Development of the Cold War to 1968 (HSC SSCE Modern History): Revision Notes

Development of the Cold War to 1968

Containment

The policy of containment became the cornerstone of American foreign policy during the Cold War. In 1947, George Kennan argued that the United States needed to adopt a strategy of 'long-term patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies' in response to Soviet attempts to expand their sphere of influence in Europe and Asia.

Early successes of containment

Several early initiatives seemed to confirm the wisdom of the containment policy:

• The Berlin Airlift (1948-49)
• Aid to Greece and Turkey
• The Marshall Plan
• The creation of NATO
• Truman's stand in Korea

Containment as the dominant framework

Containment remained the dominant US foreign policy framework throughout the Cold War. All US presidents drew on it as a rationale for various foreign policy approaches. For example, President Johnson later used containment to justify US intervention in Vietnam.

Rollback: the alternative approach

At times, US presidents considered the opposite policy of 'rollback', which aimed to actively push back communist political power from territory under its control without going to war.

In the 1952 election campaign, the Republican Party promoted a rollback of communism. Once in power, President Eisenhower experimented with this idea:

• He allowed the CIA to engineer a coup in Iran, establishing a pro-Western government in 1953
• He permitted a CIA operation to overthrow the government in Guatemala

The Eisenhower Doctrine

Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, based his foreign policy on the belief that international peace and security could be achieved through containment of communism. The United States constructed a network of bilateral and multilateral treaties designed to encircle the Soviet Union and its allies, especially Communist China.

Bilateral treaties were established with:

• Japan
• South Korea
• The Philippines
• The Republic of China (Nationalist China/Taiwan)

Dulles provided strong support to Nationalist China when threatened by Communist China in 1954 and 1958. In 1955, he began channelling aid to South Vietnam after the French withdrew from Indochina. This foreign policy approach, based on containment and international mutual security agreements, became known as the 'Eisenhower Doctrine'.

A fundamental shift in American foreign policy

The National Security Council (NSC)

In July 1947, Congress passed the National Security Act, which established the National Security Council (NSC). This body was designed to coordinate America's Cold War strategy at the highest level.

Structure and purpose

The NSC consisted of six permanent members:

• Secretary of State
• Secretary of Defense
• Secretary of the Army
• Secretary of the Navy
• Secretary of the Air Force
• The President (acting as chairman)

The NSC served as a mechanism for ensuring all aspects of American involvement in the world were directed towards common goals.

NSC-68: the blueprint for Cold War strategy

In 1949, following the rise of Communism in China, the NSC prepared a document called NSC-68. This secret document provided a clear set of overall strategies that drove American foreign policy for much of the Cold War, giving substance to the recently adopted containment policy.

The document warned that:

• The Soviet threat would likely increase dramatically in the future
• The Soviets would expand their military forces and nuclear arsenal
• The US needed to respond by strengthening both its conventional and nuclear forces
• This would ensure successful defence of the homeland and overseas interests in any armed confrontation with the Communists

Implementation and impact

NSC-68 called for a dramatic increase in US defence spending. As a result:

• The Truman administration tripled US military expenditure from 5 per cent to 14.2 per cent of GDP between 1950 and 1953
• This was paid for by large tax increases
• The outbreak of the Korean War made domestic opinion more resigned to higher taxes

Eisenhower's modifications

Many NSC-68 policies had started to be implemented by the time Eisenhower became President. However, implementing all its proposals would be unpopular domestically. Eisenhower revised military funding by:

• Reducing spending on conventional forces
• Increasing spending on nuclear forces, which were less costly

This approach aimed to maintain America's strategic position whilst controlling government expenditure.

The Domino Theory

On 7 April 1954, President Eisenhower gave a historic press conference addressing what he saw as the deteriorating security situation in South-East Asia.

Background: the French failure in Indochina

The French were failing in their attempt to re-establish colonial control over Indochina. The Viet Minh, a Vietnamese national group led by Ho Chi Minh, was on the verge of winning a stunning victory over French forces at Dien Bien Phu. A peace conference to resolve the conflict was scheduled for a few weeks later.

