Post-War Reconstruction (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
Post-War Reconstruction
The scale of economic devastation
The impact of the war on the Soviet economy was catastrophic. Between 1941 and 1945, the war killed one in eight of the population and caused massive dislocation. Stalin recognised in 1945 that the USSR would need to become the leading industrial power by 1960. In August 1945, Gosplan was instructed to prepare a new Five Year Plan for economic recovery.
Fourth Five Year Plan refers to the economic programme launched in August 1945 to rebuild Soviet industry and agriculture after wartime destruction. The Plan set ambitious targets for both sectors. One third of the Plan's expenditure was allocated to Ukraine, which had been one of the areas most devastated by war and remained a very important region for both industry and agriculture.
The fourth Five Year Plan: aims and priorities
Stalin outlined the main tasks of the new Five Year Plan in his speech to voters in the electoral district of Moscow in February 1946. The primary objectives were to rehabilitate the devastated regions of the country and restore industry and agriculture to pre-war levels, then exceed those levels to a considerable extent. The rationing system was to be abolished in the very near future. Special attention would be given to expanding the production of consumer goods and raising the standard of living of working people. The Party also intended to organise another powerful upswing in the national economy that would raise industry to a level approximately three times as high as before the war.
Industry
The challenge of conversion
When the war ended, much of Soviet industrial production had to be switched away from military needs to the civilian economy. Industry struggled to adjust to peacetime conditions. In 1945 and 1946, mining production was running at less than half the 1940 level; electric power at 52 per cent; and steel at 45 per cent. The transport infrastructure remained badly disrupted. The workforce was exhausted after the colossal efforts and sacrifices demanded by the war. Many of these problems were intensified by the sudden ending of foreign aid (particularly American assistance through Lend-Lease) in August 1945.
Foreign aid through the American Lend-Lease programme had been crucial during the war, providing the USSR with vital supplies, equipment, and materials. Its sudden termination in August 1945 created an immediate challenge for the Soviet economy, which had to rapidly adjust to functioning without this external support while simultaneously converting from wartime to peacetime production.
Industrial recovery by 1950
Despite the difficulties, by 1950 there was considerable industrial recovery under the fourth Five Year Plan. Many of the Plan's targets were equalled or exceeded. These successes were due to several factors, including war reparations, central planning, and the committed efforts of the Soviet people. The post-war Soviet economy proved itself to be very resilient, and its rapid growth from 1946 reflected a rebound effect from a long series of disasters stretching back well before the 1941 to 1945 war. Long-term growth trends were slower than in Western Europe but in the post-war years there was considerable scope for the Soviet economy to improve on its past performance.
Industrial production statistics
| Product | 1940 | 1945 | 1950 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Coal (tons) | 165.9 million | 149.3 million | 261.1 million |
| Oil (tons) | 31.1 million | 19.4 million | 32.9 million |
| Steel (tons) | 18.3 million | 12.3 million | 27.3 million |
| Cement (tons) | 5.7 million | 1.8 million | 10.2 million |
| Electricity (kilowatts) | 48.3 million | 43.2 million | 91.2 million |
These figures demonstrate that by 1950, Soviet industry had not only recovered to pre-war levels but had exceeded them substantially in most sectors. Coal production increased by approximately 58 per cent compared to 1940, while electricity production nearly doubled.
War reparations and industrial recovery
The Soviet Union insisted on the fulfilment of war reparations from enemy countries, even though many of them had pro-Soviet governments. Huge amounts of equipment and materials, including great quantities of scrap metal, were transported to the USSR, especially from Soviet zones of occupation in Germany. Sometimes whole factories, together with their workers, were shifted to Russia. Historians and economists continue to debate how much difference this made to economic recovery, but it was not a decisive factor on its own.
Under the fourth Five Year Plan, Soviet economic recovery from the war was far more impressive than had been the case after the First World War and the Civil War. Alongside the necessary rebuilding of heavy industry, there was (unlike the 1930s) improved production of consumer goods and some steady growth in living standards. As late as 1948, average Soviet incomes had climbed back up to the 1938 levels. This relatively rapid recovery was part of a wider trend: all over Europe there was prolonged growth in prosperity in the 1950s.
Continuing economic problems
Economic problems in the USSR were not entirely solved. The economy was overloaded by military expenditure, which went up sharply because of the intensification of the Cold War. The size of the armed forces increased from 2.8 million in 1948 to 4.9 million by 1953. Military spending was 18 per cent of total expenditure in 1950, but rose to 25 per cent in 1952. Among other problems there continued to be an acute housing shortage, and the recovery of Soviet agriculture was slow and plagued with difficulties. By 1953, there were growing pressures to reform the economy.
Despite impressive industrial recovery, the Soviet economy faced mounting challenges by the early 1950s. The dramatic increase in military spending—from 18% to 25% of total expenditure between 1950 and 1952—placed enormous strain on resources. This Cold War burden, combined with unresolved housing shortages and agricultural difficulties, created growing pressures for economic reform that would become urgent after Stalin's death.
Agriculture
Agricultural devastation
Agriculture in the USSR had been devastated by the war. Officially, 98,000 collective farms had been ruined, with the loss of 137,000 tractors, 49,000 combine harvesters, 7 million horses, 17 million cattle, 20 million pigs and 27 million sheep. Food production was 60 per cent of the 1940 level. The prospects for recovery were hindered by a severe labour shortage and by the fact that far less land was under cultivation than before the war. The 1945 total was only 75 per cent of what it had been in 1940.
