR
Assessment of Stalin's foreign policy, 1929–41
Between 1929 and 1941, Stalin's foreign policy appeared to be inconsistent. The USSR's relationship with Germany went from cooperation to violent ideological hostility, to a non-aggression pact, to total war. The Comintern switched from a hard-line policy against 'social fascists' to participation in Popular Fronts, to 'friendship' with Germany, to alliance with the West in 1941. The USSR went from diplomatic isolation to membership of the League of Nations, to a prospective alliance with the Western powers, to total hostility against the West from August 1939, and then to wartime alliance with the West from 1941.
However, this apparent inconsistency can be understood as reflecting a consistent underlying strategy. Stalin's aims in the 1930s can be seen as a coherent obsession with defending the Soviet state against the enemies that encircled it: capitalism, rival ideologies, a resurgent Germany, and Japan. These enemies represented real external dangers, and they were intertwined in Stalin's mind with internal dangers—both to his political control and to the economic transformation of Russia.
Stalin would ultimately succeed in his aims, but he might not have done so had circumstances been different. If Japan had, as Stalin feared, gone to war with the Soviet Union in December 1941 instead of attacking the United States, the outcome would have been very different. The pact can therefore be seen as both a calculated risk and a product of Stalin's paranoid worldview, reflecting his determination to buy time and avoid encirclement while transforming Soviet society and military capacity.
Remember!
Key Points to Remember:
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The Nazi-Soviet Pact of 23 August 1939 was a non-aggression agreement between ideological enemies that shocked the world but had logical strategic motivations for both Hitler and Stalin.
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Stalin's primary aims were to avoid a two-front war, gain territorial buffer zones in Poland and the Baltic States, and secure time to consolidate economic transformation within the USSR.
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Western democracies failed to act with sufficient urgency in their negotiations with Stalin, arriving in Moscow only in August 1939 when Stalin had already decided to sign the pact with Germany.
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Stalin made two critical miscalculations: he underestimated the speed of German victory over France in 1940, and he trusted that Hitler would honour the pact, leaving the USSR unprepared when Germany invaded in June 1941.
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The Winter War with Finland (1939–40) exposed serious weaknesses in the Red Army resulting from Stalin's purges, which further encouraged Hitler to view the USSR as vulnerable to invasion.