Eisenhower's explanation

In his press conference, Eisenhower explained that all the resources 'that the world needs' would be gobbled up by the communists in this part of the world. He then introduced a phrase that became central to American Cold War thinking:

Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the falling domino principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So, you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.

Understanding the domino theory

The 'domino principle' served as a warning of what would happen if the free world was not vigilant with containment. The domino theory provided a simple rationale for the US policy of containment.

Expansion of the theory

Eisenhower's domino theory laid the foundations for both President Kennedy and President Johnson to become more deeply involved in Vietnam. In March 1964, Defence Secretary Robert McNamara expanded the theory further, stating that unless the US could secure a non-communist South Vietnam, almost all of Southeast Asia would probably fall to communist domination, and may even threaten:

• Australia
• New Zealand
• Taiwan
• South Korea
• Japan

The failure of domino theory thinking

The fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia to Communist forces in April 1975 marked an absolute failure of 20 years of US effort to prevent Communist domination of Southeast Asia. In 1994, former Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara regretted the policy he had pursued in the sixties in Vietnam, believing that Vietnam going Communist would not necessarily have been a disaster.

Peaceful coexistence

In 1953, Joseph Stalin's death and the end of the Korean War offered an opportunity for tensions to be reduced between the superpowers. The new Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, sought to make the most of these events by pursuing a more conciliatory approach to foreign policy.

Defining peaceful coexistence

'Peaceful coexistence' refers to the period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, when there was a thaw in relations between the United States and Soviet Union. This marked a dramatic change in attitude by the Soviet leadership.

Khrushchev's rise to power

Khrushchev came to power as part of a collective leadership in 1953 after Stalin's death. With Stalin's death, the Soviet leadership embarked on a 'New Course' foreign policy to reduce tensions. In 1956, Khrushchev won a power struggle against Malenkov and became Premier of the Soviet Union.

The secret speech

The world took notice at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956, when Khrushchev delivered a speech denouncing the excesses of Joseph Stalin's dictatorial rule. This 'Secret Speech' criticised Stalin's totalitarian methods and the purges he had conducted.

Actions backing peaceful coexistence

Khrushchev demonstrated his commitment to peaceful coexistence through concrete actions:

• October 1954: Visited China to improve relations with Mao Zedong
• 1955: Met with Eisenhower in Geneva
• 1955: Agreed to remove Soviet troops from Austria after signing the Austrian Peace Treaty
• 1955: Created the Warsaw Pact and withdrew Soviet troops from neutral Finland

The limits of peaceful coexistence

Khrushchev's visit to the United States

The high point of Khrushchev's 'peaceful coexistence' policy came with his visit to the United States on 15-27 September 1959. This trip fostered expectations of improving the hostile US-Soviet relationship.

On returning to Moscow, Khrushchev gave a speech in which he said he believed a thaw in the Cold War had begun and that Eisenhower was willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union. Khrushchev had set a calmer tone in international relations, welcomed by populations in both countries. For a short time, both countries could breathe easier.

The U2 incident

The Sino-Soviet split

Khrushchev received another setback around this time with enormous implications. Relations with China deteriorated when Khrushchev visited in 1959 for the 10th anniversary of the People's Republic of China (on his way back from his US trip).

Reasons for the split:

• Mao had not been impressed with Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in 1956
• Mao was annoyed by the Soviet's lack of economic assistance
• Mao became suspicious during 1958 that the Soviets wanted to control the Pacific coast
• From 1960, there was a war of words, with Khrushchev calling Mao a 'left revisionist'

Superpower rivalry

Despite Khrushchev's wish for 'peaceful coexistence' with the United States in the 1950s, rivalry between the two superpowers continued in multiple areas.

Spheres of interest

Both sides appeared to have put the idea of rollback on the backburner, avoiding overt attempts to meddle in each other's sphere of interest. However, both superpowers regarded competition for influence in the non-aligned world as legitimate and did whatever it took to secure both minor and significant gains in a global chess game.

