The NLF and Kennedy’s Policies in Vietnam (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
The NLF and Kennedy's Policies in Vietnam
Formation of the National Liberation Front
In December 1960, North Vietnamese leaders established a new nationalist organisation in South Vietnam known as the National Liberation Front (NLF). This organisation was formed with the primary objective of liberating South Vietnam from United States imperialism while working towards the creation of a unified, sovereign, and independent Vietnamese state.
The NLF emerged from a coalition of diverse groups, each driven by different motivations. One powerful motivating factor was opposition to President Ngo Dinh Diem's quasi-imperialist policies. Diem had launched a campaign to eliminate communists in South Vietnam, but his approach largely disregarded the interests of the majority population, particularly rural peasants.
Diem's government replaced locally elected councils with appointed officials, many of whom were Catholics and former collaborators with French colonial authorities. The prospect of French despots being replaced by Vietnamese ones proved unacceptable to many, creating widespread resentment among the rural population.
This grievance connected to a broader determination to advance nationalism and achieve the reunification of an independent Vietnam. Diem's 'imperialist' regime and his administration acted as obstacles to these nationalist and democratic goals, compelling many South Vietnamese to join the NLF.
Although the war against French colonial rule had concluded in 1954, remnants of the Viet Minh infrastructure remained in place. Ho Chi Minh, often described as the 'spiritual father' of the movement, exercised considerable influence over the NLF's formation and subsequent direction. These resistance veterans were primarily motivated by nationalism rather than strict ideological commitment. However, others within the NLF were devoted to communism and establishing a reunified communist Vietnam.
A symbiotic relationship developed between nationalism and communism within the NLF. Many members were primarily nationalists who opposed what they perceived as American imperialism and the subservient behaviour of Diem and his supporters towards the USA. This created a natural affinity with communist members because both groups shared the USA as a common adversary of Vietnam.
Nguyen Huu Tho served as the NLF's leader, though he may be regarded as merely a figurehead, with actual leadership residing in Hanoi and ultimately with Ho Chi Minh. Nevertheless, the NLF represented more than simply a component of North Vietnamese strategic planning. Vietnam was a diverse society, and this diversity was reflected in how communist ideology was interpreted and implemented. Northern and Southern communism diverged in character, ensuring that the NLF maintained a distinct voice.
There exists a historical interpretation that the NLF was not only controlled by North Vietnam from Hanoi but also served as a mechanism through which communists could infiltrate and influence groups in the South with relative ease. The NLF was presented as a Southern nationalist resistance movement to avoid breaching the Geneva Conference agreements, which had prohibited North Vietnam from placing its own forces in the South.
The NLF's political manifesto, the 10-point programme, reflected the broad spectrum of support the movement commanded in South Vietnam, particularly through its anti-imperialist emphasis. However, the programme also attracted intellectuals, students, and both middle-class and rural working-class supporters. The manifesto focused less on achieving ideological objectives and more on nationalist themes.
The NLF's 10-point programme (December 1960)
The programme included the following aims:
- Overthrow the camouflaged colonial regime and the American imperialists, and the dictatorial power of Ngo Dinh Diem, servant of the Americans, and institute a government of national democratic union.
- Institute a largely liberal and democratic regime.
- Establish an independent and sovereign economy, and improve the living conditions of the people.
- Reduce land rent and implement agrarian reform, with the aims of providing land to the tillers.
- Promote a foreign policy of peace and neutrality.
- Re-establish normal relations between the two zones and prepare for the peaceful reunification of the country.
North Vietnam established a complex support network for the NLF, based on what became known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This network provided a supply route into the South for equipment and personnel, enabling the NLF to sustain its operations.
Vietcong (VC) was the name President Diem used to describe National Liberation Front members. The term suggested that they were communists, as it means 'Vietnamese communists'. The NLF was a political group formed in the South in 1960 that opposed Diem's leadership. Initially, the NLF was not necessarily communist. Instead, it opposed the dominance of a Francophone, Catholic elite who had replaced the French after 1954. However, the movement was quickly dominated by individuals loyal to North Vietnam who sought reunification of the country as a socialist state.
Alongside the VC, the NLF proved instrumental in achieving communist success in South Vietnam against both the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) and the US Army.
Kennedy's approach to Vietnam
John F. Kennedy articulated his perspective on Vietnam's importance to the USA as early as 1956, even before becoming president. He stressed that ensuring South Vietnam remained a democracy, despite the growing threat from communism, was of paramount importance for securing the democratic future of Southeast Asia as a whole.
Kennedy remained committed to the policy of containment and to the domino theory. The situation in Vietnam presented a textbook example of the need for containment. Kennedy's foreign policy centred on the strategy of flexible response. He was convinced that the USA's non-nuclear capabilities should be expanded, as this would reduce the threat of nuclear war and enable the USA to respond to a wider range of threats, including insurgency and subversion.
