Stalin’s Rise to Party Leadership (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
Stalin's Rise to Party Leadership
Stalin's position in the party leadership by 1924
By 1924, Stalin had secured a central role within the party's leadership structure. Lenin's funeral in January 1924 provided Stalin with an opportunity to entrench his position further. He took charge of arrangements for the funeral and seized the chance to promote the cult of Leninism, the process by which Lenin was elevated to god-like status. Stalin insisted that Lenin's body be embalmed and placed on public view. This has been said to demonstrate Stalin was making Leninism into a religion, with loyal comrades as its High Priest.
Trotsky's Absence from Lenin's Funeral
Trotsky was absent from the funeral, convalescing from serious influenza at Sukhum on the Black Sea. His failure to attend gave Stalin a political advantage. Afterwards, it was widely suspected that Stalin had cunningly 'arranged' Trotsky's absence by misleading messages, but this was not the case. Trotsky chose to stay at Sukhum because he was ill and the journey was far away. At the time, missing the funeral did not seem as important as was later realised.
The defeat of the Left Opposition, 1924–1927
Trotsky's hesitation in 1924
During 1924 and 1925, the power struggle shifted into a new phase. Until this time, Stalin's political skills had been underrated by other, more flamboyant leaders – just as they had underrated the importance of Stalin's bureaucratic power as General Secretary. With their more obvious and pressing concern to 'stop Trotsky', Stalin's ambitions had gone unnoticed. However, as Trotsky's position became weaker, perceptions of Stalin changed and the Triumvirate (the alliance of Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev) began to fall apart.
It was perhaps surprising that Trotsky did not make a decisive move against Stalin early in 1924. This was the time when Stalin's control of the bureaucracy was gradually being perceived as a threat. The Thirteenth Party Congress in May 1924 seemed to offer the perfect occasion to move against Stalin. Trotsky hesitated, possibly because he was nervous of being blamed for causing a split in the Party, possibly because he thought there would be a better opportunity when Stalin had valuable support from Kamenev and Zinoviev at the Congress, who protected Stalin from criticisms arising from Lenin's Testament. The Triumvirate seemed strong.
Robert Service's Analysis
Robert Service, in his biography of Stalin, suggests that Trotsky was correct in his judgement to hold back at the 1924 Party Congress. Service argues that at the time there was still an inbuilt majority against Trotsky, and that any move he made to remove Stalin from the Politburo would have awakened fears of Trotsky bidding for supreme power.
Trotsky never found a better opportunity to challenge Stalin. His position, seemingly so powerful at the time of Lenin's death, slid slowly backwards. Trotsky was not a natural conspirator like Stalin; he lacked an instinct for bureaucratic infighting, or the patience needed to mobilise his supporters, or to win over potential allies until it was too late.
Stalin's loyal supporters
Stalin, however, showed single-minded focus on building up a personal following of loyal supporters. These included Vyacheslav Molotov (the Assistant General Secretary), Lazar Kaganovich (first secretary of the party in Ukraine), Kliment Voroshilov (an ally of Stalin since they had worked together as Political Commissars fighting in the Civil War), and Sergei Kirov, a youthful rising star in the Leningrad party leadership, whom Stalin placed in key positions. According to Robert Service, 'Stalin demanded efficiency as well as loyalty from the gang members. He created an ambience of conspiracy, companionship and crude masculine humour. In return for their services he looked after their interests.'
Vyacheslav Molotov (1890–1986)
Molotov's real name was Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Skryabin. The son of a shop assistant, he joined the Bolsheviks in 1906, was twice exiled to Siberia, and was involved in the Bolshevik seizure of power in Petrograd in 1917. A loyal ally of Stalin, he was Second Secretary from 1922. Often seen as a boring mediocrity (Trotsky liked to hint he was 'Stone the Stone'), he played a key role in Stalin's rise to power. He replaced Rykov as Party Chairman in 1930 and was then Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1939 to 1949. He was ousted by Khrushchev in 1956.