Methods of competition:

Both superpowers were willing to:

• Prop up unsavoury regimes
• Make alliances
• Use espionage
• Give arms and weaponry
• Use client states to fight proxy wars

The bipolar world

During the 1950s, a bipolar world developed in which many nations lined up behind one of the two camps led by the superpowers.

Competition in the Third World

Many remaining nations that were not aligned were less developed countries in Asia, Africa and South America. The superpowers used a combination of soft power and ruthless force in the Third World and Middle East in a global geopolitical chess game to extend their influence.

Methods of fighting the Cold War

The Cold War was fought through numerous methods beyond direct military confrontation:

Method	Description
Ideology	Both superpowers promoted their ideologies to the world. Aspects of communist ideology struck a chord with many people in the Third World pursuing national liberation and wanting instant transformation of society and economy. Others feared totalitarian aspects of communism and wanted the freedom and economic benefits the Western world offered.
Domestic politics	Within both superpowers, there were long-running bitter political debates about how the Cold War should be prosecuted. Two main groups emerged: the 'hawks' who advocated aggressive foreign policy, and the 'doves' who tried to resolve problems without resorting to force.
Economic aid	The United States used the Marshall Plan in Europe to strengthen West European democratic allies. Meanwhile, COMECON was used by the Soviet Union to bind countries closely in trade pacts. Many Third World countries were swayed to join one of the rival blocs with economic aid and technical support, especially for big infrastructure projects like dams, roads, railways and bridges.
Military aid	Military aid was offered in terms of experts to train local forces and various types of modern weapons, from small arms like machine guns to big ticket items like defensive missiles, tanks or jet fighters.
Soft power	The United States had a real advantage in soft power, mostly spontaneously generated with little government involvement. Its companies, foundations, universities, churches, and civil society organisations projected American ideals and values. This power was quite diffuse and was not used to achieve specific outcomes.
Culture	American culture was exported to the rest of the world through movies, music, fashion, and consumer products. The fact that these things were highly sought after behind the Iron Curtain made it a significant aspect of the Cold War.
Espionage	Both superpowers used their spy agencies extensively for spying, sabotage and assassinations. The United States had the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Soviets had the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Committee of State Security) or KGB.
Space race	Both nations used what they had learned from the Nazi V2 rocket programme to build rockets to put satellites and eventually men in space. They competed to be first in each aspect of the space race and used space technology for spying on each other.
Arms race	The superpowers competed in the arms race by building up both conventional and nuclear forces.
Propaganda	Both sides used propaganda to sell their ideologies to their own people and the world. It was often in the form of slogans, posters, radio and TV programmes and films.
Alliances	Alliances were used to reassure friendly nations, share intelligence, pool military forces and deter enemy attack. NATO is regarded as one of the most successful alliances in history, signalling the determination of Western European nations, Canada and the United States to stand together to resist any communist attack on any member country.
Sport	Both superpowers competed in sport, particularly in the Olympic Games.
Proxy wars	Often Third World or Middle Eastern nations were used to fight a proxy war on behalf of the superpowers - as in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Angola Civil War and the Yom Kippur War.

The arms race

During the fifties and sixties, the two superpowers came to accept the idea of co-existence and largely avoided meddling in each other's sphere of interest. However, they competed in every other conceivable way, and any part of the world not already within either's sphere of interest was fair game.

The context of the arms race

The superpowers would wage deadly proxy wars and export weapons and arms all over the planet, whilst still not upsetting their overall approach of co-existence. The cost of keeping the status quo between the two superpowers was eternal vigilance, as any weakness or lack of resolve by one side threatened a major upheaval in the geopolitical balance.

The complexity of the arms race

The arms race was immensely complicated due to the interrelationship between nuclear and conventional arms. The idea that nuclear weapons were just another weapon that could be used in conjunction with a nation's overall armed forces became increasingly harder to accept over the two decades following Hiroshima.

First strike considerations

The idea of launching a first strike on one's enemy was flirted with by the United States, especially in the late 1940s and 1950s when it had nuclear supremacy. However, the United States baulked when it had the opportunity in the Korean War.