The scale of agricultural devastation was staggering and far exceeded industrial losses. The destruction of collective farms, machinery, and livestock, combined with severe labour shortages, created conditions that would take years to overcome. The loss of millions of horses and tractors was particularly critical, as these were essential for plowing and cultivation. These losses help explain why agricultural recovery lagged so far behind industrial recovery.
The 1946-7 famine
To make matters worse, 1946 was the driest year since 1891, and the harvest was poor. In some regions there was famine. Famine began in parts of Ukraine and central Russia in July 1946. The main cause was the dislocation caused by the war, especially shortage of agricultural labourers and the lack of machinery. This was intensified by severe drought. Thousands died of hunger, though nothing like on the same scale as in the Great Famine of the early 1930s. In his memoirs, Nikita Khrushchev claimed that the 1946 to 1947 famine was made worse by Stalin's policies, and that grain was exported abroad, not used to relieve the famine.
Primary Source: Collective Farm Letter (September 1948)
A letter sent to their local Politburo representative by the management of a collective farm in Western Siberia in September 1948 illustrates the ongoing difficulties:
The farmers explained that they had to hand over their whole harvest without receiving a single gram back. This undermined the economy of collective farms and the incentive of farmers to work. They noted that during the war more grain was needed to supply the army, and they gladly gave up everything to defeat the enemy. As there were poor harvests in 1945, 1946 and 1947, they also handed over everything to rebuild the economy as quickly as possible.
For 1948 they had hoped that once they had achieved their state grain delivery target of about one kilogram per work day, the district committees would distribute the surplus. However, they were given instructions to deliver much more than the quota, leaving nothing to give out and not even enough seed to sow for 1949. The farmers reported they did not see a crumb of bread and lived off potatoes.
Agricultural recovery: slow and limited
Recovery in agriculture was slow and patchy. The fourth Five Year Plan brought some increases but failed to reach most of its targets. By the time of Stalin's death in 1953, the agricultural sector was still unsatisfactory, though some regions were progressing much better than others. On the other hand, the age-old cycle of famines in Russian and Soviet history was broken; there was never another one after 1947.
One problem holding back reforms in agriculture was Stalin himself. A book by Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, was published in 1952. As with other topics, Stalin's writings were seen as incontrovertible, and this discouraged any tendencies towards innovation and change. After Stalin's death, his successors felt they had to introduce reforms and concessions to peasant farmers to alleviate the problems in agriculture.
Agricultural production statistics, 1940-1952
| Product | 1940 | 1947 | 1948 | 1949 | 1950 | 1951 | 1952 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Grain (tons) | 95.6 million | 65.9 million | 67.2 million | 70.2 million | 81.2 million | 78.7 million | 92.2 million |
| Potatoes (tons) | 76.1 million | 74.5 million | 95.0 million | 89.6 million | 88.5 million | 58.7 million | 69.2 million |
| Cotton (tons) | 2.2 million | 1.7 million | 2.2 million | 2.5 million | 3.5 million | 3.7 million | 3.8 million |
| Cattle (million head) | 28.0 million | 23.0 million | 23.8 million | 24.2 million | 24.6 million | 24.3 million | 25.0 million |
These figures reveal the slow and uneven nature of agricultural recovery. Grain production did not return to 1940 levels until 1952, twelve years after the German invasion. Potato production fluctuated significantly, showing particular vulnerability to harvest variations. Cotton and cattle showed gradual recovery but remained below or only marginally above pre-war levels by 1953.
Post-Stalin agricultural reforms
In September 1953, Georgi Malenkov delivered a speech to the Supreme Soviet, published by the official Soviet news service Izvestia. He acknowledged that up to that point there had been no opportunity to develop light industry and the food industry at the same tempo as heavy industry. At the present time this was possible, and the government was obliged to ensure more rapid improvement in the people's living standards. Investment in light industry and the production of food and fish needed significant increases. Consumer goods output required rapid growth in the production of grain. The government needed to sharply reduce compulsory deliveries from the personal plots of land on collective farms and to reduce agricultural taxes.
Malenkov's speech marked a significant shift in Soviet economic policy after Stalin's death. By acknowledging that it was now possible to develop light industry and improve living standards, he signalled a departure from the single-minded focus on heavy industry that had characterised Stalin's approach. The proposed reductions in compulsory deliveries and agricultural taxes represented an attempt to address the chronic problems that had plagued Soviet agriculture throughout the post-war period.
Key Points to Remember:
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Victory in the Great Patriotic War cost approximately 20 million Soviet lives (one in eight of the population) and caused catastrophic destruction to infrastructure, industry, and agriculture.
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The fourth Five Year Plan (1945-1950) achieved considerable success in industrial recovery, with most targets met or exceeded by 1950 due to war reparations, central planning, and Soviet resilience.
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Industrial production by 1950 had exceeded 1940 levels in most sectors, though the economy remained burdened by rising military expenditure driven by Cold War tensions.
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Agricultural recovery was far slower and more problematic, with devastation including the loss of 98,000 collective farms, millions of livestock, and severe labour shortages leading to famine in 1946-7.
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By Stalin's death in 1953, agriculture remained unsatisfactory and reform pressures were mounting, though the cycle of recurring famines had been broken after 1947.