Britain’s European Relations (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
Britain's European Relations
Britain's third application to the EEC
In 1973, Britain finally gained membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) after its third application. This marked a turning point in British foreign policy, but the decision remained deeply controversial throughout the 1970s. Both major political parties experienced internal divisions over European integration, and the question of Britain's relationship with Europe continued to dominate political debate.
Britain's entry into the EEC came after two previous failed applications in 1963 and 1967, both vetoed by French President Charles de Gaulle. The 1973 membership represented not just a policy achievement but a fundamental reorientation of British foreign policy away from its imperial past and towards European cooperation.
Heath's pro-European leadership
Edward Heath refers to the Conservative Prime Minister (1970-1974) who was passionately committed to European integration and successfully negotiated Britain's entry into the EEC.
Heath's enthusiasm for European cooperation stemmed from his formative experiences. As a student in the 1930s, he visited Germany and witnessed first-hand the dangers of nationalism under Nazi rule. This convinced him that European cooperation represented the most effective way to prevent future conflict. His first parliamentary speech addressed the Schuman Plan, the forerunner to the EEC, demonstrating his long-standing commitment to the European project.
When Heath became Prime Minister in 1970, the political landscape in Europe had shifted in Britain's favour. Charles de Gaulle, the French president who had repeatedly vetoed British membership, had been replaced by Georges Pompidou. Unlike his predecessor, Pompidou believed that the EEC needed Britain as much as Britain needed Europe. This change in French leadership proved essential to Britain's successful application.
Heath's team had already completed much of the groundwork for entry. During the early 1960s, when Heath served in a senior ministerial role, detailed arrangements and exceptions had been negotiated in 1962. Therefore, when the formal accession process began in 1971, the outcome was largely predetermined. The negotiations with France, along with Ireland and Denmark, took over two years to complete, but this was primarily a formality rather than a genuine uncertainty.
Parliamentary divisions and opposition
Securing parliamentary approval for EEC membership presented Heath with considerable challenges. Opposition came from multiple sources within Westminster. Some Conservative MPs harboured doubts about surrendering sovereignty, while others worried about the impact on Commonwealth relationships. The Labour Party also faced internal conflicts, though their concerns stemmed from different perspectives.
Enoch Powell emerged as the most vociferous opponent of British membership. Powell's relationship with Heath had already deteriorated badly following his controversial 1968 "rivers of blood" speech on immigration, after which Heath dismissed him from the shadow cabinet. Powell viewed Heath's European policy as a betrayal of British sovereignty.
Powell's opposition was absolute. He voted against the passage of the European bill at every single stage in Parliament. He argued that Heath had betrayed the country by signing the treaty before it had been debated in Parliament. His opposition was so intense that in the February 1974 general election, he refused to stand as a Conservative candidate and instead urged his supporters to vote Labour. This extraordinary move demonstrated the depth of anti-European feeling among some Conservatives.
Powell's dramatic decision to urge Conservative voters to support Labour in 1974 represented an unprecedented breach of party loyalty. This action highlighted how the European question cut across traditional party lines and created new political divisions that would persist for decades.
Labour's dilemma and Wilson's compromise
The Labour Party experienced even more severe internal divisions over Europe. While some Labour figures were committed pro-Europeans, notably Roy Jenkins, the Labour Left remained predominantly hostile to membership. Harold Wilson himself occupied a pragmatic middle position. He was neither strongly for nor against membership, but he remained obsessed with maintaining party unity on this potentially explosive issue.
Abstaining describes the parliamentary procedure of voting neither for nor against a motion in the House of Commons, allowing MPs to avoid taking a definitive position.
When Heath's plans came before Parliament, the Labour Party officially opposed them. However, Labour could not argue against joining on principle because too many pro-European Labour MPs existed within the party. Wilson therefore argued that the terms negotiated were not good enough, rather than opposing membership itself. This represented a compromise position designed to keep the party together.
Even this compromise failed to satisfy everyone. In the end, Wilson could only maintain party cohesion by promising a renegotiation of terms and a national referendum – an idea promoted by Tony Benn. When Labour returned to power in 1974, rebel Labour MPs had already helped the Conservative government win the decisive Commons vote, with 20 more Labour MPs abstaining rather than opposing membership.
In January 1973, Britain formally joined the EEC. 'The Six' original members (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) became 'The Nine' with the addition of Britain, Ireland, and Denmark.
Consequences of delayed entry
Heath's persistence and commitment had finally brought Britain into Europe, but the likelihood of a future referendum created ongoing uncertainty. Some observers feared that Britain's membership came 16 years too late. By missing the formative years of the EEC since its establishment in 1957, Britain would suffer from having no input into the fundamental structures and policies of the Community. The rules and arrangements had been designed without British interests in mind, potentially placing Britain at a permanent disadvantage.
The Cost of Delay:
Britain's late entry meant the country had no influence over the EEC's foundational structures, policies, and financial arrangements. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which would later prove expensive for Britain, had been designed to benefit France and other agricultural economies. Britain's exclusion from the formative years of 1957-1973 created structural disadvantages that would fuel euroscepticism for decades to come.
The 1975 referendum
When the Labour Party returned to government in 1974, Harold Wilson's primary objective remained party unity. He demonstrated this through his handling of the referendum campaign in 1975. Rather than imposing a party line, Wilson adopted an unusual strategy: he allowed his anti-European cabinet colleagues to campaign according to their own views. Wilson and James Callaghan argued that they themselves remained neutral, though this neutrality was largely cosmetic.