The US military concluded there were no useful military targets left in North Korea after widespread conventional bombing. But there was something else at work: the nuclear taboo.

The nuclear taboo

Despite the desire of Cold War leaders to use nuclear weapons to resolve particular situations or deal with potential future threats, they came to see nuclear weapons as being in a class of their own. From the time of the atomic attacks on Japan in 1945, a nuclear taboo had developed around this weapon.

Development of the taboo:

Nuclear weapons had come to be viewed with horror by the general public from the time of Hiroshima, but this was strengthened by the massive size of H-Bomb nuclear tests of the fifties. The idea developed that the Bomb was in a special class and there was a clear distinction between 'conventional' and 'nuclear' forces.

Examples:

• Truman could have used atomic bombs in Korea without Soviet retaliation, as they were two years away from having operational nuclear strike capability
• President Johnson refused to use nuclear weapons in Vietnam, not because of feared Soviet retaliation but because of the moral taboo and likely backlash from the American public (though Johnson had no qualms about using every conceivable type of conventional weaponry in Vietnam)

Nuclear war thinking

At first, President Truman sought to maximise the psychological impact of nuclear weapons in his dealings with the Soviets after the war. In his 9 August radio address, Truman talked about the 'awful responsibility which has come to us' but that we 'thank God that it has come to us, instead of to our enemies.'

Despite flirting with the idea of international control of nuclear weapons, Truman set the United States on a path to use their nuclear monopoly to their advantage in post-war negotiations with the Soviets, believing a Soviet-produced atomic bomb would be many years off.

Soviet response:

This had the opposite effect on Stalin. From the end of 1945, Stalin adopted a policy of 'tenacity and steadfastness', taking a tough stand on all issues out of fear of seeming weak and encouraging the Americans to exert more pressure. Truman also hoped to use the atomic bomb to compensate for Soviet superiority in conventional forces.

Eisenhower's approach: massive retaliation

In the 1950s, though the USSR had nuclear weapons, the United States still had clear superiority. President Eisenhower did not believe the US could sustain the vastly increased military budget the Truman administration had implemented.

Eisenhower's strategy:

• Cut back on conventional forces
• Placed greater emphasis on nuclear forces, which were cheaper
• Knew Soviet superiority in conventional forces meant Western Europe could be quickly overwhelmed by the Red Army's massive tank regiments
• Threatened 'massive retaliation' with nuclear weapons in response to any Soviet attack using nuclear or conventional forces

Assessment questions:

1. Was Evan Thomas right to praise President Eisenhower for using the threat of massive nuclear retaliation to bluff the Soviets? What would Eisenhower have done if Khrushchev had called his bluff, for example over Berlin?
2. Eisenhower allowed the US nuclear arsenal to quadruple during his 8-year presidency. Was this wise?
3. Eisenhower warned about the 'military industrial complex' at the end of his term but had been responsible for allowing it to take hold. Was Eisenhower's inaction in curtailing the 'military industrial complex' a real failure of his administration?

The 1960s: assured destruction

In the 1960s, Soviet missile technology improved. However, the United States developed the nuclear triad - the ability to deliver a nuclear attack from:

• B-52 bombers
• ICBMs from land-based silos
• SLBMs from submarines

Defence Secretary Robert McNamara talked of 'assured destruction' - if the Soviets launched a first-strike attack, there was no way they could destroy all US nuclear forces, especially the submarines. They could be 'assured' that their own destruction would surely follow if they tried a surprise nuclear attack.

Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)

By the late sixties, it became apparent that 'assured destruction' could work both ways due to the massive increase in the Soviet ICBM arsenal. If the US attacked the USSR, they could be assured of a massive retaliatory attack.

By the late sixties, the 'balance of terror' led the two superpowers to explore avenues of cooperation, evolving into an interest in treaties and the policy known as détente.

Other factors:

• Britain developed the atomic bomb in 1952
• France followed in 1960
• China in 1964
• More nations would follow if the USA and USSR failed to act

This led to a series of treaties, though the Mutual Assured Destruction doctrine survived.

