Attitudes to Europe (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
Attitudes to Europe
Blair entered office in 1997 with the ambition to position Britain as a central player in European affairs. This represented a marked departure from the difficulties of John Major's premiership, when European integration had nearly destroyed his government. Despite Major having skilfully negotiated opt-outs, the perception remained that Britain had become an awkward partner within the EU. New Labour's arrival was widely welcomed across Europe as potentially marking a fresh start in British-European relations.
Blair's approach to Europe contrasted sharply with the Conservative government's troubled relationship with the EU. Major's government had been plagued by internal divisions over Europe, with the Maastricht Treaty ratification nearly splitting the Conservative Party. Blair saw an opportunity to reset Britain's relationship with its European partners.
Obstacles to Blair's European ambitions
Blair's plans to achieve British leadership in Europe faced two substantial barriers that would ultimately prevent him from realising his goals.
The single currency
The euro was introduced across Europe on 1 January 1999, establishing a common currency for participating member states. This represented the most important development in the European project during Blair's early years in office. Blair personally favoured British participation, believing it would demonstrate genuine commitment to European integration and potentially secure popular support for deeper involvement in the EU. His optimal window for winning public backing existed during the government's initial honeymoon period.
However, Chancellor Gordon Brown's opposition proved insurmountable. Brown wielded considerable authority over economic policy and refused to permit even a referendum on the question. Treasury opposition meant that the possibility of British leadership in Europe through euro membership became increasingly remote.
Blair's inability to overcome Brown's resistance represented a major setback, as the euro issue symbolised the broader question of whether Britain would genuinely commit to European integration or remain semi-detached. This internal conflict between Prime Minister and Chancellor would define New Labour's European policy throughout its time in office.
Britain's transatlantic orientation
Foreign Secretary Robin Cook identified a fundamental tension in British policy: "It is a fixed pole of Tony Blair's view of Britain's place in the world that we must be the Number 1 ally of the US." Blair believed this special relationship with America would enable Britain to act as a bridge between Europe and the United States. European leaders, however, interpreted Britain's Atlantic focus as evidence of insufficient commitment to European priorities.
The concept of Britain serving as a "bridge" between America and Europe had been a recurring theme in British foreign policy since the Second World War. However, European leaders, particularly in France, viewed this position with suspicion, seeing it as an attempt to maintain influence in both spheres without fully committing to either.
This suspicion, particularly strong in France, created ongoing friction that undermined Blair's attempts to position Britain at the heart of European decision-making. The two most influential European leaders during this period, President Jacques Chirac of France and Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder of Germany, became increasingly wary of British intentions. Their doubts would prove well-founded when the Iraq War exposed the extent to which Blair prioritised American partnership over European consensus.
Worker migration
Blair made a serious miscalculation regarding EU enlargement. During Britain's EU presidency in 1998, accession negotiations advanced with six countries, mostly from the former communist bloc. When these new member states joined, Blair chose not to implement transitional restrictions on workers' rights to migrate to Britain. This decision, which he could have delayed until 2007, proved politically damaging.
A Critical Policy Misjudgement
Far more workers arrived from new member states than anticipated, transforming what had seemed a manageable policy into a divisive political issue. The question of worker migration moved to the forefront of British concerns about European membership. When Romania and Bulgaria approached accession in 2007, Blair reversed course and imposed temporary restrictions, but the damage to public confidence had already occurred.
Common Agricultural Policy
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) symbolised the dominance of France and Germany within European structures, favouring German and especially French farmers at the expense of British agricultural interests. Blair found himself consistently outmanoeuvred in negotiations over CAP reform.
A Diplomatic Confrontation
In October 2002, during discussions on reform, Chirac reportedly told Blair: "You have been very rude and I have never been spoken to like this before." This exchange illustrated how CAP reform became bound up in broader questions about the EU budget and Britain's financial contributions. The confrontation demonstrated the personal tensions that had developed between Blair and the French president over European policy.
Blair recognised that progress on CAP would probably require Britain to make concessions over the rebate Mrs Thatcher had negotiated in the 1980s. At the European Council meeting in December 2005, Blair accepted a modest reduction in the British rebate without securing a formal agreement on CAP reform.
If he intended to break the Franco-German partnership that had dominated Europe for decades, this outcome represented a clear failure. Relations with both Chirac and Schroeder had deteriorated substantially from their initially cordial state. Blair had given ground on Britain's financial interests without achieving meaningful reform of the CAP system.
