Cause, Course and Extent (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
Cause, Course and Extent
Introduction to the October/November 1917 Revolution
The Bolshevik seizure of power that began on 25 October 1917 (using the Julian calendar in use at the time) marked a turning point in Russian history. These events were not isolated incidents but rather the culmination of mounting pressures and failures that had built up since the Tsar's abdication in March 1917. Understanding both the immediate triggers and the deeper structural weaknesses that made the revolution possible is essential for grasping why the Bolsheviks succeeded in taking control.
The Julian calendar was 13 days behind the Western Gregorian calendar, which is why this event is sometimes referred to as the November Revolution in Western sources. In the Gregorian calendar, these events occurred in early November 1917.
Causes of the October/November Revolution
The October Revolution emerged from a combination of factors that created what can be described as an explosive political situation. The Provisional Government (the temporary administration that had governed Russia since March 1917) suffered from multiple weaknesses that severely undermined its authority and ability to govern effectively.
Continued involvement in the First World War remained perhaps the most damaging failure of the Provisional Government. Despite widespread war-weariness among soldiers and civilians, the government persisted with the military campaign. Defeats on the battlefield, particularly the failed June Offensive, drained morale and resources whilst generating intense resentment among troops who simply wished to return home.
The Provisional Government's decision to continue fighting in World War I proved to be its most fatal mistake. This single policy alienated soldiers, workers, and peasants simultaneously, creating the conditions for revolution.
Economic deterioration accelerated throughout 1917. Food shortages worsened in cities as the transport system collapsed and peasants withheld grain from the market. Inflation spiralled, wages failed to keep pace with rising prices, and industrial production declined. Urban workers faced hunger whilst rural areas experienced their own hardships, creating widespread discontent across Russian society.
Social resentments intensified as different groups pursued conflicting aims. Soldiers wanted peace and demobilisation. Peasants desired land redistribution. Workers sought better conditions, higher wages, and more control over factories. The Provisional Government proved unable or unwilling to address these demands decisively, leading to growing frustration.
The political manoeuvres of the Bolsheviks under Lenin and Trotsky proved increasingly effective during this period. Lenin returned to Russia in April 1917 and immediately began advocating for "All Power to the Soviets" and an end to the war. His April Theses offered clear, simple promises: peace, land, and bread. Trotsky, who had joined the Bolsheviks in summer 1917, brought organisational skills and became chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. Through the Military Revolutionary Committee (a body formed in October 1917 ostensibly to defend Petrograd against German attack but actually controlled by the Bolsheviks), they gained command over military units in the capital.
Lenin's slogan "peace, land, and bread" was remarkably effective because it directly addressed the three main concerns of Russian society: soldiers wanted peace, peasants wanted land, and workers wanted food. This simple message contrasted sharply with the complex political positions of other parties.
Kerensky's actions on 23 October
Alexander Kerensky, head of the Provisional Government, recognised the threat posed by the Bolsheviks but found himself unable to prevent their assault. On 23 October, he attempted to restrict Bolshevik power by ordering the closure of two Bolshevik newspapers, Pravda (meaning "Truth") and Izvestia (meaning "News"). He also commanded troops to raise the bridges connecting the Vyborg district (a working-class area and Bolshevik stronghold) to the city centre, and tried to curtail the authority of the Military Revolutionary Committee.
However, troops loyal to the Bolsheviks refused to carry out these orders. They claimed that Kerensky's actions represented a betrayal of the February Revolution and an abandonment of its principles. This defiance provided the Bolsheviks with a pretext to act, allowing them to portray their subsequent seizure of power as defensive measures protecting the revolution from counter-revolutionary forces.
Kerensky's Fatal Miscalculation
By attempting to suppress the Bolsheviks directly, Kerensky actually gave them the justification they needed to act. They could now claim they were defending the revolution rather than staging a coup. This tactical error demonstrated the Provisional Government's political weakness.
The course of the October/November Revolution
The Bolshevik takeover unfolded over three days, from 24 to 27 October 1917, following a plan largely developed by Trotsky. The operation demonstrated careful coordination and revealed the Provisional Government's military weakness.
