The USSR (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
The USSR
Kim Il Sung's approach to securing Soviet support
In March 1949, Kim Il Sung approached Stalin seeking Soviet backing for a North Korean assault on South Korea. Kim Il Sung developed a strategy based on winning external support from the communist world to strengthen North Korea against South Korea and its Western allies. He pressurised both the USSR and China, focusing on specific arguments to persuade Stalin to support an attack on the South.
Kim Il Sung presented Stalin with four main arguments:
- The operation would achieve a rapid and decisive victory
- A hard core of 200,000 communist supporters already existed in the South
- A well-organised communist guerrilla force was operating in the South
- The USA would not have sufficient time to intervene
Understanding Guerrilla Warfare
Guerrilla action involves fighting using 'undercover' methods of attacking a stronger enemy through traps and ambush tactics, rather than engaging opponents using traditional methods. This type of warfare was particularly significant in Kim Il Sung's strategy for undermining South Korean stability.
Kim Il Sung employed the same tactics with China. In his efforts to secure support, he attempted to undermine Stalin's backing when negotiating with Mao Zedong, and similarly tried to undermine Mao's support when dealing with Stalin.
Stalin's initial response and priorities
Stalin demonstrated acute awareness of the presence of 7,500 US troops still stationed in South Korea. He recognised Kim Il Sung's aims but rejected direct support for an immediate attack. Instead, Stalin suggested Kim Il Sung should strengthen guerrilla forces operating in the South to undermine the government there.
By February 1950, Stalin's position had shifted considerably as the international scene had changed. Chinese communists had defeated the nationalists and established the People's Republic of China. The Americans had not included South Korea in their Defensive Perimeter Strategy. These factors, alongside others, led Stalin to agree to provide North Korea with substantial military aid: 1,600 pieces of artillery, 178 military aircraft and 258 T-34 tanks.
Critical Shift in Stalin's Position
Two key developments changed Stalin's calculations:
- The communist victory in China demonstrated the viability of communist expansion in Asia
- America's exclusion of South Korea from the Defensive Perimeter Strategy suggested limited US commitment to defending South Korea
These factors transformed Stalin's assessment of the risks and opportunities involved in supporting North Korea.
Stalin's strategic calculations
Stalin was not prepared to commit Soviet troops to participate directly in a war. Several priorities influenced his thinking:
Risk of US-Soviet confrontation
A war in Korea might bring in the USA, potentially leading to a US-Soviet conflict that could spread into Europe. Stalin did not anticipate a global conflict but remained conscious that Europe represented the epicentre of Cold War confrontation at this time.
Stalin's European Focus
Despite the Korean situation, Stalin's primary concern remained Europe. He feared that any direct confrontation with the USA in Asia could escalate and potentially spread to the European theatre, where Soviet interests were most concentrated.
Benefits of a united communist Korea
A united communist Korean state as an ally of the USSR would produce positive outcomes. It would:
- Strengthen Soviet borders
- Place pressure on Japan (the USA's principle ally in Asia)
- Provide economic opportunities for the USSR
Preventing Chinese dominance
If Stalin delayed supporting North Korea, Kim Il Sung could turn to China for its primary support. This might undermine Soviet influence in the region.
Nuclear capabilities
The USSR had developed nuclear technology by 1950, giving it a degree of strategic parity with the USA.
Stalin's final position in April 1950
In April 1950, Stalin made clear to Kim Il Sung that he would not commit Soviet forces if North Korea faced conflict with the USA. Ultimately, Stalin accepted that indirect military support for North Korea represented the best possible option for the USSR. A war between North and South would almost certainly draw the USA into the conflict, which would necessitate the USA committing costly resources.
Stalin's Firm Boundaries
When the USA did intervene, Stalin made absolutely clear that the outcome was not of great importance to Soviet interests. He stated that if the North Korean venture failed, the Soviet Union would not commit its own troops against the Americans.
Stalin was not prepared to engage in direct military confrontation with the USA, particularly in the context of nuclear weapons and the USSR's inferior position at this time compared to the USA.
Key Points to Remember:
- Stalin initially rejected Kim Il Sung's request for support in March 1949, recommending instead that North Korea should strengthen guerrilla forces in the South
- Stalin's position changed by February 1950 following the communist victory in China and the American exclusion of South Korea from the Defensive Perimeter Strategy
- Stalin provided substantial military equipment (1,600 artillery pieces, 178 aircraft, 258 tanks) but refused to commit Soviet troops
- Stalin's priorities centred on avoiding direct US-Soviet military confrontation, particularly given Europe's importance and the risk of nuclear escalation
- Stalin made clear in April 1950 that the USSR would not support North Korea with its own forces if the venture failed, demonstrating limits to Soviet commitment in Asia