The Suez Crisis, 1956 (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
The Suez Crisis, 1956
Background and strategic importance
The Suez Canal operated as a vital waterway linking the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean and territories beyond, including Asia, Australia and New Zealand. This made it central to global trade networks. Most critically, approximately 80 per cent of Western Europe's oil imports travelled through the canal, making control of this route an economic and strategic necessity for European powers.
The rise of Egyptian nationalism under a new leader created considerable anxiety for British interests in the region. When Colonel Gamel Abd al-Nasser emerged as Egypt's nationalist president in 1956, Britain faced an uncertain future regarding access to this essential trade route.
The Suez Canal's strategic value cannot be overstated. Beyond oil transportation, it served as the shortest maritime route between Europe and Asia, drastically reducing journey times and shipping costs. Control of the canal meant control over a crucial artery of global commerce.
The Aswan Dam and nationalisation
The United States and Britain had initially planned to invest in the Aswan Dam construction project. However, both nations withdrew their financial support in 1956. Nasser responded by announcing the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, transferring ownership from private (largely British and French) control to the Egyptian state. This action was intended to generate the revenue needed to fund the Aswan Dam.
Nasser's decision appeared to align Egypt more closely with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, raising fears that a strategic asset might fall under Soviet influence. British policymakers viewed this development as a direct threat to Western interests in the Middle East.
The nationalisation of the Suez Canal represented more than just an economic challenge. It symbolised the decline of European colonial influence in the region and the rise of independent nationalist movements that were willing to challenge Western dominance.
Key figure: Colonel Gamel Abd al-Nasser
Colonel Gamel Abd al-Nasser (1918-70) led a nationalist movement that overthrew Egypt's old monarchy. He became president in 1956 and remained in that position until his death in 1970. His presidency proved neutral in Cold War terms, though his nationalisation of the Suez Canal alarmed Britain and the United States, who interpreted his actions as potentially pro-Soviet.
Eden's perspective and the secret Sèvres Protocol
British Prime Minister Anthony Eden held strong views about Nasser and the nationalisation. Eden's understanding of the situation was shaped by two factors: his conviction that Britain remained an imperial power, and his experience of opposing appeasement policies during the 1930s. Eden characterised Nasser as 'an evil dictator who could not be allowed to get away with unprovoked aggression'. This language and reasoning drew direct parallels with pre-war fascist dictators.
Most of Eden's cabinet, including Chancellor Harold Macmillan, supported his assessment and proposed course of action.
Eden received encouragement from both France and Israel. In late September 1956, a top-secret meeting took place at Sèvres, near Paris. Britain, France and Israel developed a coordinated military plan at this meeting. The agreed strategy worked as follows:
- Israeli forces would launch an attack on Egypt
- Britain and France would then intervene, claiming to separate the combatants and restore peace
- The actual objective was to enforce British and French control over the Suez Canal zone
This plan was deliberately concealed from Parliament and from the Americans, demonstrating the extent to which Eden was prepared to act independently of the United States. This secrecy would prove to be a critical political mistake, undermining Britain's credibility with its closest ally and violating democratic accountability.
The invasion and immediate political consequences
The plan commenced on 29 October 1956 when Israeli forces attacked Egypt. The Anglo-French military intervention followed immediately. The military operation did not proceed as smoothly as anticipated, though it might have achieved its objectives eventually.
The invasion triggered considerable political opposition within Britain. The Labour Party condemned the conflict. Street protests occurred across the country and public opinion divided sharply over whether military intervention was justified.
The domestic political reaction revealed deep divisions in British society. While some viewed the intervention as necessary to protect vital national interests, others saw it as an unjustified act of imperial aggression in an era when colonialism was increasingly challenged globally.
American opposition and the financial crisis
More damaging than domestic opposition was the response from the United States. America firmly opposed the military action. Britain lacked sufficient economic and financial strength in 1956 to withstand American pressure. The government faced a serious financial crisis as confidence in sterling collapsed.
Macmillan, initially one of the strongest advocates for the invasion, became the first senior figure to recognise that withdrawal was essential. This meant accepting failure and humiliation on the international stage. Eden's reputation suffered fatal damage from the debacle.
The American opposition took concrete form through economic pressure. The United States refused to support the British pound, leading to a run on sterling that threatened Britain's gold and dollar reserves. Without American financial backing, Britain simply could not sustain the military operation.
Consequences for Britain's international position
The Suez Crisis forced a reassessment of Britain's world role in several respects:
Reputation and moral authority: The crisis damaged Britain's reputation as a force for good internationally. The attempt to use military force to protect economic interests while concealing the true plan from allies and Parliament undermined Britain's standing.
Britain had long prided itself on being a champion of international law and democratic values. The secretive nature of the Sèvres Protocol and the subsequent military action contradicted these principles, causing lasting damage to Britain's moral authority on the world stage.
Dependence on the United States: The crisis exposed Britain's inability to act without American support. Britain could not sustain an independent foreign policy that contradicted American interests. This highlighted the end of Britain's position as an equal partner with the United States.
Economic constraints: The financial crisis demonstrated how Britain's economic and financial weaknesses directly limited foreign policy options. Economic vulnerability meant political dependency.
End of great power status: The crisis began to undermine the belief that, despite post-war changes, Britain remained one of the world's major powers. The events of 1956 revealed the gap between Britain's self-perception and its actual capabilities.
The Suez Crisis marked a psychological turning point for Britain. It shattered the illusion that Britain could still act as an independent great power and forced a painful recognition that the era of British imperial dominance had ended. Future British foreign policy would need to operate within the constraints of American approval and limited economic resources.
Remember!
Key Points to Remember:
- The Suez Canal carried 80 per cent of Western Europe's oil, making it strategically vital for British economic interests
- Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company in 1956 prompted Eden to organise a secret military plan with France and Israel at Sèvres
- The invasion on 29 October 1956 provoked American opposition and triggered a financial crisis that forced British withdrawal
- The crisis damaged Britain's international reputation, exposed economic weaknesses, and revealed Britain's dependence on US support
- Suez marked a turning point in understanding Britain's diminished status as a world power after 1945