The Nuclear Deterrent (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes

The Nuclear Deterrent

Origins of Britain's nuclear programme

Britain's path towards independent nuclear capability began in the 1930s, when British universities led pioneering research into atomic fission. Refugee scientists who fled to Britain in the early stages of the Second World War contributed expertise that proved essential to understanding nuclear processes. This scientific foundation enabled Britain to participate in the Manhattan Project, the secret American-led initiative to develop the world's first atomic bomb, which helped bring the Pacific War against Japan to a close in August 1945.

In September 1944, Churchill and Roosevelt reached an agreement that full atomic collaboration between their nations would continue after the war ended. This understanding reflected Britain's substantial contribution to nuclear research and the close wartime alliance. However, Roosevelt's death in April 1945 marked a turning point. His successor, Harry Truman, reversed this commitment.

The decision to develop an independent deterrent

By this point, Clement Attlee's Labour government had begun examining the possibility of a British nuclear programme. Several factors drove this decision:

Britain conducted its first atomic test off the coast of north-west Australia in October 1952. This achievement demonstrated British scientific and industrial capability, but it immediately became apparent that the challenges of competing with the superpowers were substantial.

The hydrogen bomb and escalating costs

Within a month of Britain's successful atomic test, the Americans detonated a far more powerful hydrogen bomb. The Soviets followed with their own hydrogen bomb test in August 1953. Having made the fundamental decision that Britain should not be excluded from this arms race, the Attlee government's successors had limited room for manoeuvre.

By the end of 1957, Britain had successfully tested its first megaton thermonuclear bomb, with American technical assistance. This weapon possessed destructive capacity 75 times greater than the atomic device exploded in 1945. However, the economic strain of attempting to maintain parity with the two superpowers was considerable. While reliance on a nuclear defence strategy, as outlined in Duncan Sandys' white paper of April 1957, did allow the nation to make savings on conventional forces, the overall costs remained substantial.

Duncan Sandys and defence reorganisation

Duncan Sandys was deliberately appointed Minister of Defence by Macmillan in 1957 because of his reputation for getting things accomplished without bureaucratic delays. He presented a thorough review of British defence strategy that incorporated lessons from the Suez crisis. His white paper established the nuclear deterrent as the central pillar of Britain's national security policy.

Dependence on American support

Despite rhetoric about independence, the reality of Britain's nuclear deterrent was its dependence on increased American collaboration. This undermined claims of genuine autonomy in British strategy.

The benefits of Macmillan's diplomacy became apparent after 1960, when Britain's own IRBM project, Blue Streak, was cancelled on grounds of cost and questionable capability. Britain had hoped this would be replaced by America's Skybolt programme, but this too was abandoned. In December 1962, Macmillan persuaded President Kennedy to supply Britain with Polaris missiles for use from British-built nuclear submarines.

In this instance, at least, the Special Relationship functioned effectively. The American concession was not offered to any other country and enabled Britain to maintain a deterrent at a vastly lower cost than would have been possible independently. However, this arrangement confirmed that British nuclear strategy depended fundamentally on American technological and political support.

Labour Party divisions and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

Britain's nuclear strategy proved deeply troublesome for the Labour opposition. Many on the left never reconciled themselves to weapons capable of destroying civilisation itself. They perceived a qualitative moral difference between nuclear and conventional forces, and questioned the practical value of a defence strategy that could invite catastrophic retaliation.

The Labour leadership, however, regarded the bomb as an unfortunate necessity until such time as the superpowers accepted the principle of multilateral disarmament. Aneurin Bevan came close to expulsion from the party in 1955 when he opposed the leadership's support for developing a British hydrogen bomb. However, he experienced a change of position and, as Shadow Foreign Secretary, surprised and dismayed former left-wing colleagues by warning the 1957 party conference about the dangers of unilateralism.

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) was formed in 1958. Though theoretically non-party, it attracted considerable support from Labour's left wing. By 1960, the movement was calling for Britain to leave NATO. That year's Labour conference passed unilateralist resolutions against strong opposition from the leadership. These decisions were reversed in 1961 after a passionate campaign by Hugh Gaitskell.

The outcome was probably fortunate for Labour's incoming government in 1964, by which time much of CND's momentum had evaporated. The episode revealed the depth of moral and strategic disagreement within the Labour movement about nuclear weapons, but ultimately the party maintained its commitment to the deterrent whilst in government.

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