Operation Barbarossa and Response (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
Operation Barbarossa and Response
Operation Barbarossa: Hitler's invasion plan
By summer 1941, Hitler stood poised to launch the invasion of Russia. He had been developing this strategy since October 1940. Britain refused to make peace following the German conquest of France and Western Europe but could not present a military threat to Germany at this stage. Hitler recognised that the Soviet Union remained poorly prepared for war. The German armed forces possessed experience and hardening from recent campaigns, and their equipment proved superior. Hitler's planners anticipated achieving a swift and decisive victory.
The invasion received the original scheduled date of 1 June 1941, but delays of three weeks occurred because political troubles among Hitler's Italian allies created a crisis in Yugoslavia. This situation compelled Hitler to invade Yugoslavia through another intervention. The invasion date was eventually re-set for 22 June.
At the time, this delay appeared minor, but it reduced the time-window available for completing the operation before winter weather conditions intervened. This seemingly small postponement would prove to have significant consequences for the German campaign.
The German invasion strategy
Three large army groups spearheaded the German invasion plan:
- Northern force directed through the Baltic States towards Leningrad
- Southern and eastern forces advancing into Ukraine
- Central thrust moving towards Moscow
Some of Hitler's senior advisers preferred to concentrate all forces in the central drive towards Moscow, but he overruled them. The aims behind Barbarossa extended beyond merely military victory. Hitler also sought to seize control over the entire Soviet economy and to eradicate communism. He believed that many Soviet citizens would welcome the German invaders as liberators.
Blitzkrieg was the term used to describe the rapid victories German armies achieved when conquering Poland in September 1939 and France in 1940. This approach employed fast-moving armoured units supported by close air support. The invasion of the USSR was designed to replicate another such lightning war.
The Stalinist reaction: unpreparedness and miscalculation
Soviet military weakness
Stalin's miscalculation regarding the effectiveness of the Nazi-Soviet Pact left the Soviet Union unprepared for war in June 1941. Even when foreign sources warned Stalin that a German invasion was imminent, he took no action. This inaction occurred partly because he preferred not to believe the warnings, and partly because he dared not take any visible steps against an invasion in case those steps provoked Hitler into launching it.
Soviet military strength had suffered undermining through the army purges of 1937 to 1939. This weakness had been demonstrated by the poor performance of the Red Army in the Winter War against Finland. Soviet resources also faced strain from the need to maintain substantial forces in the Far East following the 1939 war against Japan.
Between 1939 and June 1941, the total size of Soviet armed forces had grown substantially, but these forces lagged well behind Germany in efficiency, equipment and leadership quality.
The extensive territories in eastern Poland and the Baltic States that had been seized in 1939 and 1940 to provide a buffer zone against attack offered no defence and were overrun within weeks of the invasion.
Stalin's initial response
The weakness of the Soviet position in June 1941 appeared reflected in Stalin's actions. He shrank away from making a radio broadcast to the people; that task fell to Molotov. Stalin appears to have lost his nerve, anticipating that the people and the Party leadership would blame him and turn against him. Nearly two weeks passed before Stalin dared to make a radio speech to the nation on 3 July.
When he finally spoke, the address represented a dramatic change in tone from the terror of the 1930s. Stalin appealed to patriotism and religion, and to unity among the nationalities. The friendship with Nazi Germany, previously promoted by the regime, was replaced by ideological hatred. Stalin's new friend became the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. This new tone, describing a Great Patriotic War linking back to national struggles from Russia's past, would become a lasting feature of Soviet war propaganda.
Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov addressed the nation on 22 June 1941, stating:
"Now that the attack against the Soviet Union has taken place, our troops have been ordered to repel the treacherous attack and drive the German aggressors from the territory of our Motherland. This is not the first time our people have had to deal with an aggressive enemy. During Napoleon's campaign against Russia our people responded with the Patriotic War, and Napoleon suffered defeat and ruin."