Fighting a nuclear war

Both sides drew up plans for fighting a war using a mix of conventional and nuclear weapons. Due to the superiority in conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact, NATO made it abundantly clear that any conventional attack would be countered with nuclear weapons.

Types of nuclear weapons:

1. Tactical nuclear weapons: Smaller weapons designed for battlefield use against enemy military formations
2. Strategic nuclear weapons: Larger warheads designed for destroying cities or large urban or industrial areas

NATO's tactical nuclear stockpile

The vast array of tactical nuclear weapons available for NATO to use to repel a Soviet conventional attack is quite astounding. Also astounding is that none of these weapons went astray, went off by accident, or were taken over by a terrorist group or rogue commander.

NATO's tactical nuclear arsenal (1984):

• 2,250 artillery shells
• 1,850 free-fall bombs
• 700 Nike Hercules SAMs
• 400 ASW weapons
• 300 Atomic demolition munitions (mines)
• 180 Pershing 1a missiles
• 97 Lance missiles
• 90 Honest John missiles
• Total: 6,000 warheads (all in US custody)
• France: 42 Pluton, 110 nuclear-capable tactical aircraft

The problem with tactical nuclear weapons

In the 'use or lose it' mindset of the time, any use of a nuclear weapon was likely to trigger a massive response from the enemy. Fortunately, no tactical nuclear weapons were ever used in anger throughout the entire Cold War, though on a few occasions they came close.

The space race

One aspect of superpower rivalry that was not so dangerous was the space race, though what was achieved in space could have worrying military applications.

The beginning: Sputnik

The USSR tested their first ICBM on 21 August 1957 and followed this on 4 October with a rocket that placed the first satellite in space, Sputnik 1. This marked the official beginning of the space race.

American response

On 31 January 1958, the US responded with its first satellite, Explorer 1. Then in October, Congress passed legislation creating the National Space and Aeronautics programme (NASA).

In 1959, the Soviets were again first to:

• Take a spacecraft beyond Earth's orbit
• Reach the Moon

This was followed by the first man in space - Yuri Gagarin on 12 April 1961.

The space race intensifies

The United States was not far behind, with Alan Shephard becoming the first American in space. Most significant though was President Kennedy's commitment to land the first man on the Moon by the end of the decade.

Key achievements:

• 1962: John Glenn of the USA made the first manned orbit of Earth
• 1963: Soviets placed the first woman in space
• Following years: USA took the lead with numerous achievements
• 20 July 1969: USA landed two men on the moon (the highpoint of the space race and clear win for the United States)

Continued efforts

The efforts of both superpowers continued:

• 1971: Soviets were first to place an orbital space station in space
• 1971: US Mariner 9 orbited Mars
• 1973: US established the Skylab space station

Space cooperation

In 1975, events in space followed those on Earth with a joint Russian-American four-day spaceflight, reflecting détente back on Earth. The Apollo-Soyuz Joint Project was a product of years of discussions and negotiations.

Space treaties:

• Outer Space Treaty 1967: Provided the basic framework in international space law based on principles such as not placing nuclear weapons in space and that the moon should only be used for peaceful purposes
• Agreement on the Rescue and Return of Astronauts, 1968
• Moon Agreement 1979

The nature and impact of crises

Despite some normalcy returning to relations between the superpowers with the 1955 Vienna summit between Khrushchev and Eisenhower, there were several serious crises in the 1960s that brought both superpowers close to the brink of war. A combination of levelheaded decision-making at crucial times along with a lot of pure luck meant the world avoided Armageddon.

The Berlin Wall, 1961

On 13 August 1961, residents of Berlin woke to find barbed wire fences being erected in the middle of their city under the watchful eyes of armed East German soldiers. This was replaced four days later by a wall of brick and concrete that gradually encircled West Berlin.

Security measures:

• 300 watch towers
• 20 bunkers at intervals along the Wall
• Thousands of soldiers
• Guard dogs
• Alarms

Background to the Berlin Wall

Berlin had been an ongoing issue in relations between the United States and Soviet Union from the end of World War II. The original idea was that occupation zones in Germany would be united and a peace treaty signed with the four Allied powers.

