Responsibility and Impact of the Terror (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
Responsibility and Impact of the Terror
The conclusion of the Yezhovshchina
The Yezhovshchina had threatened the stability of the Soviet state by 1938, causing severe disruption to both industrial production and administrative functions. Although purges of Stalin's opponents continued well into the Second World War, their intensity diminished substantially after the end of 1938. Stalin employed Yezhov as a scapegoat, dismissing him for supposed excessive zeal. The Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939 formally declared that the widespread purges were no longer necessary.
Yezhov's fate demonstrated the paradox of Stalin's terror: even the chief architect of the purges was not immune. Yezhov was arrested, subjected to torture, secretly tried and executed in February 1940, becoming a victim of the very system he had administered.
Lavrentii Beria replaced him as NKVD chief, bringing a different approach to repression whilst maintaining the apparatus of state terror.
The assassination of Trotsky
Stalin pursued Trotsky even in exile. In August 1940, after several failed attempts, Stalin settled a final score with his most prominent rival.
Historical Example: The Elimination of Trotsky
Trotsky had been tracked down by Stalinist agents whilst living in a fortified house on the outskirts of Mexico City. In May 1940, hired assassins had attacked but Trotsky escaped unharmed.
The task fell to another agent, Ramon Mercador, who successfully carried out the assassination. Mercador had gained Trotsky's trust by posing as an admirer interested in discussing a political paper. Once inside Trotsky's study, he plunged an ice pick into Trotsky's head. Mercador received a 20-year sentence for the murder, but his mother was awarded the 'Order of Lenin' in recognition of her service.
Stalin had eliminated the last of the old Bolsheviks who could have challenged his leadership.
Responsibility for the Terror and purges
Stalin's personal role
Historical debate continues about the precise extent of Stalin's role in the Terror, though there is little doubt that he was central both in initiating the purges and ending them temporarily before their resumption during and after the Second World War.
Stalin's violent tendencies were evident from his earliest days as a Bolshevik activist. Nevertheless, few anticipated the scale of Terror that would emerge in the 1930s beyond Stalin's ruthless persecution of the peasantry during collectivisation. A moment that may have been instrumental in the institutionalisation of Terror was the suicide of Stalin's wife, Nadezhda Alliluyeva, in 1932.
Stalin's personality made him suspicious, vindictive and paranoid. He was obsessed with reinforcing his own position, eliminating potential rivals, and exacting revenge on fellow Bolsheviks (the 'Old Guard') who had been his rivals or opponents before the 1930s. He personally promoted and then orchestrated the ending of the purges.
Many Soviet citizens apparently believed the official Party line that Stalin was a heroic leader, protecting the people from traitors seeking to undermine Soviet progress or destroy the country. Those anxious about excesses during the Terror persuaded themselves that Stalin bore no personal responsibility.
Stalin's use of fear
In 1931, Yagoda asked Stalin whether people followed him out of conviction or fear. Stalin's response was revealing: "Fear". When pressed to explain further, Stalin replied that people are always afraid, though convictions can change. This exchange illuminates Stalin's conscious deployment of terror as a governing tool.
The concept of 'enemy of the people'
Stalin originated the concept of 'enemy of the people', which automatically rendered it unnecessary to prove that ideological errors by an individual engaged in controversy could be proven. This term enabled the usage of extreme repression, violating all norms of revolutionary legality. It permitted action against anyone who disagreed with Stalin, those merely suspected of hostile intent, and those with damaged reputations.
Khrushchev's Condemnation of Stalin's Methods
Nikita Khrushchev, who became Soviet leader after Stalin's death, delivered a speech to the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956 condemning Stalin's methods. Khrushchev had served as a provincial party secretary in the 1930s, secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1938 and a Politburo member in 1939. In his 1956 speech, he stated:
"Stalin did not operate through persuasion, explanation and patient cooperation with people, but by imposing his concepts and demanding absolute submission to his opinion. Whoever opposed this concept or attempted to prove an alternative viewpoint faced removal from the leading collective and subsequent moral and physical destruction. This was particularly true following the Seventeenth Party Congress, when many prominent Party leaders and rank-and-file Party workers, honest and dedicated to communism, fell victim to Stalin's despotism."
Alternative explanations for the Terror
Whilst Stalin's personal responsibility cannot be dismissed, historians have identified several other contributing factors:
Terror as systemic - Terror was embedded within the communist system and had precedents in earlier Russian regimes. The 1917 Revolution and its aftermath, along with the Civil War, witnessed the communist regime employing terror which then intensified by scale under Stalin. Any means were justified to ensure that the first socialist state remained intact against a hostile world.
