European Integration (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
European Integration
Britain's foreign policy in the early 1960s
The Future Policy Study, presented to Harold Macmillan's cabinet in 1960, established the framework for British foreign policy during this period. The document identified Britain's core strategic priority as the Atlantic Alliance - the defence partnership centered on NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation). NATO had been established in 1949 to defend Western nations during the Cold War and comprised 12 countries including Britain.
Under NATO's collective defence policy, an attack on any member would trigger a response from all members. This principle of collective security was fundamental to Western defence strategy during the Cold War period.
The Future Policy Study outlined several interconnected objectives for British foreign policy. Britain aimed to maintain and strengthen the association between the United Kingdom and the continental countries of Western Europe, ensuring continued American presence in Europe. The government sought to develop an economic and political community embracing both the United States and Western Europe. Additionally, Britain wanted to strengthen the Commonwealth as a means of maintaining influence as a power with worldwide interests, promoting British ideals, and forming a bridge between the Western world and developing countries in Asia and Africa.
Britain's post-war position and the emergence of superpowers
The Second World War left Britain in a severely weakened state. The country faced massive debts and existed in the shadow of two new superpowers - extremely powerful nations with influence over other countries - the United States and the USSR.
In 1947, Britain's ambassador in Washington informed the Americans that Britain faced bankruptcy and would have to withdraw from commitments in Greece, Turkey and Palestine. The same year saw independence granted to India and Pakistan, marking the beginning of Britain's retreat from Empire.
However, political and public opinion adapted slowly to these changed circumstances. The implications for British foreign policy took time to be recognized. In 1962, Dean Acheson, who had served as US Secretary of State between 1949 and 1953, observed that 'Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role'. This statement captured Britain's uncertain position in the post-war international order.
The Cold War - the state of tension between the West (including the US, Western Europe, Britain and Canada) and Communist states (the USSR and its allies) after the Second World War - shaped British foreign policy throughout this period. The conflict lasted until the collapse of communism between 1989 and 1990. Britain aligned itself firmly with the United States in opposing the expansion of communism across Europe, becoming a founder member of NATO.
The formation of the EEC and Britain's initial reluctance
The Schuman Plan of 1950, named after French foreign minister Robert Schuman, proposed creating a Coal and Steel Community that would integrate French and German heavy industry.
The Schuman Plan aimed to promote rapid economic reconstruction while binding together the historic enemies, France and Germany, eliminating the dangers of future wars between them. This represented a revolutionary approach to ensuring European peace through economic integration rather than military alliances alone.
This initiative formed the foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC) - an economic union, often known as the Common Market, established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957.
The EEC's six founder members were France, Germany, Italy and the 'Benelux' countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg). The organization later became the European Union in 1992. Britain and the United States strongly supported this scheme as contributing to the security of Europe at the beginning of the Cold War. However, Britain did not initially become involved in the EEC.
Several factors explained Britain's reluctance to join the European project:
Political Opposition:
- Very few politicians or journalists favored Britain taking up a leadership role in European integration
- The Left tended to be suspicious of the free-market principles behind the Common Market
- The Labour politician Herbert Morrison's response exemplified this attitude: 'the Durham miners won't wear it, I'm afraid'
- The Right regarded the preservation of traditional trade links with Australia, Canada and New Zealand as far more important than those with Europe
National Identity and Pride:
- Many believed European integration was an issue for continental Europe rather than Britain
- The Germans had been deadly wartime enemies and France had been overrun and occupied, whereas Britain had 'won the war'
- There existed an assumption that Britain remained a great world power
Strategic Considerations:
- Britain wanted to balance its involvement in Europe with maintaining the 'special relationship' with the United States - the close relationship between the United Kingdom and United States based on historical, diplomatic, cultural, economic and military ties, strengthened by being allies during the Cold War with the common objective of resisting Soviet power
The Treaty of Rome and the development of the EEC
The EEC took shape at an international conference at Messina in Sicily in 1955. British delegates were present to observe and encourage but not to join. These agreements were then developed in detail and the Treaty of Rome launched the EEC, without Britain, in 1957.
The organization was dominated by the partnership between France and Germany. The French president from 1958, Charles de Gaulle, was determined to protect this partnership from 'les Anglo-Saxons' (Britain and, through Britain, the influence of the United States).
At that time, the extent of 'The Six's' future success remained unclear. Within a short period, however, British attitudes began to shift.