However, this was derailed when Britain, France and the United States decided to:

• Unite their three zones
• Create a common currency

Khrushchev's objectives

Khrushchev wanted to resolve the German question by getting control of West Berlin, which he saw as:

• An annoyance in the middle of East Germany
• Making it easy for people to flee East Germany
• A nest of spies
• A propaganda symbol for the West

The Vienna Summit crisis

During the June 1961 Vienna summit between Khrushchev and President Kennedy, tensions rose between the two leaders over Berlin. The Soviet leader threatened to solve the Berlin question unilaterally.

Kennedy's response (25 July address):

• Stated the United States may have to defend West Berlin's rights with military force
• Increased the US ICBM force
• Added five new army reserves
• Privately, Kennedy did not want more options than threatening 'massive retaliation' as Eisenhower had done

Impact of the Wall

During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, one of Kennedy's concerns was that Berlin would be the first place the Soviets would capture in the event of all-out war.

Kennedy's Berlin visit

After the Cuban Crisis and eased tensions with Khrushchev, President Kennedy visited Berlin in June 1963. He received a rapturous welcome from the people of West Berlin. The situation stabilised after this. However, both sides knew that in the event of all-out war between the superpowers, Berlin would be on the front line. The Berlin Wall remained a chilling symbol of the Cold War and became its most enduring iconic symbol.

Cuba, 1962

The Cuban Crisis of October 1962 is considered by many historians to be the closest the world has come to a global nuclear war of catastrophic proportions. It officially started on 16 October 1962, when a US U2 spy plane flying over Cuba took photos of what appeared to be nuclear missile launching sites. However, the crisis had deeper roots.

Background to the crisis

After the failure of the 1961 Vienna Summit, both superpowers increased their military spending and resumed nuclear testing (suspended since 1958). By resuming testing in August 1961, both leaders were sending a message.

Khrushchev's message:

• Aimed to send the biggest message by detonating a 57-megaton hydrogen bomb called the Tsar Bomba on 30 October
• Meanwhile, the United States publicly announced its nuclear forces were vastly superior to those of the Soviet Union

Khrushchev's bold plan

To bolster his position at home, Khrushchev decided to secretly place Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) on Cuba and reveal this after the 1962 US congressional elections.

Reasons for the plan:

• Place the United States under the same pressure the Soviet Union was under with US Jupiter missiles stationed in Turkey and Italy
• Reduce budgetary pressures on the Soviet economy (cheaper than building more ICBMs)
• Defend Cuba from American invasion after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion

Castro's perspective

In Cuba, Fidel Castro was willing to host Soviet missiles and troops to ward off further American attempts to invade.

Castro's background:

• January 1959: Castro ousted dictator Batista and established a revolutionary government
• After Castro nationalised American-owned property, allied himself with the Communist Party and established close relations with the Soviet Union, the United States cut off diplomatic ties and established a trade and travel ban
• April 1961: CIA engineered an invasion of Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs to topple Castro (this was a disaster and Kennedy was humiliated)
• November 1961 to October 1962: United States continued covert operations called Operation Mongoose to topple Castro

The thirteen days

The Cuban Missile Crisis lasted 13 days, from 16 October 1962 (when Kennedy received news of Soviet missiles on Cuba) to 28 October (when Khrushchev announced the missiles would be removed).

American perspective:

From the American point of view, placing Soviet missiles on Cuba struck at the heart of the Monroe Doctrine.

Kennedy's response

On 16 October, President Kennedy convened a meeting of the Executive Committee (ExCom) to consider options. On 18 October, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko denied there were missiles in Cuba.

Over the following days, various options were debated by the ExCom. The military pushed hard for air bombardment of Cuba followed by land invasion. However, Kennedy decided on a naval blockade of Cuba to stop missiles or nuclear material from being taken to Cuba.

