Southern Democrats and the New Deal, 1933-41 (Edexcel A-Level History): Revision Notes
Southern Democrats and the New Deal, 1933-41
Roosevelt's electoral victory and the limits of presidential power
Franklin D. Roosevelt achieved a decisive victory in the November 1932 presidential election, winning 57.4 percent of the popular vote with 22.8 million votes compared to Republican Herbert Hoover's 15 million. The electoral college system amplified this success dramatically, with Roosevelt securing 472 votes against Hoover's mere 59.
Despite this impressive mandate, the American system of government placed significant constraints on presidential authority. Roosevelt could not simply impose his agenda—he needed to build support in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Powerful committee chairpersons held considerable influence, with the ability to reject, modify, or delay presidential proposals. Success in this environment required exceptional persuasive skills and political negotiation rather than executive authority alone.
This constitutional reality meant that Roosevelt's ambitious New Deal programme would depend heavily on maintaining good relationships with key congressional figures, particularly those from the South who dominated important committees. Unlike parliamentary systems, the American separation of powers gave Congress significant independence from the executive branch.
Securing southern Democrat support: the Garner partnership
Strategic alliance formation (1932-1936)
To secure crucial southern support for his presidential campaign, Roosevelt made a calculated decision in 1932 to select John Nance Garner of Texas as his vice-presidential running mate. Garner represented the southern Democrat establishment and brought significant political capital to the ticket.
Garner's credentials were impressive. As Speaker of the House of Representatives since 1931, he held the most powerful position in Congress. This alliance proved highly valuable in Roosevelt's first term, as Garner used his influence to ensure New Deal legislation successfully navigated through Congress. The partnership was so effective that Roosevelt chose Garner again as his running mate in 1936, when he won an overwhelming landslide victory, capturing 46 of the 48 states.
The implicit bargain
However, this political alliance came with an important understanding. Throughout this period, Garner worked closely with Roosevelt to advance major social and economic reforms, but he simultaneously ensured that the New Deal would not challenge white supremacy in the South.
This included protecting the use of white primaries in the Texas Democratic Party—a system that excluded black voters from meaningful political participation. Since Democrats dominated southern state elections, whoever won the Democrat primary would almost certainly win the general election, making these whites-only primaries a powerful tool for maintaining racial exclusion.
White primary: A primary election in southern states where only white voters could participate. Established by the Democratic Party or state legislatures after 1890, white primaries were one of several methods used to disenfranchise black and minority voters. Because political parties were considered private organisations, they claimed exemption from US electoral law.
Growing opposition to federal expansion
Traditional Democrat values challenged
The rapid expansion of federal government power through New Deal programmes created significant tension within the Democratic Party. Initiatives like the National Recovery Administration (NRA), the Public Works Administration (PWA), and federal banking legislation represented a dramatic shift in governmental authority. This troubled many Democrats, whose party had traditionally championed state government autonomy and opposed concentrated federal power.
The scale of this discomfort became evident in 1935 when Al Smith, the Democratic presidential candidate in 1928, actually joined the Liberty League—an organisation specifically created to oppose the New Deal. This remarkable defection demonstrated how far the New Deal had strayed from traditional Democratic principles in the eyes of its critics.
The Court Packing Plan crisis (1937)
Roosevelt's attempt to reshape the US Supreme Court in 1937 proved to be a critical turning point. After the Court had declared key New Deal legislation unconstitutional during his first term, Roosevelt proposed a plan following his 1936 landslide victory that would allow him to appoint additional justices. Specifically, he sought authority to add one new justice for every sitting justice over age 70, up to a maximum of six additional appointments.
Roosevelt publicly justified this proposal by claiming older justices could not handle the increasing workload and that additional justices would improve efficiency. However, this explanation fooled few observers.
Newspaper editors, Republicans, southern Democrats, and even the three liberal justices on the Court condemned the scheme as a transparent attempt to manipulate the Court for political advantage. The proposal ultimately failed, but the controversy it generated had lasting consequences for Roosevelt's relationship with southern Democrats.
The Conservative Manifesto and coalition formation (1937-1941)
The 1937 turning point
The failed Court Packing Plan catalysed a major realignment within the Democratic Party. In December 1937, a document known as the Conservative Manifesto appeared, formally titled 'An Address to the People of the United States'. The driving force behind this manifesto was Josiah W. Bailey, a Democratic senator from North Carolina.
The manifesto articulated a clear alternative vision to Roosevelt's approach, demanding:
- Limitations on high federal spending for New Deal programmes
- A completely independent Supreme Court free from political interference
- Protection of state government authority
- Reduced federal government intervention
The Roosevelt Recession provides ammunition
The manifesto gained credibility because of unfortunate timing. The years 1937-38 witnessed a return to economic recession, which historians later termed the Roosevelt Recession. Bailey and other critics blamed this downturn on excessive federal spending on social programmes, arguing that the New Deal's interventionist approach had actually damaged economic recovery.
Birth of the Conservative coalition
The Conservative Manifesto led to the formation of an informal Conservative coalition between southern Democrats and Republicans. This alliance, lasting from 1937 to 1941, successfully blocked any further major New Deal reforms.
The coalition united around shared principles of limited federal government, states' rights, and fiscal conservatism, despite the traditional partisan divide between Democrats and Republicans. This development effectively ended the period of radical New Deal reform that had characterised Roosevelt's first term from 1933 to 1937.
