Relations between Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
Relations between Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill
The Yalta Conference in February 1945 brought together the three Allied leaders—Joseph Stalin, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill—at a moment when victory in Europe seemed assured. The conference produced agreements that appeared to signal continued cooperation between East and West, most notably the Declaration on Liberated Europe. However, beneath this surface optimism, the three leaders held fundamentally different priorities and perceptions that would soon undermine their wartime alliance.
The Yalta Conference represented the last major meeting of the "Big Three" Allied leaders whilst Roosevelt was still alive. Roosevelt would die just two months later in April 1945, and the subsequent Potsdam Conference would see significant changes in leadership with Truman replacing Roosevelt and Attlee replacing Churchill mid-conference.
Stalin's position and priorities
The Second World War had devastated the Soviet Union. Conservative estimates placed Soviet casualties at 25 million, with massive destruction of towns, cities, agriculture and industry across the western USSR. In this context, Stalin prioritised lasting security above all else. He adopted a pragmatic approach: whilst he and Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov viewed the Grand Alliance allies as fundamentally anti-Soviet, Stalin remained willing to maintain cooperation with the West where it served Soviet interests.
Vyacheslav Molotov served as Soviet Foreign Minister from 1939 to 1949 (and again 1953-1957). He represented the USSR at Yalta and Potsdam, and his hardline attitudes contributed substantially to the deterioration of East-West relations. Molotov considered Britain and the United States to be inherently opposed to the Soviet Union's security needs.
Poland represented the most pressing issue in East-West relations. At Yalta on 6 February 1945, Stalin explained his position with remarkable clarity about Soviet security concerns.
Stalin's Statement on Poland at Yalta (6 February 1945)
"It is a question of security of the state not only because we are on Poland's frontier but also because throughout history Poland has always been a corridor for attack on Russia."
Stalin's reasoning continued: during the preceding thirty years, Germany had twice used Poland as a route for invasion precisely because Poland had historically been weak. Therefore, Stalin insisted that Poland must be "strong and powerful and in a position in her own, and in our interests" but also "free, independent and powerful."
Stalin's Non-Negotiable Position on Poland
For Stalin, Poland was not merely another diplomatic issue—it was a matter of Soviet survival. The country's geographic position made it the natural invasion route into Russia, and after suffering 25 million casualties, Stalin viewed Soviet control over Poland as essential to preventing future attacks. This security imperative would prove incompatible with Western expectations of genuine democratic processes in Eastern Europe.
Stalin's broader objectives in Europe centred on establishing Eastern Europe within a Soviet sphere of influence. He intended to transform Germany into a communist state eventually, though he accepted this would take time. The dismemberment of Germany served Soviet interests not directly, but rather by ensuring Germany remained economically weak and unable to threaten Soviet security again.
Roosevelt's position and approach
Roosevelt's commitment to cooperation formed the foundation of his vision for post-war international relations. He believed that lasting peace required a post-war order built upon the American conception of democracy. For Roosevelt, democracy served not merely American interests but the interests of all states, and the security the USSR valued could only be achieved through what emerged at Yalta.
Roosevelt's Critical Misunderstanding
This reasoning reveals a misconception that would prove damaging. Roosevelt operated under the assumption that Stalin shared the same understanding of and values inherent in the configuration of the post-war world. He believed he could secure a democratic, non-communist future for Eastern European states and that international affairs could be managed through an international peacekeeping organisation (which would become the United Nations).
Roosevelt demonstrated willingness to work with Stalin, convinced that the Soviet leader's aims aligned with Western democratic principles. However, historians have criticised Roosevelt for a degree of naivety in underestimating the security requirements of the Soviet Union regarding Eastern Europe. His interpretation of Yalta agreements assumed Soviet acceptance of genuine democratic processes in liberated territories, an interpretation Stalin would reject.
Roosevelt's Letter to Stalin (1 April 1945)
On 1 April 1945, Roosevelt wrote to Stalin outlining his concerns about the interpretation of the Yalta declaration on Poland. He emphasised that the agreement regarding the formation of a new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity "should be little more than a continuation of the present Warsaw Government."
Roosevelt worried that any solution resulting in a merely disguised continuation of the existing communist-dominated regime would prove "unacceptable and would cause the people of the United States to regard the Yalta agreement as having failed."
Churchill's position and concerns
Churchill had concluded by April 1944 that Stalin intended to expand Soviet power throughout post-war Europe. In correspondence to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, Churchill articulated his deep suspicions about Soviet intentions.
Churchill's Assessment of Communist Leaders (April 1944)
"I have tried in every way to put myself in sympathy with these communist leaders. I cannot feel the slightest trust or confidence in them. Force and facts are their only realities."
This assessment, made a full year before Yalta, shaped Churchill's subsequent approach to Stalin and Soviet intentions.