Growing support for membership
By 1975, voter support for Britain remaining in the EEC had grown considerably stronger compared to 1973. The economic difficulties the country experienced seemed to prove that Britain needed membership for its own economic survival. The deteriorating economic situation made the prospect of isolation appear more dangerous.
Most of the press supported continued membership. The 'Yes' campaign benefited from substantial financing by business supporters. A survey conducted in 1975 found that of 419 company chairmen questioned, only four wanted to leave the EEC. This overwhelming business support translated into effective campaign resources.
Cross-Party Coalition:
The political leadership of the 'Yes' campaign proved formidable. Most of the cabinet, led by Roy Jenkins, supported membership. Edward Heath and most senior Conservatives backed the campaign. Jeremy Thorpe, the Liberal leader, also threw his support behind continued membership. This cross-party coalition of established political figures made a more substantial impression on voters than the opposition campaign.
The 'No' campaign arguments
The 'No' campaigners fell into two main categories, each with distinct concerns. The first group argued that EEC membership would harm British workers. This position was championed by Barbara Castle and Michael Foot, both from the left wing of the Labour Party. They feared that European policies would undermine workers' rights and living standards.
The second group opposed membership on the grounds that Britain would lose its independence. This argument brought together Tony Benn from the Labour Party, Enoch Powell (who had by then left the Conservatives to become a UUP MP), and Ian Paisley of the DUP. Their campaign literature warned that the Common Market was progressively making British laws and deciding British policies on food, prices, trade, and employment. They argued that as the system tightened, the British people's right to change policies and laws through voting would steadily diminish.
Two Distinct Lines of Opposition:
The 'No' campaign brought together unlikely allies from opposite ends of the political spectrum:
- Economic arguments: Left-wing Labour figures like Barbara Castle and Michael Foot feared EEC membership would undermine workers' rights and living standards
- Sovereignty arguments: Figures like Tony Benn, Enoch Powell, and Ian Paisley argued that Britain would lose its independence and democratic self-governance
Referendum result and consequences
The referendum posed a straightforward question: 'Do you think that the United Kingdom should stay in the European Community (the Common Market)?' The result, announced in July 1975, showed decisive support for membership. 17 million people (68.3 per cent) voted 'yes', while 8 million (32.5 per cent) voted 'no'. Britain's membership was confirmed by a commanding two-to-one majority.
The 1975 Referendum Result:
The referendum produced a clear outcome:
- Yes vote: 17 million (68.3%)
- No vote: 8 million (32.5%)
- Margin: More than 2:1 in favour of remaining
This decisive result appeared to settle the question of British membership, though underlying divisions would resurface in subsequent decades.
The margin of victory appeared reassuring, providing proof that Britain genuinely wanted to remain 'in'. However, the fact that a referendum had been held at all could be interpreted as a worrying sign of insufficient commitment. For Wilson personally, the referendum represented a triumph. He had successfully avoided a Labour split while maintaining his leadership.
European commissioner describes the equivalent of a minister at European level, with each commissioner appointed by national governments to serve in the European Commission.
After the referendum, the European issue temporarily quietened. Roy Jenkins, one of Labour's most prominent pro-European figures, left Parliament to become a European commissioner. However, the underlying divisions had not disappeared. The Labour Party became increasingly anti-European in the following years. Those Conservatives who opposed the growing influence of Europe maintained their opposition. Nevertheless, because the British people had voted to remain in the EEC, the debate was effectively closed for the time being.
Impact on the special relationship with the USA
Edward Heath's approach to foreign policy, with its orientation towards Europe, meant he was less inclined to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance. When Henry Kissinger, the United States secretary of state, attempted to use Britain as a link between America and Europe, Heath rejected this role. He insisted that the United States should negotiate with the European Community as a whole, rather than using Britain as an intermediary or go-between.
Kissinger later commented that Heath 'dealt with us with an unsentimentality totally at variance with "the special relationship"'. This assessment highlighted how Heath's European focus had cooled the traditionally close Anglo-American relationship. However, on a personal level, Heath developed a good working relationship with US President Richard Nixon. Heath proved more forthright in his support for American policy in Vietnam than Harold Wilson had been during his earlier premiership.
Redefining Britain's Role:
Heath's rejection of the traditional 'special relationship' with the United States represented a fundamental shift in British foreign policy. Rather than positioning Britain as America's closest ally and European intermediary, Heath insisted that Britain's primary loyalty lay with its European partners. This approach prioritised European integration over Atlantic cooperation, marking a significant departure from the policies of previous prime ministers.
Key Points to Remember:
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Britain joined the EEC in January 1973 under Edward Heath's leadership, after two previous failed applications, with Heath's personal commitment to European cooperation stemming from his 1930s experiences in Germany.
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The 1975 referendum produced a decisive result (68.3% yes to 32.5% no), confirming British membership, though the need for a referendum itself suggested underlying doubts about the European project.
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Both major parties experienced deep internal divisions, with Labour split between pro-Europeans like Roy Jenkins and anti-Europeans on the left, while Conservatives faced opposition from figures like Enoch Powell who viewed membership as betraying British sovereignty.
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The referendum campaigns divided along two main lines: economic arguments (would membership benefit or harm British workers?) and sovereignty arguments (would Britain lose its independence and right to self-governance?).
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Heath's focus on European integration meant he distanced Britain from its traditional 'special relationship' with the USA, refusing to act as an intermediary between America and Europe and insisting the US negotiate with the EEC as a whole.