The president found himself constrained by opposition from within his own party, demonstrating how regional and ideological divisions could override party loyalty.
Southern Democrats, racism, and the New Deal
Using racism as a political strategy
Throughout the 1930s, southern Democratic politicians systematically employed racism to secure white voter support. The case of Theodore Bilbo illustrates the extremism of some southern Democrats.
Example: Theodore Bilbo's Racist Proposal
A former governor of Mississippi, Bilbo won election to the US Senate in 1935 and immediately demonstrated his commitment to white supremacy. He introduced an amendment to unemployment relief legislation proposing that federal funds be used to deport all black Americans to Liberia in West Africa. This shocking proposal revealed the depths of racist ideology among some southern political leaders.
Ensuring racial inequality in New Deal programmes
Southern Democrats used their congressional power to shape New Deal programmes in ways that maintained racial hierarchies:
- They ensured that federal benefits primarily went to white Americans
- They blocked any federal government interference with Jim Crow Laws—the system of racial segregation in southern states
- They used their control of congressional committees to prevent civil rights legislation from reaching the floor for debate
Congressional control mechanisms
Southern Democrats maintained their power through strategic control of key congressional committees. The House Ways and Means Committee and the House Rules Committee both determined whether legislation could even be debated in the House of Representatives.
This procedural control gave southern Democrats effective veto power over civil rights initiatives without needing to vote against them publicly. By simply refusing to schedule hearings or advance legislation through committee, they could kill civil rights proposals before they ever reached a vote.
The price of New Deal reform
Roosevelt's dependence on southern Democrat support for his economic and social reforms from 1933 to 1937 came at a significant cost.
The Fundamental Compromise
The great achievements of the New Deal—unemployment relief, banking reform, labour protections, and social security—did not extend to advancing civil rights for black Americans. Roosevelt chose economic reform over racial justice, calculating that he could not achieve both simultaneously given the political realities of congressional power.
This decision had profound consequences. While millions of Americans benefited from New Deal programmes, the fundamental system of racial oppression in the South remained intact and unchallenged by federal authority.
The changing Democratic coalition
The two-thirds rule and southern power
Historian David M. Kennedy's analysis highlights a crucial development in 1936. At that year's Democratic convention, southern Democrats reluctantly agreed to abandon the two-thirds majority rule for selecting presidential nominees. This rule had traditionally given the South an effective veto over any candidate deemed unsafe on racial issues, protecting southern interests within the party.
Example: Senator 'Cotton Ed' Smith's Protest
The 1936 convention demonstrated the depth of southern resistance to racial change. Senator Ellison 'Cotton Ed' Smith of South Carolina walked out twice—first when a black clergyman delivered the opening prayer, and again when Arthur Mitchell, the first black Democrat elected to Congress, seconded Roosevelt's nomination. Smith's racist outbursts revealed the intensity of white southern opposition to any recognition of black political participation.
A president independent of the South?
Roosevelt's overwhelming 1936 victory created an unsettling realisation for southern Democrats: a Democratic president could potentially win election without any southern electoral votes. This shifted the power dynamics within the party, threatening the South's traditional dominance.
However, southern Democrats still controlled enough congressional power to block legislation, ensuring their continued influence despite changing electoral mathematics. Electoral success did not translate into complete legislative freedom for the president.
Exam focus: analysing southern Democrat influence
Exam tip: When answering questions about southern Democrats and the New Deal, avoid simply listing facts. Instead, explain the relationship between different factors. For example, connect Roosevelt's need for congressional support to his failure to challenge Jim Crow Laws, showing how political necessity shaped policy outcomes.
Key analytical points to develop:
- The tension between Roosevelt's progressive economic agenda and conservative racial policies
- How the American system of government gave minorities (regional or political) disproportionate power to block change
- The difference between electoral success and legislative success
- The contradiction within the Democratic Party between northern liberals and southern conservatives
Common mistakes to avoid:
- Assuming Roosevelt had dictatorial power as president
- Ignoring the role of congressional committees in blocking legislation
- Treating the Democratic Party as a unified bloc
- Forgetting that opposition to the New Deal came from within Roosevelt's own party
Essay structure suggestion: For questions on why the New Deal failed to advance civil rights:
- Explain Roosevelt's electoral success but legislative constraints
- Analyse southern Democrat control of congressional committees
- Discuss the Conservative coalition from 1937
- Evaluate Roosevelt's political calculations and priorities
- Conclude by assessing whether Roosevelt could have acted differently
Remember!
Key Points to Remember:
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Presidential power had limits: Despite landslide electoral victories in 1932 and 1936, Roosevelt needed congressional support to pass legislation, giving southern Democrats leverage to protect racial segregation.
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The Garner bargain: Roosevelt's choice of John Nance Garner as vice president secured southern support for economic reforms but guaranteed no federal challenge to white supremacy in the South.
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The 1937 turning point: The failed Court Packing Plan led to the Conservative Manifesto and an informal coalition of southern Democrats and Republicans that blocked further New Deal reforms from 1937 to 1941.
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Congressional control was key: Southern Democrats dominated crucial committees like House Ways and Means and House Rules, giving them power to prevent civil rights legislation from even reaching the floor for debate.
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New Deal reform excluded civil rights: Roosevelt's dependence on southern Democrat support meant that despite major economic and social reforms, the New Deal did not challenge Jim Crow Laws or extend civil rights to black Americans—political necessity trumped moral imperative.