Stalin's radio broadcast of 3 July 1941 (his first public address since the invasion two weeks earlier) declared:
"The enemy is tireless and cruel. He aims to secure our lands, grain, and oil. He aims to bring back the power of the landowners and restore Tsarism, to destroy the national culture and statehood of Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Uzbeks, Tatars, Moldovans, Georgians, Armenians, and other free peoples of the Soviet Union."
The speech portrayed the war not merely as defence against danger to the country, but as assistance to help all peoples of Europe suffering under German fascism.
Stalin's errors and leadership failures
Stalin bore responsibility for errors and poor leadership during the early stages of the war:
- He experienced a panic attack following the invasion and failed to provide leadership in the first weeks. He prepared to move the government away from Moscow to Samara on the Volga, and only decided at the last moment to stay in Moscow.
- He relied for too long on many inferior commanders who had received promotion for political reasons following the purge of the army.
- In September 1941, he helped to cause a substantial defeat of his southern armies at Kiev by refusing to allow them to retreat until it was too late. He also demonstrated no urgency in defending Leningrad after it came under siege.
Only after a long series of defeats and disasters did his war cabinet, Stavka, become an effective mechanism to run the war. Stavka was the top-level military command of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. The Stavka had originated in Tsarist times, but was re-formed under Stalin on 23 June 1941. It comprised leading generals such as Timoshenko and Zhukov, as well as prominent politicians including Molotov and Voroshilov. Stavka was subordinate only to GKO (the State Defence Committee), which functioned as the supreme political war cabinet.
Stalin proved saved by the size of Russia, with its huge population and vast distances; by the severity of the Russian winter; and by the patriotism of the Soviet people. He also learned from his mistakes and eventually received accolades as the Great War Hero. Stalin benefited from advance information about the intentions of Japan, provided by a master spy, Richard Sorge. When Japan attacked the US naval base at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii in December 1941, this brought the United States into the Grand Alliance against the Axis Powers (Germany, Italy and Japan). Stalin was thus saved from having to fight a two-front war.
Viktor Kravchenko, an engineer who worked in collectivisation of Ukraine in the 1930s and served as a captain in the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War, wrote in his 1947 memoir:
"During the period of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Stalin helped Hitler to conquer Europe by providing him with metals, ores, oil, grain, meat, butter, and every conceivable material, in accordance with their economic pact. Even after the invasion, Stalin helped Hitler by leaving him immense riches in military goods and productive capacity... Failure to prepare for war will be held against Stalin regime in history, despite the ultimate victory. It was to blame for millions of unnecessary casualties, for human wretchedness beyond calculation."
Kravchenko highlighted that despite warnings, the population of Leningrad was not evacuated. In three successive winters of terrifying siege up to May 1943, more than 1.3 million people died of hunger and cold.
Key dates
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| June 1941 | Operation Barbarossa launched (22 June); German invasion of USSR |
| September 1941 | Beginning of Siege of Leningrad |
| December 1941 | Battle of Moscow; German advance halted |
| July 1942 | Renewed German offensive south towards Caucasus oil fields |
| November 1942 | German army surrounded at Stalingrad |
| February 1943 | Surrender of German army at Stalingrad |
| July 1943 | Battle of Kursk; start of long German retreat |
| January 1944 | End of Leningrad siege |
| May 1945 | Soviet victory in the Battle of Berlin |
Key Points to Remember:
- Operation Barbarossa launched on 22 June 1941 (delayed from 1 June due to the Yugoslav crisis), employing three army groups with aims extending beyond military victory to include economic control and eradication of communism.
- The Nazi-Soviet Pact left the USSR unprepared for war; Soviet military strength had been undermined by the army purges of 1937-1939 and the Winter War against Finland.
- Stalin initially panicked and delayed addressing the nation until 3 July 1941, when he changed propaganda tone from ideology to appeals to patriotism, religion and national unity.
- Stalin made substantial early errors (panic, reliance on inferior commanders, poor decisions at Kiev and Leningrad) but eventually learned from mistakes and was saved by Russia's size, winter conditions, Soviet patriotism and intelligence from Richard Sorge about Japan's intentions.