Lazar Kaganovich (1893–1991)
Often known as 'Iron Lazar', from 1917 he rose through the ranks to become First Secretary of Ukraine. He was a loyal supporter of Stalin in the 1920s, running the party bureaucracy. He joined the Politburo in 1930. His role in forced collectivisation was very brutal; he has been blamed as the chief cause of the Great Famine in 1932 to 1933; he continued to be a central figure managing industry, railways and the war effort. He lost influence after Stalin's death.
Kliment Voroshilov (1881–1969)
A member of the Politburo from 1925 to 1961, he was a loyal supporter of Stalin from 1921 and became People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs in 1925. He was made a Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1935. Voroshilov became a Second World War commander and remained a powerful figure in the regime until after Stalin's death.
Sergei Kirov (1886–1934)
Active in the revolutions of 1905 and 1917, he was a flamboyant military commander in the North Caucasus in the Civil War. He became prominent in the party organisation in Azerbaijan; in 1926, he was handpicked by Stalin to replace Zinoviev as Party boss in Leningrad. He was very popular with the Party membership and seen as a rising star. This is probably the reason why he was assassinated, on Stalin's secret orders, in 1934.
The breakdown of the Triumvirate
After the Thirteenth Party Congress of 1924, tensions grew within the Triumvirate as Kamenev and Zinoviev became frustrated by their failure to control Stalin. Bukharin became an ally of Stalin against the others. This was the time when the debate over 'permanent revolution' or 'Socialism in One Country' was particularly intense, and the mood of the Party was moving towards Stalin's view that stability within the USSR was more important than 'reckless adventures' fomenting revolution abroad. Similarly, the future of the NEP was fiercely debated; many in the Party disagreed with Bukharin's enthusiastic support for peasants 'enriching themselves'. In these shifting alliances, Stalin almost invariably placed himself in the 'golden middle', avoiding extreme positions.
Primary source evidence: Zinoviev's concerns
Primary Source: Zinoviev's Letter to Kamenev (30 July 1924)
In a private letter from Zinoviev to Kamenev, dated 30 July 1924, Zinoviev expressed frustration:
"You're letting Stalin make a mockery of us. You want facts? Examples? Allow me! The National Question: Stalin makes all the appointments of the Central Committee instructors. The Comintern: V.I. [Lenin] dedicated a good 10 per cent of his time to the Comintern. Stalin just turns up, takes one quick look, and makes a decision. Bukharin and I are never asked about anything. Pravda: This morning, Bukharin was told the entire editorial board of the paper had been sacked without him being asked. We can't tolerate this any longer. If the party is doomed to go through a period [probably very brief] of Stalin's personal despotism, then so be it. But I for one do not intend to keep quiet about all this swinish behaviour by Stalin. People talk about the 'triumvirate' in the belief that I am not the least important member of it. But in reality there is no triumvirate, only Stalin's dictatorship."
This source reveals the growing concerns among party leaders about Stalin's accumulation of power through bureaucratic control.
The battle intensifies: January to December 1925
By the beginning of 1925, the balance within the Party was swinging further away from Trotsky. At the Central Committee in January, Trotsky was forced out of his post as People's Commissar for War. Zinoviev proposed that Trotsky should be expelled from the Party but Stalin, determined to keep his image as a moderate, rejected this. Trotsky was thus isolated but not yet defeated. Without fears of Trotsky to keep it together, the Triumvirate became even more fractious; Kamenev and Zinoviev opposed Stalin in the Central Committee in September 1925 and the battle lines of the power struggle were redrawn at the Fourteenth Party Congress in December 1925. Kamenev and Zinoviev launched a direct attack on Stalin.
Kamenev's attack on Stalin, December 1925
Primary Source: Kamenev's Statement at the Party Congress (December 1925)
At the Party Congress in December 1925, Kamenev made a statement as part of his and Zinoviev's attack on Stalin:
"We are against creating a theory of 'the Leader', we are against making anyone into 'the Leader'. We're for the idea that our leadership should be internally organised in such a way that there is a truly all-powerful Politburo uniting all our party's politicians, and that the Secretariat should be subordinate to it, carrying out the Politburo's decrees. Personally, I suggest our General Secretary is not the kind of figure who can unite the old Bolshevik high command around him. It is precisely because I've often said this personally to comrade Stalin, and precisely because I've often said this to a group of Leninist comrades, that I repeat it now to the Congress. I have come to the conclusion that comrade Stalin is incapable of performing the role of unifier of the Bolshevik high command."
