Relations with Europe (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes

Relations with Europe

Thatcher's Bruges speech and opposition to federalism

In September 1988, Margaret Thatcher delivered a speech to the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium, which fundamentally shaped Conservative attitudes toward European integration for years to come. Thatcher used this platform to articulate her vision of Britain's relationship with Europe and the future direction of the European Economic Community (EEC).

Thatcher made clear that Britain did not seek isolation from Europe, stating that "Our destiny is in Europe as part of the Community." However, she strongly opposed attempts to create a unified European identity that would suppress national distinctiveness. She argued that "Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity." This represented a rejection of what Thatcher saw as efforts to create "some sort of identikit European personality."

Thatcher firmly opposed applying this model to Europe, arguing against concentrating power at the European centre. She warned that attempts to suppress nationhood and create a European "conglomerate" would damage rather than strengthen Europe. She positioned herself against those in the EEC, particularly Jacques Delors (the president of the European Commission), who advocated for closer political union and "ever closer political union."

Thatcher wanted to emphasise that the EEC should function as a trade association between sovereign states, not evolve into a federal superstate. She believed success depended on "dispersing power away from the centre" and allowing individual countries to determine their own policies on matters such as economic management and social policy. In Britain, she stated, there would be resistance to "collectivism and corporatism at the European level," even if some member states wished to pursue such approaches domestically.

The Single European Act and Thatcher's shifting position

Thatcher's Bruges speech marked a notable shift in her public stance on Europe. In 1986, she had signed the Single European Act (SEA), which appeared to support deeper European integration. The SEA aimed to create a single European market, which aligned with Thatcher's economic philosophy of free trade and reduced barriers to commerce.

However, Thatcher later claimed she had not fully understood how the SEA would be used to advance Britain's relationship with Europe beyond purely economic matters. The Act limited the influence of individual nation states in European decision-making, which troubled Thatcher as she observed the direction Europe was taking. She became increasingly concerned that the SEA was being used as a vehicle for political integration rather than simply economic cooperation.

Following the Bruges speech, Thatcher appeared to grow more negative about Britain's European involvement. While the speech itself was intended to present a positive vision, it infuriated other European leaders and raised doubts about Britain's commitment to further integration. Within Britain, the speech energised Eurosceptic Conservative MPs, who formed the Bruges Group to organise opposition to any European federal state.

Thatcher's more assertive line on Europe created tension within her own government. Ministers such as Geoffrey Howe and John Major believed she was backtracking from positions she had previously agreed to since 1985. Meanwhile, Eurosceptics like the Bruges Group argued that the federalists in Brussels were transforming the EEC into something fundamentally different from what Britain had joined in 1973.

Britain and the Exchange Rate Mechanism

In July 1990, Britain entered the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), a system designed to stabilise currency exchange rates between European countries. However, in November 1992, Britain was forced to withdraw from the ERM in what became known as "Black Wednesday." This withdrawal damaged the government's economic credibility and had lasting political consequences.

The Maastricht Treaty and European Union

After the collapse of communism in 1989, Thatcher enthusiastically supported expanding the EEC to include new states in Eastern Europe. This reflected her desire to extend free trade and ensure communism was definitively defeated. However, she also viewed expansion as a way to weaken the power of the European Commission in Brussels, believing a wider union would necessarily be a shallower one rather than a deeper union.

In February 1992, the Treaty on European Union was signed at Maastricht. This treaty fundamentally changed the nature of European cooperation by establishing the European Union and setting up new structures to manage the EEC's expansion. Under the terms of the treaty, the EEC became the European Union, and conditions were established for introducing a single currency by 1999. The treaty was agreed in December 1991 and signed in February 1992 by European member states. It was eventually ratified by the British Parliament in June 1993, though not without considerable difficulty.

Major and Conservative divisions over Europe

John Major inherited a Conservative government increasingly divided over European policy. The issue of Europe had become deeply contentious within the party, with clear factional lines emerging between pro-Europeans and Eurosceptics.

Pro-European cabinet ministers included Ken Clarke and Chris Patten, who supported Britain's involvement in European institutions and closer integration. However, the Eurosceptics were becoming increasingly influential and vocal. This faction included cabinet ministers such as Michael Portillo and John Redwood, as well as backbenchers like Iain Duncan Smith and Bill Cash. These individuals were encouraged by Thatcher's increasingly anti-European interventions following her departure from office. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 provided them with an opportunity to voice their concerns about the direction of the European Union.

Major's diplomatic style and personal relationships enabled him to negotiate effectively with other European leaders. He established good personal connections with the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and his diplomatic skills helped him secure important concessions for Britain. Major successfully negotiated opt-outs from the plans for a single currency and from the Social Chapter. These opt-outs meant Britain would not be required to join the euro or adopt European employment regulations.

However, selling these achievements to sceptical Conservative politicians and British public opinion proved far more challenging than the negotiations themselves. While the opt-outs satisfied some doubters within the Conservative Party, they did not eliminate opposition. The divisions over Europe within the party continued to deepen.

The Maastricht rebels

In July 1993, rebel Conservative MPs mounted a direct challenge to Major's authority by blocking his attempt to get Parliament to ratify the Maastricht Treaty. Major responded by threatening a vote of no confidence, which would have led to the dissolution of Parliament and a general election if he had lost. The Conservatives were far behind Labour in opinion polls, making this a high-stakes gamble. However, the threat worked, and Major won the vote, securing sufficient support to ratify the treaty.

The incident damaged Major's authority and made him appear weak. His inability to silence the rebels demonstrated the extent of the divisions within his party. The situation was further complicated when Major was recorded making candid comments to a TV reporter, as described above.

Even after the Maastricht Treaty was ratified, the divisions over Europe did not heal within Conservative ranks. Losing the party whip or being threatened with deselection did not stop the Eurosceptic rebels. Major's 'back me or sack me' resignation in June 1995 did not strengthen his position as substantially as he had hoped.

The growth of anti-European sentiment

The debate over Europe mobilised anti-European sentiment outside Parliament as well as within it. The Anti-Federalist League, which later became the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), was established in 1993. In 1994, the wealthy financier Sir James Goldsmith set up the Referendum Party to contest the 1997 general election on the single issue of demanding a referendum on Britain's relationship with Europe.

These developments demonstrated that Euroscepticism had moved beyond a purely Conservative Party concern to become a broader political movement. The growth of these organisations reflected widespread public unease about European integration and Britain's place within the European Union.

The expansion of the EU also continued during this period. In January 1995, the EU grew from 12 member states to 15 with the accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden. This expansion changed the dynamics of European cooperation and added to debates about the future direction of the union.

Public sentiment toward European integration was captured by tabloid newspapers. The Sun newspaper, for example, ran a front-page headline reading "UP YOURS DELORS," urging readers to protest against Jacques Delors and the European Commission. Such coverage reflected and reinforced public scepticism about European federalism.