The Flaws in the Plan (Edexcel A-Level History): Revision Notes

The flaws in the plan

The Fourth Crusade faced serious planning problems from the very beginning. Without a national fleet available, the crusade leaders had to negotiate with Venice for transportation. In early 1201, an envoy was sent to Venice with a secret mission: the crusade would not head straight to the Holy Land but would first attack Alexandria in Egypt. This destination was kept secret to avoid discouraging recruitment, but it was actually a strategic choice based on previous attempts to control Egypt by Richard I, King Amalric of Jerusalem, and Sicily.

Problem 1: The price of reliance on the Venetians

The Treaty of Venice

When the crusade envoy arrived in Venice and met with Doge Enrico Dandolo, they began negotiations that would result in the Treaty of Venice in April 1201. Dandolo was an experienced leader who had served as both judge and ambassador to Byzantium. Despite being elderly (around 98 when he died) and suffering from cortical blindness, he was a shrewd negotiator who had previously secured favourable trading terms for Venice with the Byzantine Empire in 1198.

The treaty outlined extraordinarily ambitious plans:

Transport arrangements:

• 4,500 knights
• 9,000 squires (two per knight)
• 20,000 additional foot soldiers
• Total expected force: 33,500 men

Additional provisions:

• Transportation for 4,500 horses (one per knight)
• Nine months' food supply for all troops
• Venetian naval escort of 50 galleys with approximately 30,000 Venetian crew members

Payment terms:

• 85,000 marks (approximately $60,000 at the time) to be paid in instalments
• Initial deposit of 5,000 marks
• Half of all booty and land acquired during the crusade would go to Venice
• Deadline for crusader arrival: 29 June 1202

The scale of Venetian commitment

This treaty represented one of the most ambitious transportation agreements of the medieval period. The Venetians would need to dedicate the resources of their entire city for over a year, involving tremendous labour to adapt and build ships capable of housing knights, horses, and supplies. The chronicler Robert of Clari recorded that Venice stopped all commercial activities for 18 months to prepare, ultimately readying 500 ships for departure.

The fatal flaw: Overestimation

The risks of this overestimation were severe:

• The figure of 33,500 was wildly optimistic compared to previous crusades
• During the Third Crusade, Frederick Barbarossa had travelled with only around 15,000 troops, which had been considered one of the largest forces in crusading history
• The treaty cost was equivalent to double the annual income of King John of England
• The envoy had essentially committed to paying for troops that might never arrive, placing the entire financial burden on the crusade leaders

Problem 2: The size of the forces

The death of Thibault III of Champagne

On 24 May 1201, a disaster struck the crusade leadership. Thibault III of Champagne, the principal leader of the Fourth Crusade, died unexpectedly. He passed on his crusade vow to Reynald of Dampierre. This death had profound consequences:

Immediate leadership crisis:

• The crusade was left without its main leader
• Duke Eudes of Burgundy was offered the position but refused
• Eventually, Boniface of Montferrat was selected after persuasion from the chronicler Geoffrey of Villehardouin

Boniface of Montferrat: A controversial choice

Boniface seemed ideal in many ways:

• He came from a distinguished crusading family
• His brother William Longsword had fathered King Baldwin V
• Another brother, Conrad of Montferrat, had held the garrison at Tyre during the Third Crusade
• He accepted the position at Soissons in June 1201

However, his appointment created new problems:

Controversial connections:

• He was friends with Philip of Swabia, an enemy of the pope in the imperial succession crisis
• His wife, Irene Angelus, was the daughter of the deposed Byzantine emperor Isaac Angelus
• This gave him close ties to Byzantine politics, which would later prove significant

Poor punctuality:

• Boniface didn't arrive in Venice until 15 August 1202, making him one of the last leaders to join
• His late arrival contributed to delays and uncertainty

Loss of support:

• Some knights from Champagne lost faith after Thibault's death
• Reynald of Dampierre chose to sail directly to Outremer rather than wait for Venice
• This deprived the crusade of important contingents

The decision to avoid Venice

Many crusader contingents simply avoided Venice altogether. This wasn't primarily about objecting to Boniface's leadership, but rather due to several factors:

Limited obligation:

• Only the knights of Champagne, Flanders, Blois, Saint-Pol, and (after his acceptance) Montferrat had formally agreed to meet in Venice
• Other crusaders were free to travel by whatever method and route they preferred
• Historical precedent supported this – during the Third Crusade, different groups had travelled separately

Notable absentees:

• Reynald of Dampierre: Felt obliged to fulfil Thibault III's crusade vow immediately. Travelled directly to Outremer and helped Prince Bohemond IV of Antioch.

• John of Nesle: Was supposed to join Baldwin of Flanders but was delayed and sheltered at Marseilles for winter. He then sailed directly to Outremer from this French port, depriving Baldwin of up to half his potential forces.

• Walter of Brienne: Helped Pope Innocent III deal with a threat in southern Italy, then sailed straight to Acre. This was another example of papal involvement that actually hindered the Fourth Crusade.

In total, it is estimated that around 300 knights arrived in Outremer rather than travelling with the Fourth Crusaders, including those who left the crusade at later stages such as at the siege of Zara.

The effect of finance on force size

The crusade leaders had clearly overreached themselves financially. They simply could not afford to pay for 20,000 soldiers to join the Fourth Crusade and were overly optimistic in assuming that noble support from across Europe would cover the funding gap. Their limited resources and power meant their ambitious goals were beyond their means.

The disappointing reality

By August 1202, the situation was dire. Out of the 33,500 troops the leaders had committed to paying for, only around 12,000 had actually arrived. Of these:

• Approximately 1,800 were knights
• The rest were support troops or squires

Late arrivals compounded the problem:

• Crusaders were supposed to be ready to leave Venice by 29 June 1202
• The papal legate Peter of Capuano didn't arrive until 22 July
• The Germans under Abbot Martin of Pairis didn't arrive until August
• The most punctual troops were forced to wait on Lido, a small island near Venice

Consequences: In debt to the Venetians

With just over one-third of the anticipated forces gathered at Lido, the crusade faced financial disaster. Despite the shortfall, the leaders managed to raise an impressive 51,000 marks to pay part of the treaty. This money came mostly from their own pockets, as Pope Innocent III's tax of one-fortieth had gathered very little. In England, for example, this tax wasn't even collected until 1217.

Historical interpretation: Weakness of the leadership

Historian Jonathan Phillips argues that the crusade leaders were fundamentally too weak to compel all troops to assemble in Venice. In his 2004 work The Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople, Phillips emphasises several key points:

No compulsion to use Venice:

• Crusaders who took part were under no obligation to sail from Venice
• The leaders were perhaps blinded by the prospect of the wonderful Venetian navy
• They believed this was the best way to reach Egypt in military terms
• They wrongly assumed all crusaders would want to join the same fleet

Limited authority:

• Only representatives of Champagne, Flanders, Blois, and Saint-Pol signed the treaty
• Beyond these contingents, there was no obligation for crusaders to travel with the Venetians
• There was no papal directive ordering everyone to gather at Venice
• None of the expedition's nobles had sufficient authority to compel everyone to gather

Contemporary evidence:

Remember!