They found it very hard to do this effectively. They had, after all, been allied to him for the previous year and had frequently backed Stalin's view of the dangers of 'factionalism'. From 1925, they were easily painted as factionalists endangering the security of the USSR at a precarious time. The result was that Kamenev and Zinoviev were gradually pushed towards joining their former enemy, Trotsky, in the Left Opposition. Stalin and Bukharin formed a partnership, sometimes called the 'Duumvirate', that was virtually running the country in 1926 and 1927.
The Literary Discussion
The power struggle was far from over in 1926 and the Party leadership was still unstable. Bukharin and Zinoviev still feared Trotsky and even more so when Kamenev and Zinoviev joined Trotsky in mid 1926. The Left Opposition became the United Opposition. The bitter infighting in the first half of 1926 was theoretical as well as political: there was a war of words fought out by the main contenders in a flood of books and pamphlets sometimes known as the 'Literary Discussion'. This was an important episode in the power struggle.
Trotsky's writings were the most impressive of those produced in the Literary Discussion; Bukharin, Kamenev and Zinoviev also contributed books and articles. But Stalin was an active theorist, too. His book On Questions of Leninism argued the case for 'Socialism in One Country' with tenacious cleverness (though misrepresenting what Lenin had actually said). His opponents continued to underrate Stalin's understanding of revolutionary theory but his book and his speeches were well prepared.
Trotsky did not win the war of words as he had expected; Stalin's line appealed to a majority of party members. Even if Trotsky had won, it would not have compensated for his weak position in bureaucratic politics.
The clash between Trotsky and his allies on one side, against Stalin and Bukharin on the other, continued through 1926. Although Stalin generally had the upper hand, he still faced continuous criticism and, in December 1926, his frustrations led him to offer to resign as General Secretary. Trotsky and the United Opposition increased the pressure in the spring and summer of 1927, at a time when Stalin was blamed for the crushing of the Chinese Communists in Canton and Shanghai.
The expulsion of the opposition, 1927
Stalin and Bukharin fought back strongly, backed by their inbuilt majorities in Party committees. In October 1927, the Central Committee voted to expel Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev from the CC. In November, Trotsky and Zinoviev were expelled from the Party altogether. At the Fifteenth Party Congress in December 1927, the expulsions were confirmed, and dozens of other 'oppositionists' were expelled also. Stalin and Bukharin were seemingly triumphant.
The defeat of Bukharin and the Right
Outwardly, the 'Duumvirate' of Stalin and Bukharin was secure and harmonious. The two families lived near each other and private relations between them were friendly. But political tensions began to emerge in 1928. Partly, these tensions were about power: Stalin's long-term aims did not extend to sharing power. Partly, they were about policy, especially in relation to the NEP and the peasants.
The grain crisis of 1928
At the beginning of 1928, Russia was facing a serious food shortage; the regime had difficulty buying enough grain from peasant producers. This crisis intensified dissatisfaction with the NEP among Party members keen to see Russia industrialise more quickly. There was an undercurrent of criticisms of Bukharin, always likely to be seen as 'soft' on the peasant question. Stalin's instincts were in favour of tough action to compel the peasantry to increase grain supplies; it is also possible Stalin had always favoured such policies but had held back while he was fighting his political battles with the Left. As Stalin moved to harsher measures in the countryside, divisions between him and Bukharin widened.
Stalin's Unilateral Action in Siberia
Stalin personally supervised stern measures against the peasants in western Siberia in January and February 1928. It is telling that he did not discuss this with Bukharin beforehand, but took unilateral action. At the same time, Stalin was preparing the way for a rapid surge in industrialisation – what later became the first Five Year Plan. Again, this led to friction with Bukharin, who wanted industrialisation, but at a slower pace.
