The End of Post-War Consensus: Foreign Affairs (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
The 'Special Relationship' with the USA
Origins and foundations of the 'special relationship'
Winston Churchill articulated the concept of a 'special relationship' between Britain and the United States on multiple occasions during and after the Second World War. Churchill maintained that this close partnership between the two nations was essential to maintaining global peace and stability. The notion persisted throughout the post-war period because it corresponded to genuine shared characteristics and mutual interests between the two countries.
The relationship rested on four main foundations:
- Military alliance: Britain and the USA fought as allies in the First World War, Second World War, Korean War and throughout the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union
- Shared language: Both nations used English as their primary language for governance and public discourse, facilitating diplomatic communication and cultural exchange
- Economic similarity: The two countries had achieved comparable levels of economic development and shared broadly similar capitalist economic systems
- Common values: Both nations championed democracy, upheld the rule of law, and protected civil rights, distinguishing them from authoritarian regimes
After 1945, Britain occupied a unique geopolitical position. The country maintained relationships with three distinct spheres: the United States as its principal ally, Europe (including the European Economic Community after 1973), and the Empire transitioning into the Commonwealth. This positioning gave Britain potential influence as a bridge between these different power centres, but also created tension about where British priorities should lie.
Wilson and the Vietnam War challenge
For Harold Wilson's Labour governments (1964-1970, 1974-1976), the Vietnam War presented the most difficult challenge to Anglo-American relations. President Lyndon B. Johnson wanted Britain to commit troops to support the American military intervention in Vietnam, applying considerable diplomatic pressure on Wilson to join the war effort.
Wilson adopted a careful balancing position. He refused to commit British forces to Vietnam, but equally refused to publicly condemn American policy in Southeast Asia. This delicate diplomatic stance reflected multiple competing pressures on his government.
This approach reflected several considerations:
Wilson needed to maintain support within his own Labour Party, where many backbenchers strongly opposed American intervention in Vietnam and wanted the government to criticize US policy. Committing troops would have provoked internal party conflict and potentially split Labour.
The economic dimension also weighed heavily on Wilson's calculations. The Korean War (1950-1953) had placed substantial financial strain on the previous Labour government under Clement Attlee, and Wilson wished to avoid repeating this experience. Britain's economy was already facing challenges, and a major military commitment would have exacerbated these problems.
Britain also had its own military commitments to manage. The country was engaged in combating a Communist insurgency in Malaya (modern-day Malaysia), which meant British forces were already deployed in Southeast Asia. Wilson used this existing commitment as partial justification for not extending British involvement to Vietnam, though he carefully avoided criticizing the American position.
Heath's European focus
Of all post-war Prime Ministers, Edward Heath (1970-1974) placed the least emphasis on Anglo-American relations. For Heath, the defining priority was securing British membership of the European Economic Community, which Britain finally joined in 1973. Relations with European partners took precedence over the transatlantic relationship.
Historian Niklas Rossbach offers an interpretation of the Heath-Nixon relationship that suggests both leaders attempted to transform the Anglo-American special relationship into a broader European-American partnership, aligning with Britain's new EEC membership. According to Rossbach's analysis, this attempt ultimately failed and actually reinforced existing diplomatic assumptions about the bilateral nature of the special relationship rather than successfully multilateralizing it.
Heath articulated a more transactional view of international relations. He argued that Britain should pursue its own national interests rather than automatically deferring to American preferences. Heath stated that at each stage of policy development, "our job and Europe's job is to look after our own interests because what the Americans do is to look after their own interests." This represented a more pragmatic, less sentimental approach to the special relationship than some of his predecessors had adopted.
Callaghan's diplomatic continuity
James Callaghan (1976-1979) maintained constructive relations with two American presidents during his time as Prime Minister. Alan Dobson argues that Callaghan enjoyed good working relationships with both the Republican Gerald Ford and the Democrat Jimmy Carter. However, Dobson cautions against reading too much into the fact that Ford did not visit Britain during his presidency. Ford served for less than two and a half years following Richard Nixon's resignation, which limits what conclusions can be drawn about the relative importance of Britain to his administration.
The strength of Anglo-American defence cooperation during Callaghan's premiership was demonstrated at the 1979 Guadeloupe conference. When Callaghan requested American assistance regarding Britain's need for a new nuclear weapons delivery system, President Carter responded positively. Carter agreed to provide Britain with the American Trident weapon system on affordable terms, ensuring Britain could maintain its independent nuclear deterrent capability. This agreement illustrated that defence cooperation remained robust regardless of broader political developments.
EEC membership and the special relationship
British entry into the European Economic Community in 1973 raised questions about the future of Anglo-American relations. The EEC's name suggested it was primarily an economic organization, and its supporters argued that membership would enhance Britain's economic prosperity through increased trade with European partners. However, the EEC also possessed a political and diplomatic dimension. It represented a commitment by Heath's government to work more closely with European allies and to exercise greater influence in world affairs through collective European action.
NATO membership remained the foundation of British security policy during the Cold War, but EEC membership added another layer to Britain's international commitments. The Warsaw Pact countries (the Soviet alliance system) bordered the EEC's eastern frontier, which meant that EEC membership had Cold War implications. Being part of NATO necessitated cooperation and integration with western European partners, and few observers believed that joining the EEC would or should terminate close cooperation with the United States.