Economic transformation - Terror was a necessary component of the economic change occurring from the late 1920s. It served to remove the kulaks, provide slave labour and create scapegoats for mistakes and failures.
Over-zealous local officials - Terror resulted from the actions of excessively zealous officials in the provinces, who operated ruthlessly following their own independent agenda. The drive to terror did not originate exclusively from Stalin. Local Party activists promoted terror, confident this aligned with their leader's wishes, and their actions would not be challenged.
German military threat - Terror constituted a response to the genuine threat of military action involving Germany. The contacts between the Red Army and Nazis arising from the Rapallo (1922) and Berlin (1926) treaties had made Stalin suspicious of potential collaboration.
Self-escalation - The Terror became self-perpetuating, almost developing a momentum of its own as individuals used it to settle personal scores, eliminate rivals or avoid being denounced themselves. Fear motivated people: for those worried about being denounced, it was safer to prove loyalty by denouncing someone else first.
The impact of the Terror and purges
Impact on political power
By the end of the purges, Stalin had achieved a position of supreme power. He became a dictator with absolute control over the Party and a subservient populace. He had removed potential rivals, though it should be noted that most high-profile victims, such as Zinoviev, Kamenev and Bukharin, had already lost power and influence before the Terror commenced.
The Party was transformed into a compliant tool of Stalin. The Central Committee, for example, which had controlled membership through expulsions of those who failed to match the high standards of discipline that Party membership demanded, lost this power.
The scale of the purges within the Party was staggering. The expulsion of 850,000 members between 1936 and 1938 was attributable to the personal interventions of Stalin and Yezhov's NKVD, with dismissal reasons becoming more arbitrary. By 1939, less than 10 per cent of the Party membership had joined before 1920; less than a quarter of recruits since 1920 survived the purges.
Impact on the Red Army
The expulsion of many Party bureaucrats and administrators constituted a major development, but an even greater impact came from the loss of experienced army officers. Around 23,000 officers were shot or dismissed (some were later reinstated) and many new officers required recruitment to compensate for the increase in the size of the Red Army in the late 1930s. The Red Army expanded from just under 1 million in 1936 to 5 million by 1941.
The challenge of finding and training sufficient numbers of officers, combined with military failures evident in the initial months of the war in 1941, must be attributed at least partly to the effect of the purges. This devastating loss of experienced military leadership would prove costly when the Soviet Union faced the German invasion.
Impact on wider society
Other areas of society also suffered from the loss of skilled personnel. Teachers, engineers and specialists were all persecuted during a period when rapid industrial change demanded their expertise. This posed dangers for economic development.
Different areas experienced varying degrees of suffering depending on the zeal of local officials. Whilst some elements of society suffered more severely than others, there was also a positive outcome: 'ordinary people' had been given an opportunity to challenge their managers and officials, making them more accountable and therefore more responsive to needs.
Key figure: Lavrentii Pavlovich Beria (1899-1953)
Lavrentii Pavlovich Beria: Stalin's Chief of Secret Police
Beria, like Stalin, came from Georgia. From 1935 he served as a member of the Moscow Party elite. He replaced Yezhov as NKVD chief in 1938 and played a central role in Stalin's purges. During the war he organised mass deportations of 'suspect' nationalities, including the Crimean Tatars in 1944. He also organised the use of workers from the gulags for war production.
In 1945, he took charge of developing the Soviet atomic bomb. He remained central to 'High Stalinism' and renewed purges. In 1953, he was overthrown and killed in a coup led by Khrushchev and Zhukov, following Stalin's death.
Key Points to Remember:
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Stalin bore personal responsibility for the Terror through his paranoid, vindictive personality and obsession with power, though he also used Yezhov as a scapegoat when the purges threatened state stability.
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Alternative explanations include terror as integral to the communist system, necessary for economic transformation, the work of over-zealous local officials, a response to the German threat, and self-escalation.
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The Terror consolidated Stalin's absolute power, transforming the Party into a compliant tool and removing 850,000 members between 1936 and 1938.
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The Red Army suffered greatly, losing approximately 23,000 officers whilst simultaneously expanding from 1 million to 5 million troops, contributing to early military failures in 1941.
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Wider society lost skilled personnel including teachers, engineers and specialists, though ordinary people gained some ability to hold officials accountable.