Reasons for Renewed Tensions (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes

Reasons for renewed tensions

The late 1970s marked a dramatic shift in superpower relations, as the cooperative spirit of détente gave way to heightened hostility. This transition stemmed primarily from the Soviet Union's December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, which triggered American concerns about Soviet expansionism and prompted a reassessment of Western policy toward Moscow. Understanding these developments requires examining the Afghan crisis, the American response, and the emergence of new political leadership that would reshape the Cold War landscape.

The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-79

Background to the crisis

In April 1978, a military coup removed Mohammad Daoud Khan from power in Afghanistan. Khan, a cousin of Afghanistan's former king, had governed since 1973 with backing from the leftist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The same faction that initially supported him ultimately orchestrated his removal, primarily because Khan failed to implement the socialist programmes to which he had committed. This internal power struggle created instability that would draw Soviet attention and intervention.

The PDPA regime

The PDPA was a communist organisation that had supported Khan's rise to power but later turned against him when he proved insufficiently radical. After seizing control in 1978, the PDPA rapidly fractured into competing factions. Hafizullah Amin emerged as the leader of one dominant group, which initiated a programme of radical and disruptive land reform.

The Soviets grew increasingly worried that the PDPA government, despite being their ally, was rapidly losing control. Amin appeared unreliable and incapable of managing the rising Islamic opposition he confronted. Soviet leaders feared that Afghanistan might realign with the United States, Pakistan, or China, which would eliminate Soviet influence in a strategically positioned neighbour. The prospect of losing Afghanistan represented both an ideological setback and a threat to Soviet security interests in Central Asia.

Soviet interests and motivations

The USSR possessed multiple reasons for viewing Afghanistan as strategically important:

Geographical considerations: Afghanistan shared a border with the Soviet Union stretching 2,500 kilometres, directly adjoining the Muslim-majority Central Asian republics of the USSR. Any instability or hostile alignment in Afghanistan could potentially spread unrest into Soviet territory.

Ideological and regional influence: Afghanistan functioned as a socialist state and regional ally of the USSR. If it aligned with America, this would strengthen the USA's geostrategic position in the region at the expense of Soviet influence. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev worried that Afghanistan could be transformed into an American ally, thereby establishing a hostile presence on the Soviet southern border.

Security concerns: The USSR needed to protect its own security interests. Brezhnev believed Afghanistan had to remain a buffer protecting Soviet security, given its geostrategic position. The only effective way to ensure this security, from the Soviet perspective, was to undertake military intervention in Afghanistan. This would restore a stable and popular socialist state that remained loyal to the Soviet Union.

In January 1980, Brezhnev attempted to justify the invasion by arguing that imperialism and its accomplices had launched an undeclared war against revolutionary Afghanistan. He claimed that the well-advanced plot by external forces had created a genuine threat that Afghanistan could lose its independence and become an imperialist military base on the Soviet Union's southern border. Brezhnev framed the intervention as assistance requested by the Afghan government to defend national independence and freedom from armed aggression.

The invasion

In December 1979, Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan. This military action would profoundly affect international politics throughout the 1980s, effectively ending the era of détente and initiating what became known as the Second Cold War.

The USA's reaction to Afghanistan, 1978-79

The Iranian connection

Events in Afghanistan acquired greater importance for America when, in its neighbouring country Iran, the Shah's pro-American regime was overthrown by anti-American Islamic fundamentalists led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

The Americans feared that Khomeini's regime would collapse, leaving Iran vulnerable to leftist and even communist influences. This could further reinforce Soviet regional influence. Soviet connections with Afghanistan consequently began to assume greater importance for American strategic planning. At his summit meeting with Brezhnev, President Jimmy Carter emphasised the USA's growing concerns. He stressed that America had not interfered in Afghanistan's internal affairs and did not expect the USSR to do so either.

