Stalin’s Attitude to Foreign Powers (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
Stalin's Attitude to Foreign Powers
Overview of Stalin's foreign policy priorities
Stalin's approach to foreign affairs differed markedly from the internationalist vision pursued under Lenin. His primary objective was securing Russia's safety whilst focusing domestic resources on internal transformation. This defensive stance reflected his commitment to Socialism in One Country, the policy of constructing socialism within the USSR's borders rather than pursuing immediate global revolution. Complete isolation proved impossible, however, and Stalin faced pressing external challenges that demanded attention, particularly regarding China and Germany. He also had to manage the Comintern (Communist International), the organisation established to promote worldwide communist revolution, though this became an unwelcome remnant of failed revolutionary dreams under his leadership.
The Comintern was established in 1919 under Lenin to coordinate international communist parties and promote world revolution. Under Stalin, its role and priorities would undergo significant transformation as his focus shifted from global revolution to building socialism within the Soviet Union.
Stalin's chief diplomatic representative was Georgi Chicherin, supported by his capable deputy Maksim Litvinov. Both men projected a moderate, reassuring image to foreign governments. Stalin valued their polished diplomatic skills highly, recognising their usefulness in maintaining what he termed 'safe' relations with external powers, particularly Germany.
Stalin's response to developments in China, 1925-1927
Background to Chinese instability
China experienced profound upheaval following the collapse of the Imperial system in 1911. Political fragmentation intensified after President Sun Yat-sen's death in 1925. An expanding industrial working class engaged in militant labour action, with mass strikes erupting in Shanghai and Canton. Two rival political forces competed for control: the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), established in 1921, and the Guomindang (GMD), a right-wing nationalist movement led by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). The CCP anticipated support from Stalin and the Comintern for achieving communist revolution. The GMD, often known as the Kuomintang (KMT), claimed revolutionary credentials whilst pursuing nationalist objectives and waging political warfare against Chinese communists from 1926 onwards.
Stalin's preference for the Guomindang
Stalin chose to support Jiang Jieshi's nationalist movement rather than the communist party, calculating that the GMD offered greater prospects for bringing stability to a strategically important region bordering Russia's eastern territories. Stalin harboured suspicions about the independent Marxist interpretations developed by Chinese communists, who appeared unwilling to follow Moscow's direction.
Stalin's decision to support the nationalist Guomindang over the Chinese Communist Party represented a fundamental shift in priorities: stability and security for the USSR took precedence over supporting fellow communists and spreading revolution abroad. This pragmatic approach would have devastating consequences for Chinese communists.
Consequently, Stalin pressured the CCP into joining an 'alliance from within' the Guomindang. This arrangement failed catastrophically, as demonstrated by three violent episodes:
- March 1926: The GMD massacred striking workers in Canton and established military dictatorship.
- April 1927: GMD forces viciously suppressed a communist-led workers' revolt in Shanghai, killing thousands of workers.
- 1927: The GMD massacred striking workers in Wuhan; approximately 30,000 workers died in 1927 alone.
Stalin's reasoning and international ramifications
Stalin's concern centred on maintaining stability within Russia rather than exporting revolution to neighbouring territories. He viewed the Guomindang as the strongest force in China and therefore provided Jiang Jieshi with financial resources and military assistance. Stalin additionally pressured the Politburo into accepting the Guomindang as a Comintern member. From Stalin's perspective, the fault for China's disasters lay with the communists themselves, who had abandoned the urban working class and concentrated on the peasantry. This interpretation allowed Stalin to deflect blame whilst justifying his decision to back the nationalists.
The consequences extended beyond China. Stalin's 'betrayal' of the CCP attracted bitter criticism from Trotsky and the Left Opposition. However, Stalin's 'Socialism in One Country' policy enjoyed widespread support within the Party, and Trotsky's influence was diminishing. Although the Congress of December 1927 provided the occasion for substantial criticism of Stalin's China policy, the same Congress expelled Trotsky from the Party. Links between the CCP and the Soviet Union weakened considerably as a result of these events.
Primary source perspective: Trotsky's August 1930 critique
Primary Source Analysis: Trotsky's Critique of Stalin's China Policy
Leon Trotsky, writing from exile in Prinkipo near Istanbul in August 1930, condemned Stalin's support for the Guomindang between 1926 and 1927. Trotsky's account described how Jiang Jieshi sought Comintern membership in 1926 to position himself as an executioner under the protective cover of world communism.