The formation of EFTA
In 1959, Britain took the lead in forming the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), created in 1960 along with Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland as an alternative to the EEC. These countries were sometimes referred to as the 'outer seven' as opposed to the 'inner six' of the EEC. EFTA created a free trade area, although each member could negotiate separately with non-EFTA members.
However, EFTA proved only moderately successful and the new organization was unable to match the economic growth of the EEC. This disparity prompted a fundamental reassessment of British policy.
Britain's application to join the EEC (1961)
In 1961, the Macmillan government submitted Britain's application to join the EEC. The reasons for changing approach to the EEC were economic. The government hoped that joining the EEC would:
- Boost industrial production through access to a large-scale export market
- Increase industrial efficiency through greater competition
- Stimulate economic growth by participating in the rapid economic expansion already evident in the EEC
The United States was also keen to see Britain join the EEC for strategic reasons, viewing Britain as a vital link between Europe and America. Tensions were rising in the late 1950s over the Cold War. At the same time, belief in Britain's imperial power had been damaged by the Suez crisis and by the accelerating pace of decolonization in Africa.
Complex Negotiations:
Despite the application to join the EEC, Britain wanted to maintain its position in two other areas of affairs: the Commonwealth and the United States. This made the negotiations with the EEC extremely complex and difficult.
The EEC had already developed detailed economic structures, particularly the Common Agricultural Policy, that Britain found difficult to conform to. Special exemptions for Britain's Commonwealth trade partners, such as lamb exports from New Zealand which would have been blocked by EEC rules, had to be negotiated. This process took many months of hard bargaining, led on the British side by Macmillan's chief negotiator, Edward Heath.
De Gaulle's veto (1963)
The negotiations appeared to have reached a successful conclusion in January 1963, but at the last minute the French President Charles de Gaulle exercised France's right of veto and blocked Britain's application.
Primary Source: Edward Heath's Account of the Veto
Edward Heath, the chief negotiator for Britain, wrote about the veto in his autobiography published in 1998:
"When the Brussels negotiations resumed in January 1963 we were all very optimistic and an official English translation of the draft treaty was prepared. The French foreign minister was not present; we were told he had to attend de Gaulle's press conference. I concluded the meeting in an upbeat mood, saying: 'We all seem to be in complete agreement'. Immediately afterwards we were told what de Gaulle had said in his press conference. He declared that the negotiations had shown that Britain could not adapt to the ways of the Six; and criticised Britain's unwillingness to give up its 'special political and military relations' with the United States. We were all astonished and very worried about the future."
Impact of De Gaulle's Veto:
De Gaulle's intervention proved devastating. The other five members of the EEC were shocked and disappointed at the British negotiating team but were unable to persuade de Gaulle to continue with the negotiations. His intervention caused deteriorating relations between France and Britain for some time. It also meant that Britain remained outside the EEC.
Key Historical Figures:
Charles de Gaulle (1894-1970) was leader of the Free French Forces who fought on after France surrendered in 1940. He had strained relations with his main allies, Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, and remained suspicious of 'les Anglo-Saxons', especially the Americans, in his later career. He led France through the transition from dictatorship to democracy after the liberation of France in 1944. He retired in 1946 but returned as president in 1959, remaining in that position until 1969.
Edward Heath (1916-2005) was the Conservative MP for Bexley, Kent from 1950 to 2001. He served as Chief Whip under Eden and shadow Chancellor under Douglas-Home before becoming leader of the Conservative Party from 1965 to 1975. He was prime minister from 1970 to 1974 but lost the party leadership to Margaret Thatcher in 1975, and was openly critical of her policies. Throughout his life, he oversaw the entry of Britain into the EEC in 1973. Heath implemented major reform to Britain's system of local government.
Key Points to Remember:
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Britain prioritized the Atlantic Alliance and the 'special relationship' with the United States over European integration in the early 1960s, as outlined in the 1960 Future Policy Study.
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Britain initially refused to join the EEC (formed 1957) due to:
- Suspicion of free-market principles
- Preference for Commonwealth trade links
- The assumption that Britain remained a great power that could balance commitments to Europe, the Commonwealth and the USA
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Britain formed EFTA in 1959 as an alternative to the EEC, but this proved less economically successful, prompting Britain to apply for EEC membership in 1961 for economic reasons:
- Market access
- Competition
- Growth
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French President Charles de Gaulle vetoed Britain's application in January 1963, criticizing Britain's unwillingness to give up its special relationship with the United States, leaving Britain outside the EEC.