Carter's initial measures

Carter characterised the Soviet intervention as a flagrant breach of international protocol and a major threat to international peace. He judged that any possibility of early ratification of the SALT II arms limitation agreements was impossible. On 3 January 1980, Carter formally requested that the US Senate postpone indefinitely any further consideration of the SALT II agreement because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The following day, 4 January 1980, Carter addressed the nation and set out a series of measures aimed at the Soviet Union:

• A deferral of action on cultural and economic exchanges
• Major restrictions on Soviet fishing privileges in American waters
• A ban on the sale of high technology and strategic items to the Soviets
• An embargo on sales of grain to the Soviet Union
• US military and economic assistance to Pakistan to enhance that state's security

The broader implications

Carter referred to the intervention as a blatant breach of international protocol and a major threat to international peace. The invasion demonstrated, in Carter's view, that the Soviet Union had taken a radical and aggressive new step, using its military power against a relatively defenceless nation.

Carter made clear that any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region would be regarded as an assault on the essential interests of the United States of America. Such an assault would be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

The Carter Doctrine, 1980

Announcement and content

On 23 January 1980, President Carter unveiled what became known as the Carter Doctrine in his annual State of the Union address. The Carter Doctrine translated into an American commitment to prevent any further Soviet advance into the Persian Gulf and Southern Asia. It emphasised the prospect of a military solution to any such expansionism and therefore focused on building up US strategic forces. The doctrine also reinforced the need for America to strengthen its relations with China.

Carter feared that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan represented a new direction in Soviet global strategy. He was concerned that it marked an initial step in establishing a Soviet presence not only in the Persian Gulf but also in the Indian Ocean. Such developments would enable the USSR to threaten essential oil shipments upon which the West depended. Carter's administration had experienced an era of energy shortages and rising oil prices, making control over Middle Eastern oil supplies particularly urgent.

Impact on Western alliances

Carter attempted to persuade the NATO alliance and the West to suspend East–West détente. However, détente in Europe was working beneficially for Western European nations. Whilst Europe deplored Soviet actions over Afghanistan, its leaders were not prepared to suspend détente in Europe. European trade links with the Soviet Union not only continued but expanded. Europe did not perceive its interests being served by allowing itself to become a pawn in America's global power strategy.

The end of détente

The Carter Doctrine marked a massive overreaction by America. The Soviets took the view that American leadership in 1980 had used the intervention in Afghanistan as a pretext that enabled them to dismantle détente, revive the nuclear arms race, and build up a position of strength for America in the Persian Gulf. From the Soviet perspective, America's actions were not seen as a response to their intervention but as opportunistic international behaviour. America was simply waiting for 'an Afghanistan' to occur in order to fulfil its real aim of bringing détente to an end.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan delivered the final blow to détente's existence. As far as the West was concerned, the invasion demanded international condemnation and a policy of containment to prevent further Soviet expansionism. The invasion did not represent a threat to world peace greater than any since the Second World War, yet that was the interpretation taken by America. The Carter administration determined that its entire relationship with the Soviet Union depended on a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

New personalities

Ronald Reagan's election

The 1980s brought a new era in the Cold War. After the period of détente, the presidency of Ronald Reagan brought tension and suspicion. Public opinion once more began to fear the outright possibility of nuclear war. The 1980s saw the arms race accelerate, and the superpowers gained the capability to destroy the earth several times over.

Reagan was originally a Hollywood film star who entered politics in 1966. He was a right-wing Republican who cut spending on domestic social programmes whilst increasing military spending. He adopted an aggressive policy towards Central America, and in 1983 he ordered the invasion of Grenada in order to remove a Marxist regime.

Reagan's approach to the Soviet Union

Reagan's June 1982 speech before the British Parliament clearly set the tone for his relationship with the Soviet Union. He referenced the contrast between totalitarian regimes in the Soviet sphere (from Stettin on the Baltic to Varna on the Black Sea) and democratic systems in the West. Reagan declared that regimes planted by totalitarianism had endured more than thirty years to establish their legitimacy, yet none had been able to risk free elections. He argued that regimes planted by bayonets do not take root.

There was never the slightest chance that Reagan would contemplate war to remove the Soviet Union's ideological, political, and economic stranglehold over Eastern Europe. However, Reagan was determined to pursue aggressive policies that were designed to change Soviet behaviour. Reagan was convinced that détente had resulted in America's trust in the Soviet Union being misplaced.