The ‘Great Turn’ (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
The 'Great Turn'
By 1924, the Soviet economy continued to operate under the New Economic Policy (NEP). The compromise of 1921 had marked a departure from war communism, introducing a partial return of free markets and private economic activity. This shift brought a degree of economic stability, and many within the Party viewed the NEP as the appropriate path forward for the foreseeable future. However, between 1927 and 1929, Soviet economic policy underwent a dramatic transformation. The regime committed itself to rapid industrialisation regardless of cost, and abandoned previous policies that had favoured the peasantry. Instead, the government imposed brutal enforcement of agricultural collectivisation. This policy reversal, known as the Great Turn, marked the end of the first, Leninist phase of the Bolshevik state and the beginning of Stalinism.
The New Economic Policy represented a pragmatic compromise that allowed limited capitalism while maintaining state control over key industries. This mixed economy approach was controversial among hardline communists who viewed it as a betrayal of revolutionary principles.
The problems of the Russian economy
Industrialisation difficulties
Industrialisation in Russia had progressed at some speed during the tsarist period before 1917, but the industrial economy suffered severely during war and civil war. Although some industrial recovery occurred after 1921, progress remained slow and uneven despite the elaborate central planning organisations established under Veshenka and Gosplan. Several factors hampered production:
- Strikes disrupted output
- Managerial inefficiency limited effectiveness
- Low levels of mechanisation restricted productivity
Officials blamed private traders (Nepmen) for obstructing central planners, while factory managers accused government officials of interfering and demanding unrealistically low prices. This mutual recrimination reflected deeper structural problems within the Soviet industrial system.
The tensions between central planners and factory managers revealed fundamental contradictions in the Soviet economic system. Neither market forces nor central planning could function effectively when both were operating simultaneously but working at cross-purposes.
Agricultural and collectivisation challenges
The problems afflicting industrialisation connected directly to agriculture and collectivisation. The regime required sufficient food supplies to meet the needs of industrial workers, and also sought a grain surplus to help finance industrial investment and machinery purchases. The hope was that kolkhozes (voluntary collectives) and sovkhozes (state farms) would achieve the necessary production levels, but the growth of collective farms proved extremely slow. Even by 1928, less than 5 per cent of the peasant population worked on collective farms, and peasants showed little enthusiasm for joining them.
Collective farms: organisation and structure
Collectivisation had existed to a limited extent since 1918. Communist ideology regarded collective agriculture as essential for transforming the countryside. Two types of collective farm operated:
Kolkhoz (people's farm): This structure resembled peasant communes in tsarist Russia, with around 75 peasant families working as 'brigades' in a farm cooperative. The kolkhoz represented a form of collective ownership and management by the peasants themselves.
Sovkhoz (state farm): The sovkhoz operated as a state-run enterprise, often on land confiscated by the state from estate owners. Landless peasants received this land but became state-controlled workers rather than independent farmers.
The distinction between kolkhozes and sovkhozes reflected different approaches to agricultural organization. Kolkhozes maintained the fiction of peasant autonomy while sovkhozes made explicit the reality of state control. However, in practice, both types of collective farms faced heavy state interference and strict procurement quotas.
Contemporary perspectives on economic problems
Primary sources from the period reveal diverse views on the economic situation. A peasant farmer writing in December 1924 expressed deep frustration with state farms, accusing the central government of reducing coal production in the Donbass. He argued that peasants in the October Revolution expected land distribution and guaranteed wages, not tsarism, landowners or capitalists. However, he claimed the state leadership proved incompetent, resulting in widespread calamities. He concluded that official decrees failed to reflect the true wishes of the peasantry, who desired more land and guaranteed wages.
Primary Source: Nikolai Bukharin's Economic Warning (April 1925)
Nikolai Bukharin, a leading Party expert on economic questions, reported to Moscow party activists in April 1925. He warned that advanced technology had become a source of conspiracy. Prosperous peasants resented their inability to accumulate wealth or hire peasant labourers, while poor peasants sometimes complained about being prevented from working for wealthier neighbours.
Bukharin feared that excessive concerns about hired labour, accumulation, and the emergence of a prosperous peasant class might lead to incorrect economic strategy. He cautioned against being too eager to restrict prosperous peasants, as this made middle peasants afraid to improve their farms. Poor peasants complained about wealthy neighbours preventing them from selling their labour.
Bukharin concluded that the Party needed to encourage all peasants to enrich themselves, accumulate wealth, and develop their farms.
Primary Source: Mining Engineer's Critique (March 1927)
An experienced mining engineer writing to the magazine Enterprise in March 1927 questioned how to reduce prices when Soviet industrial organisation faced such problems. He challenged arguments about the advantages and disadvantages of the command economy – a system where Marxist theory demanded that the state should control the 'commanding heights of the economy' to enforce socialism on business and eliminate capitalism.
