Attitudes to the USSR and China (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes

Attitudes to the USSR and China

The context of détente in the 1970s

During the 1960s and 1970s, the Cold War entered a new phase characterised by reduced tensions between the superpowers. This period became known as détente, a French term meaning 'relaxation' that described the increased diplomatic contact between the USA and USSR, alongside negotiations aimed at controlling nuclear weapons. The shift towards détente emerged from practical concerns: the arms race proved economically burdensome for both sides, and the ever-present threat of nuclear war created pressure for dialogue rather than confrontation.

The thawing of relations took various concrete forms. In 1972, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) began, representing negotiations between the USA and USSR to limit their nuclear arsenals. These discussions led to the Antiballistic Missile Treaty and established caps on specific weapons systems. By 1975, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe produced the Helsinki Final Act, which aimed to recognise existing political borders across Europe, thereby reducing the likelihood of territorial disputes and facilitating increased trade between East and West.

However, détente remained fragile and incomplete. Arms control discussions could not eliminate underlying ideological differences, and new sources of friction would emerge as the decade progressed.

The Sino-Soviet split and its international implications

Before examining Western attitudes towards China and the USSR, it is necessary to understand a development that fundamentally altered Cold War dynamics: the Sino-Soviet split. This term describes the deterioration in diplomatic relations between the USSR and China during the 1970s, in which the Chinese leadership asserted independence from Moscow and adopted different interpretations of Marxist ideology on certain issues.

China had come under Communist rule in the 1940s when Mao Zedong led the Communist party and the Red Army to victory, both in the Second World War against Japan and in the subsequent civil war against domestic political opponents. Following their victory, China became a Communist neighbour and theoretical ally of the USSR. Yet relations between the two Communist powers cooled considerably as Mao refused to accept orders from Moscow and pursued an independent foreign policy.

American and British approaches to China

Nixon's strategic calculation

Richard Nixon had built his political career on strong anti-communist credentials. His political identity had long been defined by opposition to Communism, which insulated him from accusations of being soft on the issue when he pursued improved relations with China. A Democrat president or more liberal Republican politician would have faced greater criticism for such an approach, but Nixon's established reputation provided him political cover for this dramatic policy shift.

Nixon identified three specific reasons for seeking better relations with China:

1. Improved international relations would benefit trade and stimulate economic growth
2. The Sino-Soviet split created an opportunity to move closer to China as a means of outmanoeuvring the USSR, potentially isolating Moscow diplomatically
3. China provided backing to North Vietnam, and establishing dialogue with Beijing might help facilitate an end to the Vietnam War

The Taiwan obstacle

A substantial impediment blocked the path to normalised relations with Communist China. The Nationalist government, having lost the Chinese civil war, had fled into exile in Taiwan. Since the Second World War, American governments had recognised this Nationalist regime in Taiwan as the legitimate Chinese government. How could America recognise the Communists without appearing to abandon its allies in Taiwan?

Nixon's officials worked discreetly with their Chinese counterparts to prepare for a summit meeting. Henry Kissinger, serving as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, conducted secret negotiations with China regarding future relations. Meanwhile, the United Nations debated China's representation: the Chinese seat remained occupied by the exiled Nationalists in Taiwan. The US position advocated that Communist China should be permitted to join the UN, while Nationalist China should remain as Taiwan rather than claiming to represent all of China. When the vote occurred, it favoured Communist China, which joined as the Nationalist representatives departed.

Diplomatic breakthrough through sport

While secretive negotiations progressed, China extended an invitation to the US table-tennis team to visit. This 1971 event became known as 'Ping Pong Diplomacy' by international media. The following year, Nixon travelled to China for a week-long visit, meeting Mao on a single occasion. Though Mao was elderly and in poor health, speaking little during their encounter, the meeting itself carried enormous symbolic weight and allowed Nixon to articulate his views and requirements for improved bilateral relations.

British engagement under Heath

As Prime Minister, Edward Heath sought to establish Britain's own connections with China. His Foreign Secretary, Alec Douglas-Home, visited China in 1972, with Heath himself making trips in 1974 and 1975. Discussions between the two sides focused on trade matters and largely avoided contentious political issues.

One sensitive topic could not be entirely ignored: Hong Kong. This island territory, leased from China by Britain, was scheduled to be returned in 1997. When suggestions arose that the deadline might be postponed, they met with rejection. However, Mao's successor, Deng Xiaoping, accepted that Hong Kong's prosperity and significance depended upon its capitalist, free-market economy remaining intact.

Western attitudes towards the USSR in the early 1970s

The Nixon-Brezhnev summit

Richard Nixon's meeting with Communist Party secretary-general Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow during May 1972 marked an important moment in superpower relations. Brezhnev had observed Nixon's February trip to China with considerable anxiety: improved understanding between China and the USA threatened to leave the USSR diplomatically isolated. Moreover, the Cold War's enormous cost had become unsustainable. If the threat of war diminished and all sides reduced their military expenditure, while simultaneously increasing international trade, all parties would benefit.

Nixon became the first US President to visit Moscow. His trip resulted in agreements addressing weapon stockpile limitations and grain trading. The USSR continually struggled to feed its population adequately, and these trade arrangements had both economic and political dimensions. Building upon earlier SALT achievements, further summits occurred in 1973 and 1974, though they produced limited additional progress. One issue proved particularly divisive: Carter's successor presidency raised human rights concerns, which Soviet authorities had no wish to discuss.

The limits of détente

Did détente represent a genuine transformation of superpower relations by the late 1970s? The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 demonstrated that Red Army forces had exceeded the boundaries established in 1945, adopting a stance that NATO regarded as threatening. This challenged the spirit of Helsinki's commitment to respect existing borders and discourse about human rights in the Soviet Union and its client states received a distinctly frosty response from Moscow.

Key takeaways