Nevertheless, Heath expressed the view that European and American interests might not always align perfectly. He emphasized that Britain and Europe needed to pursue their own interests independently when appropriate, just as the United States pursued its own national interests. This represented a more conditional view of the special relationship than the unconditional partnership that Churchill had envisaged.
Reality versus fears: In practice, Anglo-American relations survived British EEC membership without substantial damage. Defence cooperation remained as close as before. When Carter agreed to supply the Trident system in 1979, it demonstrated that the United States still viewed Britain as a vital security partner worthy of access to advanced American military technology.
The Cold War context of the 1970s
Understanding Anglo-American relations in the 1970s requires appreciation of the broader Cold War environment. The Brezhnev Doctrine, set out in 1968 by Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, articulated Moscow's position that each Communist party bore responsibility not only to its own national population but also to the international communist movement. This doctrine provided ideological justification for Soviet intervention in other communist countries. The USSR had invaded East Germany in the 1940s and Hungary in 1956. In 1968, Warsaw Pact troops entered Czechoslovakia to suppress a reformist Czechoslovak government. The Brezhnev Doctrine sent a clear message that the Soviet Union expected its allies to accept Moscow's direction, and that NATO should not interfere in Soviet sphere affairs.
Détente: A period of relaxation
The 1960s and 1970s witnessed a period of détente in Cold War relations. Détente, a French word meaning 'relaxation', described the increased level of diplomatic contact between the USA and USSR and negotiations regarding nuclear weapons. Various factors drove this shift toward reduced tension. The arms race had become extremely expensive, placing economic pressure on both superpowers. Both the USSR and USA recognized that their respective economies would benefit from reduced military expenditure.
In 1972, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) began, representing a series of negotiations between the USA and USSR aimed at limiting nuclear weapons. These talks led to the Antiballistic Missile Treaty and imposed caps on the number of weapons each side could deploy. In 1975, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe produced the Helsinki Final Act, which recognized existing political borders in Europe, reducing the threat of border disputes and facilitating increased trade between East and West.
During this period, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in Britain was less active than it had been during the 1960s, and would not regain prominence until the 1980s. The British government showed little appetite for adopting policies on nuclear weapons or relations with the USSR that differed substantially from American positions. The Wilson and Callaghan Labour administrations largely continued the approach of previous Conservative governments on these matters. However, a left-wing faction within the Labour Party retained an optimistic view of the USSR, though this group could not take control of the party's foreign and defence policy during this period.
British alignment with US policy: Throughout the 1970s, despite détente and Labour governments, Britain maintained close alignment with American Cold War strategy. The Wilson and Callaghan administrations showed no significant departure from Conservative approaches to nuclear weapons or Soviet relations, demonstrating the continuity of the special relationship across party lines.
The Sino-Soviet split and Western responses
China had come under Communist control in the 1940s when Mao Zedong led the Communist Party and its military forces to victory, both against Japan during the Second World War and against domestic political opponents in the subsequent civil war. After establishing Communist rule, China cooperated closely with the USSR as fellow Communist powers. However, relations between the two countries deteriorated as Mao refused to accept orders from Moscow.
The Sino-Soviet split describes this breakdown in diplomatic relations between the USSR and China during the 1970s. The Chinese leadership asserted its independence from Moscow and developed a distinct interpretation of Marxist ideology on certain theoretical points. This split transformed the Cold War from a bipolar confrontation between two superpowers into a more complex situation involving three competing major powers.
Nixon's anti-communist credentials
Richard Nixon pursued rapprochement with China for strategic reasons, despite his established reputation as a hardline anti-communist. Nixon's political identity as a Republican with strong anti-communist credentials meant he was less vulnerable to domestic criticism that he was being soft on Communism, whereas a Democrat president or more liberal Republican might have faced stronger opposition to engaging with Communist China.
Nixon identified three reasons for wanting improved relations with China:
- Economic benefits: Any improvement in international relations created opportunities for increased trade, which would benefit the American economy
- Strategic advantage against the USSR: With the Sino-Soviet split creating tension between China and the USSR, developing closer ties with China offered a way of outmaneuvering and diplomatically isolating the Soviet Union
- Ending the Vietnam War: China was one of North Vietnam's principal backers, and Nixon calculated that improving relations with China might help secure a settlement that would allow American withdrawal from Vietnam
The Taiwan complication: A major obstacle complicated American-Chinese relations. The Nationalist government that had lost the Chinese civil war to Mao's Communists had fled into exile in Taiwan. American governments had traditionally recognized and supported this Nationalist government as the legitimate government of China, creating a diplomatic barrier to engagement with the Communist government that actually controlled mainland China.
Key Points to Remember:
- The 'special relationship' between Britain and the USA rested on shared military history, language, economic development and democratic values, but required continuous management as circumstances changed
- Wilson navigated Vietnam War pressures by refusing both to commit troops and to publicly condemn American policy, balancing party opinion against alliance maintenance
- Heath prioritized European integration over the transatlantic relationship, though defence cooperation continued; EEC membership did not end the special relationship
- Détente characterized the 1970s Cold War, with SALT talks and the Helsinki Final Act reducing tensions, while British policy largely aligned with American positions
- The Sino-Soviet split created a three-way Cold War dynamic, which Nixon exploited to pursue rapprochement with China for economic, strategic and Vietnam War-related reasons
- The 1979 Trident agreement demonstrated that Anglo-American defence cooperation remained strong despite Britain's EEC membership