24 October: The beginning of the insurrection
Following Trotsky's plan, during the night of 24-25 October, approximately 5,000 soldiers and sailors from Kronstadt (a naval base near Petrograd) moved into the city. Bolshevik Red Guards (armed worker militia units) began systematically taking control of strategic locations throughout Petrograd. These targets included:
- The telephone exchange
- Post office
- Railway stations
- News agency
- State bank
- Bridges
- Power stations
Opposition proved minimal. Although defenders at the main telegraph office offered some resistance, troops stationed at most locations surrendered without fighting. The carefully planned operation proceeded largely unopposed, suggesting that the Provisional Government commanded little genuine loyalty from military units.
Lenin had been in hiding but travelled to the Smolny Institute (Bolshevik headquarters) by tram during the evening to assume direct leadership of the insurrection. His relatively late arrival indicated that Trotsky had orchestrated much of the practical preparation and initial execution.
The choice of strategic targets reveals the Bolsheviks' understanding of modern revolution: controlling communication and transport infrastructure was essential for seizing power in a twentieth-century city. This was not a spontaneous uprising but a carefully planned military operation.
25 October: The storming of the Winter Palace
Early in the morning, Kerensky departed Petrograd in an attempt to rally military support. He borrowed a car from the American Embassy and disguised himself as a nurse to avoid detection. His flight from the capital symbolised the collapse of Provisional Government authority.
Red Guard soldiers and sailors surrounded the Winter Palace, where the remaining ministers of the Provisional Government had gathered. The palace faced threats from multiple directions: artillery positioned in the St Peter and Paul fortress across the river, and guns from the battleship Aurora, moored nearby on the River Neva. The Aurora's crew had declared their support for the revolution.
At 9:40pm, the Aurora fired a blank shot—the prearranged signal for the Bolshevik assault to begin. Despite the dramatic symbolism, the actual attack proved anticlimactic. The Red Guard penetrated the building easily, with some government members escaping through a back entrance. Although further shots were fired, only one shell struck the palace; most projectiles landed harmlessly in the river.
The famous shot from the Aurora was actually a blank—a signal rather than an attack. This detail illustrates how the "storming" of the Winter Palace was more symbolic than militarily significant.
The Winter Palace's defenders consisted of some military cadets from the Engineering School, two companies of Cossacks, and a small detachment from the Women's Battalion. Around 10:00pm, shots rang out inside the palace, followed by shouts from the cadets. Approximately 50 hostile sailors and soldiers were arrested and disarmed. However, as more armed men arrived, the guard's position became increasingly hopeless. At roughly 2:00am, a loud commotion erupted at the entrance as an armed crowd of soldiers, sailors, and civilians, led by the Bolshevik Antonov, forced their way inside. Antonov arrested everyone present in the name of the Revolutionary Committee.
Meanwhile, at 10:40pm, the Second Congress of Soviets convened, although neither Lenin nor most Bolsheviks attended initially as they remained engaged in street fighting. The first Bolshevik deputies arrived near midnight bearing news of the day's events. Some Mensheviks and right-wing Socialist Revolutionaries issued a public declaration protesting against what they termed the "military conspiracy and seizure of power."
26 October: Congress assumes power
In the early morning hours, the Congress greeted the announcement of the Winter Palace's capture and the arrest of the remaining Provisional Government ministers. At 5:00am, the Congress formally adopted a resolution to take power into its own hands. The Bolsheviks spent the day conducting "mopping up operations" throughout the streets, consolidating their control.
At 9:00pm, the second session of the Congress opened. Lenin presented his Decree on Peace (a proposal calling for an immediate end to the war), which the Congress adopted unanimously. This decree represented one of the Bolsheviks' most popular policies, directly addressing the widespread desire for peace.
The Decree on Peace was strategically brilliant. By immediately addressing the most pressing concern of soldiers and the general population, the Bolsheviks gained significant popular support and legitimacy for their new government.
27 October: Establishing the new government
At 2:00am, Lenin introduced his Decree on Land (legislation acknowledging peasant land seizures and promising redistribution). The Bolshevik faction then presented their proposals for reorganising the government. Mensheviks and left-wing Socialist Revolutionaries opposed these plans, but the Congress approved them by an overwhelming majority.
The Congress elected a new "All-Russian Central Executive Committee" consisting of 101 members, of whom 62 were Bolsheviks and 29 were left-wing Socialist Revolutionaries. More significantly, a Sovnarkom (Soviet of People's Commissars—essentially a cabinet or government) was created to run the country. This body included only Bolsheviks because the left-wing Socialist Revolutionaries refused to participate. Lenin was elected chairman, making him effectively the head of the new government.