At the Politburo session that accepted the Guomindang into the Comintern, only one vote opposed the decision. Trotsky noted that whilst engaged in preparing counter-revolutionary action in April 1927, Jiang Jieshi simultaneously exchanged portraits with Stalin, strengthening friendship ties prepared by Stalin's agents who had visited Jiang Jieshi at Canton. Trotsky argued that the Chinese Communists were compelled to submit and remain silent.
Significance: This source reveals the depth of opposition to Stalin's China policy and highlights the tension between supporting nationalist forces versus communist parties abroad.
Germany and the Treaty of Berlin, 1926
Context: normalising Soviet-German relations
The Treaty of Rapallo, signed with Weimar Germany in 1922, had represented the first major breakthrough in 'normalising' relations between the USSR and the wider international community. Germany and Russia maintained positive relations following Rapallo. Gustav Stresemann, German foreign minister from 1923 to 1929, demonstrated eagerness to preserve cooperative relations with Russia, whilst Georgi Chicherin remained committed to pro-German foreign policy.
The Treaty of Rapallo (1922) was groundbreaking because it marked the USSR's emergence from diplomatic isolation following the Russian Civil War. Both Germany and Russia, as international 'pariahs' after World War I, found mutual benefit in cooperation, establishing diplomatic and economic ties that would shape Soviet foreign policy throughout the 1920s.
Stresemann's attempts in 1925 to restore Germany's diplomatic position in Europe culminated in the Locarno treaties, a wide-ranging set of agreements designed to ensure that the post-war peace settlement would not be altered through force. Prosperity and peace appeared to be returning to Europe during the mid-1920s, and the Treaty of Berlin of 1926 reflected this optimistic mood, particularly from the German perspective.
Terms of the Treaty of Berlin
The German government presented the Treaty of Berlin as adapting the German-Russian agreement at Rapallo to accommodate a 'new political situation'. Consolidating relations with Russia proved popular within Germany. On the Russian side, Maksim Litvinov spoke approvingly, characterising the Berlin agreement as 'an amplification of the Treaty of Rapallo'.
The treaty's text addressed 'trustful cooperation between the German people and the peoples of the USSR' and referenced 'promoting general peace'. Specific articles included:
- Article 1 re-stated Rapallo's importance as the foundation for friendly German-Soviet relations regarding all political and economic questions affecting both countries.
- Article 2 stipulated that if either country faced attack by a third power, the other would remain neutral in the conflict.
- Article 3 contained a joint promise not to join any economic boycott launched against either Germany or Russia.
- Article 4 stated the treaty would remain in force for five years, with both states agreeing to discuss 'in good time' the future of their political relations.
Benefits for the USSR
The USSR gained tangible economic advantages from the Berlin treaty. In June 1926, the USSR received substantial financial credits from German banks. Positive relations continued until Stresemann's death in 1929, which coincided with the beginnings of the global economic crisis. The period 1928 to 1929 also marked the time when Stalin began adopting a radically different approach to the Comintern's role.
Key figure: Maksim Litvinov (1876-1951)
Maksim Litvinov came from a wealthy family of Lithuanian Jews. He engaged in revolutionary politics from 1898 and joined the Bolsheviks in 1903. He spent time in exile from 1906, residing mostly in Britain where he married an English woman. Lenin appointed him Soviet envoy to Britain in 1918. His social background and international experience made him highly effective in dealing with Western diplomats. He served as Chicherin's deputy, and replaced Chicherin as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs in 1930.
Key Points to Remember:
- Stalin's foreign policy prioritised Russia's security and internal socialist construction over international revolution, fundamentally diverging from Lenin's internationalist approach.
- In China 1925-1927, Stalin backed the nationalist Guomindang over the Chinese Communist Party, believing stability mattered more than spreading revolution, despite the GMD's massacres of communist workers.
- The Treaty of Berlin 1926 consolidated Soviet-German cooperation established at Rapallo, providing the USSR with economic benefits and diplomatic security through neutrality agreements.
- Stalin used skilled diplomats Chicherin and Litvinov to project a moderate image abroad, maintaining 'safe' relations whilst pursuing defensive foreign policy objectives.