Kennedy's announcement (22 October):

• Announced in a televised address his plans for a 'quarantine' of Cuba (because 'blockade' could be seen as an act of war)
• Urged Khrushchev to remove missiles from Cuba
• Threatened the Soviet Union with a 'full retaliatory response' if any missile was launched from Cuba
• This threat implied it would not just be Cuba that would be attacked, but the Soviet Union as well

The stand-off

Over the following days, there was a tense stand-off as Soviet freighters approached the quarantine line. At the UN Security Council, US Ambassador Adlai Stevenson confronted the Soviets over the missiles. After the Soviet ambassador's denial, Stevenson displayed large photos from U2 flights showing missile sites in Cuba.

Consequences

It is clear that Kennedy appeared to have won the confrontation. However, he did not rub it in or gloat, and he ordered his Executive against any displays of triumphalism.

How the crisis changed both leaders

Both leaders were changed and sobered by the events of October 1962. According to Sachs:

Both leaders were changed and sobered by events. Both realised how the world was on a hair trigger, how misunderstanding could lead to utter disaster, and how fragile their positions had been during the crisis. For those 13 days, local commanders on both sides could easily have sparked a global war by disobeying or misunderstanding orders from above, or by acting on the prerogatives granted as a result of the heightened military alert status. And despite all efforts by both sides to avoid calamitous accidents, such calamities nevertheless nearly occurred multiple times.

Kennedy and Khrushchev realised they had something in common. They both had the shared ability to destroy the world and a responsibility to prevent this from happening. They established a strong rapport and exchanged up to 100 letters via a back-channel.

What they learned:

• Both realised they had resisted pressure from hardliners who urged the use of military force in each country
• Kennedy's distrust of the military was much stronger after the Crisis
• It strengthened his confidence in his own approach to foreign policy
• Both leaders recognised they both had a genuine desire to avoid war

Kennedy's peace campaign

After the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy pursued a peace campaign, which reached its climax on 10 June 1963. President Kennedy's speech at the American University in Washington DC, titled 'Strategy of Peace,' gave an accurate analysis of the situation the world now faced in the Cold War:

Today, should total war ever break out again - no matter how - our two countries would become the primary targets. It is an ironic but accurate fact that the two strongest powers are the two in the most danger of devastation. All we have built, all we have worked for, would be destroyed in the first 24 hours. We are both devoting massive sums of money to weapons that could be better devoted to combating ignorance, poverty, and disease. We are both caught up in a vicious and dangerous cycle in which suspicion on one side breeds suspicion on the other, and new weapons beget counter-weapons.

Khrushchev's response:

Khrushchev commented that Kennedy's American University speech was 'the greatest speech by an American President since Roosevelt'.

Concrete results:

• Ten days after the speech, a hotline was set up for direct communication between the Kremlin and the White House
• 25 July: The United States, Soviet Union and United Kingdom agreed to the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, banning testing in the atmosphere, underwater or in outer space
• 5 August 1963: The treaty was formally signed

The tragedy:

Czechoslovakia, 1968

Alexander Dubcek, the leader of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party, attempted extensive economic and social reforms. He aimed to implement 'Communism with the Human Face' characterised by:

• Civil liberties
• Free elections

Many people took to the streets demanding these reforms. The 'Prague Spring' led to a heightened sense of optimism.

Soviet concerns

The invasion

On 20 August 1968, Warsaw Pact forces entered Czechoslovakia, catching people by surprise and shocking the Western world. They swiftly:

• Took control of Prague and other cities
• Took control of communications and transport links

Despite widespread protests, the invasion was swift and successful. Dubcek was forced from power and an authoritarian leadership was re-established with harsh censorship and restrictions on freedom of movement.

International reaction

Brezhnev expected this would be the case, but for him it was a much greater priority to keep Soviet control in the Eastern bloc.

The Brezhnev Doctrine

The Soviet Union justified their action in Czechoslovakia with the Brezhnev Doctrine - the stated belief that the Soviet Union had the right to intervene in Communist bloc countries in Eastern Europe to maintain communist rule.

Though deploring the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the United States did not challenge it. The United States was not concerned about the Brezhnev Doctrine because it was only about defending existing Soviet-controlled territory, not expanding it.

Remember!