Labour's European policy achievements
Despite these setbacks, Labour did achieve some progress in European affairs during its first years in office. These successes, whilst more modest than Blair's initial ambitions, demonstrated that constructive engagement with Europe could yield positive results.
The Social Chapter
Labour's stated European policy goals in 1997 differed little from Conservative positions, with one major exception. The Social Chapter established common standards for workers' rights across EU member states. The Conservative government had negotiated an opt-out from these provisions.
Labour signed the Social Chapter shortly after taking office, a decision widely interpreted as demonstrating New Labour's constructive intentions towards European cooperation. The government's willingness to embrace the Social Chapter, which both Conservative and Labour parties had previously debated extensively, suggested genuine commitment to deeper European integration.
The Social Chapter covered areas such as working conditions, health and safety standards, and consultation rights for workers. Conservative opposition had centred on concerns about increased regulatory burdens on British businesses and potential impacts on labour market flexibility. Labour's decision to sign represented a clear ideological difference from the previous government.
EU enlargement
EU enlargement ranked high on Europe's agenda during the late 1990s, representing an opportunity both main British parties could support with genuine enthusiasm. The greater the EU's geographical extent and diversity, the less probable became an eventual federal outcome. Britain actively promoted enlargement whilst simultaneously advancing implementation of the single market.
Britain's support for enlargement served multiple strategic purposes. A wider EU would be more diverse and therefore less likely to move towards federalism. Additionally, many of the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe held more Atlanticist foreign policy views, potentially creating allies for Britain's approach to transatlantic relations.
Despite earlier agreements, serious barriers to genuinely free trade persisted, especially in financial services where Britain possessed particular strength.
The Saint-Malo Agreement
Perhaps the most notable indication of British 'leadership' in Europe came through the Saint-Malo Agreement in 1998, when Britain and France established the foundations for a European Security and Defence Policy. Britain had previously expressed nervousness about extending EU competence into defence matters, fearing complications for NATO.
A High Point in Anglo-French Relations
This agreement therefore marked a high point in Blair's relationship with Chirac, demonstrating Britain's willingness to advance European cooperation in sensitive areas. The Saint-Malo Agreement represented a significant shift in British policy, acknowledging that European defence cooperation could complement rather than compete with NATO structures.
The Iraq War and European relations
Britain's collaboration with the United States in Iraq proved disastrous for Blair's European ambitions. If the Anglo-American bombing raids on Iraq in 1998 and 2001 had already raised concerns in several European capitals, Britain's role in the 2003 Iraq War fundamentally damaged Blair's standing across Europe.
A low point arrived on 10 March 2003, when Chirac announced that France would veto any second UN resolution authorising military action. At that moment, a central element in Blair's strategy to legitimise American military policy collapsed.
The Lasting Impact of Iraq
Although relations improved somewhat after Chirac and Schroeder departed the political stage, the Iraq War's impact on New Labour's European policy proved profound and lasting. If Blair retained any hope of defying Brown and taking Britain into the euro, the corrosive effects of the War on his domestic credibility rendered a referendum unthinkable.
Speaking in his premiership's second year, Blair articulated his goals: "It means realising once and for all that Britain does not have to choose between being strong with the US, or strong with Europe; it means having the confidence that we can be both." His premiership revealed just how difficult this self-imposed mission proved. Blair never managed to reconcile the concept of Europe as Britain's long-term destiny with loyalty to America as his immediate priority.
Perhaps Blair's greatest failure regarding Europe was that, after ten years in power, the British people remained no closer to wholeheartedly embracing European integration than in 1997. He was probably fortunate that French and Dutch rejections of a proposed constitutional treaty in 2005 saved him from holding a referendum on it in Britain – a popular vote he would, in all likelihood, have lost.
Key Points to Remember:
- Blair entered office promising to place Britain at the centre of Europe but faced insurmountable obstacles, particularly Brown's opposition to the euro and European suspicion of Britain's American orientation.
- The Iraq War in 2003 proved disastrous for Blair's European ambitions, fundamentally damaging his relationships with France and Germany and destroying any remaining possibility of British euro membership.
- Labour achieved some progress through signing the Social Chapter, promoting EU enlargement, and establishing the European Security and Defence Policy via the Saint-Malo Agreement with France in 1998.
- Blair's miscalculation on worker migration from new EU member states created lasting political damage, with far more workers arriving than anticipated after he failed to implement transitional restrictions.
- After ten years in power, Blair had failed to reconcile loyalty to America with European integration, and the British public remained no more committed to Europe than in 1997.