The engineer argued that recent discussion focused on worn-out equipment and outdated factories, and the need for capital investment. From his experience, he claimed equipment maintenance represented no more than half the problem. Factory directors appointed by the state often knew nothing about production or machinery operation. They made poor decisions, causing breakdowns and accidents, then complained about equipment wearing out. The engineer questioned how prices could fall under such chaotic conditions.
The reasons for the 'Great Turn'
By 1927, several factors were driving the regime towards a policy shift:
Industrial management weaknesses: Serious deficiencies existed in industrial management, requiring greater efficiency to increase production, improve the quality of industrial goods, and reduce prices. The problems in industry and agriculture were closely intertwined. Both the peasantry and urban workers faced harsh economic conditions, including shortages, unemployment, and low living standards.
Slow pace of industrialisation: The drive towards industrialisation appeared to be progressing too slowly. By 1927, the NEP was failing to produce the growth many leading communists expected. They wanted to increase the USSR's military strength and develop its self-sufficiency, reducing reliance on foreign imports. This represented both an ideological commitment and a practical security concern.
The Grain Procurement Crisis of 1927-1928
A substantial crisis in grain procurement emerged during the winter of 1927 to 1928. The government purchased 25 per cent less grain than the previous year's total. Grain prices remained low and peasant producers concentrated on other goods for which they could obtain higher prices. Party leaders sent an urgent stream of complaints to Moscow, blaming the peasants for 'hoarding' grain while they hoped for higher official prices.
This crisis became a turning point that pushed Stalin towards more radical policies, providing justification for the abandonment of the NEP and the forced collectivisation that followed.
Ideological motivation: Many within the Party felt impatient to revert to 'true' communist ideology in managing the economy. To move towards 'true socialism' required developing industry rather than having a state dependent on procuring grain by purchasing it from peasant producers. 'True socialism' also demanded state control over production, not dependence on the peasantry for successful grain harvests.
Stalin's changing attitude: Stalin's attitude to economic policy was also evolving. Having previously supported the NEP, he was now ready to be more radical. This may have resulted from economic circumstances pushing him to seek new solutions, or because he now felt secure enough in power to implement the policies he had always wanted.
The evolution of policy during these years proceeded as follows:
| Year | Development |
|---|---|
| 1925 | The Fourteenth Party Congress (the 'industrialisation congress') called for 'the transformation of our country from an agrarian into an industrial one, capable by its own efforts of producing the necessary means.' |
| 1926 | The NEP was maintained although concerns were raised as more investment was needed to drive industry forwards. |
| December 1927 | At the Fifteenth Party Congress there was an announcement of the end of the NEP and beginning of the first Five Year Plan for rapid industrialisation – known as 'The Great Turn'. |
Historians and the debate about the 'Great Turn'
Historical interpretation of the NEP and the Great Turn varies considerably. E.H. Carr's Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution (1973) emphasises all-party support for the NEP and suggests Bukharin's policies of continuing support for richer peasants were economically sound. Alec Nove's An Economic History of the USSR (1969) claims the NEP was working well in the 1920s but industrial production was distorted by the Party's policy of forcing prices down to an unrealistically low level.
Contrasting Historical Perspectives
Other historians, including R.W. Davies in 1998, have argued that the NEP had rescued the economy from disaster in the beginning but had to be changed by the late 1920s because it could not provide the framework for large-scale industrialisation.
This historiographical debate reflects broader questions about whether the Great Turn was:
- Economically necessary
- Ideologically driven
- Primarily a result of Stalin's personal ambitions and the power struggle within the Party
The impact of the Great Turn
The Great Turn of 1928 to 1929 initiated an economic and social revolution. Both its successes and its failures would have a massive and lasting effect on the Soviet economy and on the lives of the people, both in industrial towns and cities and in the countryside. The new shift in policy also generated a substantial impact on debates and power struggles within the Party.
During 1928 and 1929, the clash of opinion (and wills) between Stalin and Bukharin intensified, and relations between the two former allies broke down completely. The NEP era had ended; the period of rapid industrialisation was beginning. This transformation affected every aspect of Soviet life, from production methods to social relations, from urban development to rural existence.
The Great Turn represented more than a change in economic policy – it marked a fundamental transformation of Soviet society. The decision to abandon the NEP and pursue forced industrialisation and collectivisation would shape the USSR's development for decades to come, with profound consequences for millions of Soviet citizens.
Key Points to Remember:
- The Great Turn (1927-1929) marked the end of the NEP and the beginning of forced industrialisation and collectivisation, representing the transition from Lenin's economic policies to Stalinism.
- Multiple factors drove the Great Turn: industrial inefficiency, slow growth, the 1927-28 grain crisis, ideological pressure for 'true socialism', and Stalin's consolidation of power.
- Collective farms came in two forms: kolkhozes (people's farms run cooperatively) and sovkhozes (state farms with peasants as workers), though by 1928 less than 5% of peasants worked on collective farms.
- Historians debate whether the Great Turn was economically necessary (Davies), whether the NEP could have continued successfully (Nove), or whether Bukharin's alternative approach was viable (Carr).