Kennedy believed this flexible approach would eliminate the constraints created through Eisenhower's massive retaliation strategy. This strategic shift reflected Kennedy's recognition that the threats posed by the increasing strengths of both China and the USSR required a different response. The implications for Vietnam were clear, as communist-led insurgency in South Vietnam threatened to spread beyond its borders. Such insurgency could not be addressed through Eisenhower's massive retaliation strategy because that approach relied on the threat of using nuclear weapons, which would have been impossible as a means of dealing with insurgency.
Kennedy therefore supported counterinsurgency measures delivered by conventional ground forces. General Maxwell Taylor described Vietnam as a 'laboratory' for counterinsurgency tactics.
Counterinsurgency refers to tactics used to defeat guerrillas or unconventional warfare, with focus on intelligence gathering, targeting individual leaders, and methods aimed at infiltrating the enemy rather than confronting it head-on. This approach marked a significant departure from conventional warfare strategies and became central to Kennedy's Vietnam policy.
Key figure: General Maxwell Taylor
General Maxwell Taylor (1916–2009) was a staunch ally of Kennedy who argued in favour of sending military forces into Vietnam. He was influential in determining the USA's policies towards Vietnam during the Kennedy presidency.
The Taylor-Roscow mission (November 1961)
In November 1961, Kennedy sent General Taylor and the Chair of the State Planning Department Policy Committee, Walt Roscow, to Vietnam to assess the situation. They presented a report which included the following recommendations:
- An increase in the helicopter force in order to facilitate counterinsurgency actions
- Greater training support for the South Vietnamese Army
- An increase in the numbers of US combat forces
- Some strategic bombing of North Vietnam
The report recommended sending up to 10,000 US ground troops. Kennedy chose to adopt a compromise position on the report. He remained committed to counterinsurgency rather than sending in ground troops, but he did recognise the validity of strengthening the South Vietnamese Army. This decision reflected Kennedy's cautious approach to escalation whilst maintaining his commitment to preventing communist expansion in Southeast Asia.
The Strategic Hamlet Program, 1962
This strategy was introduced in March 1962 through Operation Sunrise. It aimed to create armed stockades which would house South Vietnamese rural peasants. The intention was that this would isolate such people from the Vietcong. For Diem and his brother, the Strategic Hamlet Program was a means through which they could spread their own influence rather than a way of encouraging Vietnamese peasant farmers to challenge the Vietcong.
The peasants were placed under pressure to move into the hamlets, but little clear planning or well-developed incentives were in place to facilitate the process. In effect, the programme was a form of forced relocation.
By September 1962, the regime claimed that over four million people were living in strategic hamlets. By the end of 1962, there were over 3000 such hamlets. These impressive statistics masked the serious implementation problems plaguing the programme.
The Strategic Hamlet Program was largely a failure. In reality, it often led to improved recruitment of the peasants into the Vietcong. The programme compelled peasants to erect fences and construct defensive moats and other fortifications against an enemy that targeted government officials rather than them. Corrupt officials who fraudulently took money meant for medical aid, irrigation projects, fertiliser, and seed further alienated the increasingly disaffected peasants.
The scheme was fundamentally flawed because it was almost impossible to isolate Vietcong agents from the hamlets. The forced relocation, combined with corruption and lack of genuine benefits, drove many peasants into the arms of the very insurgency the programme was designed to combat. Rather than creating secure zones, the Strategic Hamlet Program became a recruiting tool for the Vietcong.
Diem described the Strategic Hamlet Program as 'a means to institute basic democracy' in Vietnam. His brother regarded it as 'an enthusiastic movement of solidarity and self-sufficiency'. Despite these optimistic assessments, the programme soon collapsed. Rather than protecting peasants from the Vietcong, the forced relocation, corruption, and lack of genuine benefits drove many into the arms of the very insurgency the programme was designed to combat.
Key Points to Remember:
- The National Liberation Front was established in December 1960 as a coalition of diverse groups united by opposition to Diem's regime and desire for Vietnamese reunification, though it became increasingly dominated by North Vietnam.
- Kennedy committed to containment and flexible response in Vietnam, favouring counterinsurgency tactics over massive retaliation, which reflected his belief that nuclear threats were unsuitable for combating insurgency.
- The Taylor-Roscow report (November 1961) recommended sending up to 10,000 US ground troops, but Kennedy adopted a compromise position, strengthening the South Vietnamese Army without deploying large-scale American ground forces.
- The Strategic Hamlet Program (March 1962) aimed to isolate rural peasants from the Vietcong through forced relocation into fortified villages, but it failed due to poor planning, corruption, and the absence of genuine incentives.
- Rather than weakening the Vietcong, the Strategic Hamlet Program's failures inadvertently increased peasant support for the insurgency, demonstrating the limitations of Diem's approach to rural pacification.