The Congress adopted additional resolutions:
- Transferring power in the provinces to local soviets
- Freeing those arrested for political activity by the Provisional Government
- Abolishing the death penalty at the front
- Ordering the immediate arrest of Kerensky
- Appealing to the Cossacks (who had remained loyal to the Provisional Government) to switch allegiances
- Urging railway workers to maintain order on the railways
The session concluded at 5:15am.
In December 1917, the Bolsheviks established the Cheka (the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage), a secret police force that would become notorious for its role in suppressing opposition.
The creation of the Cheka marked a significant step toward establishing authoritarian control. Originally presented as a temporary measure to protect the revolution, it became a permanent instrument of state terror.
The extent of the October/November Revolution
Understanding the actual scale of the October Revolution challenges some common assumptions and reveals important truths about the nature of Bolshevik power.
Numbers involved
The October Revolution in Petrograd was actually a relatively small-scale operation. Trotsky himself estimated that 25,000 to 30,000 people "at the most" actively participated in the events. If accurate, this would represent approximately 5 per cent of all workers and soldiers in the city. This figure aligns broadly with other calculations based on the mobilisation of the Red Guards and allied forces.
Perhaps 10,000 to 15,000 people gathered in the square in front of the Winter Palace on the evening of 25 October. However, many of these were likely bystanders rather than active participants in the so-called "storming." The few surviving original photographs from the revolution suggest that the forces involved were quite small. Nevertheless, it suited the Bolsheviks politically to claim larger numbers, as the legitimacy of their new regime rested partly on the assertion that it emerged from a "popular" revolution representing broad working-class support.
The Reality Behind the Myth
Despite Soviet propaganda depicting mass participation, the actual number of active revolutionaries was remarkably small—perhaps only 5% of Petrograd's workers and soldiers. This raises critical questions about the revolution's legitimacy and popular support.
Scale of violence and disruption
During the three days required for the Bolsheviks to gain control of Petrograd (25-27 October), remarkably little actual fighting occurred. Records suggest no more than five deaths during this period. This limited violence resulted largely from the Provisional Government's lack of military resources to resist the assault effectively. The government simply had no loyal troops in sufficient numbers to mount a defence.
Much of Petrograd remained surprisingly unaffected by the disturbances. Trams and taxis continued running as normal. Restaurants, theatres, and cinemas stayed open. Even Trotsky later acknowledged that the revolution consisted essentially of "small operations, calculated and prepared in advance" rather than a mass uprising or prolonged street fighting.
The fact that daily life continued largely uninterrupted during the "revolution" demonstrates how limited the actual fighting was. This was more a carefully orchestrated takeover than a chaotic popular uprising.
The myth of the Winter Palace storming
In 1927, the Soviet filmmaker Sergei Eisenstein created October, a film that perpetuated the myth of the Winter Palace storming as a heroic popular rising. The dramatic pictures in Eisenstein's film—showing masses breaking through gates and storming the building—were entirely fictitious. In reality, when the shot was fired from the battleship Aurora, the Women's Battalion guarding the palace panicked and abandoned their posts. Army cadets offered minimal resistance. Red Guards essentially walked into the building rather than "storming" it militarily. They wandered around until locating the remaining members of the Provisional Government. The discovery of the Tsar's extensive wine cellar then fuelled a period of drunkenness rather than revolutionary fervour.
Propaganda vs. Reality
Eisenstein's film October created the dramatic imagery of the revolution that most people remember today. However, this was pure fiction. The actual "storming" involved Red Guards walking into a largely undefended building. Understanding this distinction is crucial for separating myth from historical reality.
This discrepancy between myth and reality raises important questions about how the revolution has been remembered and represented, and how the Bolsheviks constructed narratives to legitimise their seizure of power.
Remember!
Key Points to Remember:
- The October Revolution resulted from multiple converging factors: the Provisional Government's weakness, continued involvement in an unpopular war, economic deterioration, social resentments, and effective Bolshevik political organisation under Lenin and Trotsky.
- The actual seizure of power (24-27 October 1917) involved relatively small numbers (perhaps 25,000-30,000 active participants) and remarkably little violence (no more than five deaths), contradicting the myth of a mass heroic uprising.
- Lenin's Decree on Peace and Decree on Land, adopted on 26 and 27 October respectively, addressed popular demands and helped consolidate Bolshevik support among war-weary soldiers and land-hungry peasants.