Bukharin's isolation
In April 1928, Bukharin protested against 'excesses' by officials. Bukharin expected other Party leaders to support him, but they did not. He and Stalin clashed repeatedly in the Politburo. Bukharin's numerous speeches and articles in favour of 'sensible' policies made little impact. Bukharin was now isolated and vulnerable to Stalin's attacks.
Bukharin's defence, February 1929
Primary Source: Bukharin's Speech at the Politburo (9 February 1929)
In a speech at a meeting of the Politburo on 9 February 1929, Bukharin defended himself against attacks by Stalin:
"Serious, urgent questions are not discussed. The entire country is deeply troubled by the grain crisis and supply problems. But conferences of the proletarian ruling party are silent. The entire country feels that all is not well with the peasantry. But conferences of the proletarian party, our party, are silent. The entire country sees and feels the changes in the international situation. But conferences of the proletarian party are silent. Instead, there is a hail of resolutions about 'deviations'. Instead, there are millions of rumours and gossip about the 'rightists' Rykov, Tomsky, Bukharin, etc. This is petty politics, not the politics needed in a time of difficulties to tell the working classes the truth of the situation, the politics that trusts the masses and hears and feels the needs of the masses."
This source illustrates Bukharin's frustration with Stalin's manipulation of party discourse and his isolation from power.
The emergence of Stalin the Despot
Stalin, formerly the moderate in the 'golden middle', was reverting to radical revolutionary policies in many areas: war in the countryside against the 'kulaks', sudden and rapid industrialisation, even a new emphasis on interventionist foreign policies and aggressive support for the Comintern. These new policies were followed through with increasing severity through 1928 and into 1929. Bukharin ceased to be a partner and became an enemy, along with other 'rightists' such as Rykov and Tomsky.
By February 1929, Bukharin was desperate enough to consider making an alliance with Trotsky (he did not go through with it, but Stalin was aware of the contacts between them). In April 1929, Bukharin was deprived of several of his government posts, including editorship of Pravda; in November 1929, he was expelled from the Politburo. In December 1929, Stalin made a speech that revealed the harsh nature of the policies he now intended to follow. The era of Stalin the Revolutionary was over; the era of Stalin the Despot was just beginning.
Why Stalin won the power struggle
Whether Stalin was an opportunist who manipulated ideology or was driven by genuine convictions, he certainly knew how to deal with ideological issues and debates, always promoting the idea that he was following the principles laid down by Lenin. Stalin's ability to pick a middle path through Party debates while also exploiting developments, such as the change from elections to appointments within the party hierarchy, the growth of central authority during the Civil War, and the ban on factionalism, provided the framework within which Stalin was able to rise to power.
Stalin showed political skills that other, more obviously talented leaders lacked. He built up bureaucratic control through his role as General Secretary, placing loyal supporters in positions throughout the party apparatus. His opponents underestimated both his abilities and his ambitions until it was too late to stop him.
Stalin's Strategic Pattern of Defeating Rivals
The defeat of his rivals followed a careful pattern:
- First phase (1922–1924): He worked with Zinoviev and Kamenev to isolate and defeat Trotsky
- Second phase (1924–1927): He broke with Zinoviev and Kamenev, defeating the Left Opposition
- Third phase (1928–1929): He turned against his former ally Bukharin, defeating the Right
In each phase, Stalin positioned himself as the moderate, reasonable figure defending party unity against 'factionalists' and 'deviationists'.
Remember!
Key Points to Remember:
- Stalin used Lenin's funeral in January 1924 to promote the cult of Leninism and position himself as Lenin's heir, while Trotsky was absent due to illness.
- Stalin defeated his rivals in stages: first the Left Opposition (Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev) by 1927, then the Right (Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky) by 1929, always positioning himself as the moderate defender of party unity.
- Stalin built a loyal following through his control of the party bureaucracy as General Secretary, placing supporters like Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov and Kirov in positions throughout the party apparatus.
- By December 1929, Stalin had consolidated power and the era of 'Stalin the Despot' began, with former rivals eventually purged, forced into confessions, and executed in the 1930s.