Anthony Eden served as British Foreign Secretary between 1940 and 1945. Eden played a central role in Allied planning and diplomatic negotiations throughout the war, and he accompanied Churchill to Yalta. His diplomatic experience informed British policy towards the USSR during this period.
Churchill believed the Soviet Union posed a threat to British imperial interests. Consequently, he determined that Britain must establish a close alliance with the United States to counter this threat. This strategic necessity assumed even greater urgency given the economic damage the war had inflicted upon Britain, which limited British capacity to project power independently.
In October 1944, Churchill had arrived at the percentages agreement with Stalin in Moscow. This understanding between Churchill and Stalin determined the extent to which Britain and the USSR would control Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe through spheres of influence.
The Percentages Agreement (October 1944)
The agreement operated as a mechanism for protecting British interests, though it demonstrated no commitment to democracy in the affected regions. Under these terms:
- Romania: 90% Soviet sphere
- Greece: 90% British sphere
- Hungary: 50% each power
This arrangement revealed Churchill's acceptance that traditional great power politics would shape post-war Europe, rather than Roosevelt's vision of universal democratic principles.
Churchill's realism about Soviet intentions and his willingness to negotiate spheres of influence revealed his acceptance that traditional great power politics would shape post-war Europe, rather than Roosevelt's vision of universal democratic principles.
The Declaration on Liberated Europe
The official text agreed at Yalta included the Declaration on Liberated Europe, which stated that the three governments would jointly assist peoples in any European liberated state or former Axis state where conditions required.
The Four Commitments of the Declaration
The declaration specified four commitments:
- To establish conditions of internal peace
- To carry out emergency relief measures for distressed peoples
- To form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment of governments through free elections responsive to the will of the people
- To facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections
Definition: Axis States
Axis states comprised Italy, Germany and Japan. These three countries had signed the Tripartite Pact in 1937, creating a ten-year military alliance known as the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis. After the Second World War began, they became collectively known as the Axis powers.
The Declaration on Liberated Europe appeared to establish clear areas of agreement between East and West. However, as events rapidly demonstrated, relations between Roosevelt and Churchill on one side and Stalin on the other were already deteriorating.
The Poland question and deteriorating relations
Poland crystallised the emerging divisions within the Grand Alliance. During the war, a Polish government in exile had operated from London. The USSR, however, supported a pro-communist government established in the Polish city of Lublin upon Poland's liberation. Stalin had systematically eliminated non-communist Polish leaders who had resisted the Nazis, ensuring they could not challenge the communist Polish government when it returned from exile to govern post-war Poland.
The Lublin Government
The Lublin Government referred to the communist-dominated provisional government that Stalin installed in Poland. Western leaders, particularly Roosevelt, viewed this government as illegitimate and contrary to the Yalta agreement's commitment to representative interim authorities and free elections.
The Core Disagreement: Interpreting Yalta
Disagreement emerged immediately over how the Declaration on Liberated Europe should be interpreted and applied specifically to Poland. Stalin maintained that the communist government would remain in place. Roosevelt, by contrast, viewed this position as entirely opposed to Yalta agreements.
Roosevelt's letter of 1 April 1945 articulated American concerns that Stalin's interpretation violated the agreement's fundamental principles. He warned that American public opinion would consider the Yalta agreement a failure if Poland merely continued under the existing Warsaw communist regime with superficial modifications.
The contrasting interpretations of Yalta exposed the gulf between Western democratic expectations and Soviet security imperatives. What Roosevelt and Churchill understood as agreements to establish democratic governments through genuine popular elections, Stalin interpreted as arrangements to establish governments friendly to Soviet interests within a Soviet sphere of influence.
Key Points to Remember:
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The Yalta Conference (February 1945) revealed fundamental differences beneath surface cooperation: Stalin prioritised Soviet security through a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe; Roosevelt believed in cooperation based on shared democratic values; Churchill suspected Soviet expansionist intentions and sought a close US alliance.
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Stalin's position on Poland was non-negotiable because of security concerns—Poland had served as a corridor for German invasion twice in thirty years, and Stalin insisted Poland must be strong and within the Soviet sphere of influence to prevent future attacks on the USSR.
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Roosevelt's approach has been criticised for naivety: he underestimated Soviet security needs regarding Eastern Europe and assumed Stalin shared American democratic values, leading to fundamental misunderstandings about the meaning of Yalta agreements.
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Churchill's percentages agreement (October 1944) established spheres of influence with Stalin (e.g. Romania 90% Soviet, Greece 90% British), demonstrating his realistic acceptance of great power politics rather than universal democratic principles.
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The Declaration on Liberated Europe promised free elections and representative governments, but Stalin and Roosevelt interpreted it completely differently: Roosevelt expected genuine democracy; Stalin expected governments friendly to Soviet interests, leading to immediate disagreements over Poland's communist Lublin Government.