Causes of the Second Boer War (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
Causes of the Second Boer War
Background to the conflict, 1896-1899
The Second Boer War emerged from escalating tensions between Britain and the Boer republics (Transvaal and Orange Free State) over political rights, imperial prestige, and economic interests in southern Africa. The period from 1896 to 1899 saw a gradual breakdown in relations, driven by competing visions for the region's future.
Uitlanders were foreign workers and settlers, predominantly British, who had moved to the Transvaal following the discovery of gold. Despite their economic importance, they lacked full political rights, including voting privileges. This became a contentious issue that Britain used to justify intervention in Transvaal's internal affairs.
Milner's appointment and imperial pressure
In 1897, the British government, heavily influenced by Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, appointed Alfred Milner as high commissioner to southern Africa. Milner was a passionate imperialist who believed that gold-rich Transvaal, possibly with German or French support, posed a threat to British interests in the region.
Milner set about mobilising pro-British elements in southern Africa and maintained constant pressure on behalf of the uitlanders. His approach to dealing with Transvaal President Paul Kruger was uncompromising. Milner insisted that uitlanders should receive full citizenship rights within five years. Several interpretations exist for Milner's motivations:
- He may have believed that granting uitlanders voting rights would create an uitlander-dominated Transvaal that would naturally integrate into the British Empire
- He possibly calculated that raising this issue would provoke conflict with Britain, thereby enabling him to pursue the broader imperial objective of securing British dominance in southern Africa under the banner of protecting citizens' rights
Milner's aggressive policy enjoyed substantial support from organised pressure groups and influential newspapers, particularly the Primrose League and the Imperial South African Association. These organisations framed the dispute as defending Britain's interests in southern Africa. However, not all Britons embraced this jingoistic stance. Chamberlain himself felt some unease about Milner's confrontational approach, recognising that war with Transvaal would likely prove unpopular domestically.
The Bloemfontein Conference
In a final attempt to resolve Anglo-Transvaal tensions, Steyn, president of the Orange Free State, invited Milner and Kruger to a conference at Bloemfontein on 31 May 1899. At this meeting, Milner presented several demands, most notably that Transvaal should immediately enact legislation granting uitlanders voting rights.
Kruger rejected these demands. Despite encouragement from Chamberlain to continue negotiations, Milner abandoned the conference on 5 June. His withdrawal demonstrated his unwillingness to compromise and suggested that he viewed confrontation as inevitable or even desirable.
Milner expressed confidence that Kruger would eventually capitulate to British pressure, telling associates that he expected Kruger to 'bluff up to the cannon's mouth' before accepting Britain's terms. Meanwhile, tension mounted as Salisbury's government dispatched additional military reinforcements to southern Africa. This military build-up indicated that, whilst Salisbury may not have actively desired war, by summer 1899 the Cabinet believed the Boers required 'teaching a lesson'.
Salisbury's position
Salisbury held two central beliefs that shaped his approach:
- Britain had an obligation to protect people of British descent living in southern Africa
- Transvaal's aspirations toward creating a Dutch-dominated South Africa would damage British prestige and had to be prevented
Salisbury did not originally want or anticipate war. He harboured misgivings about Milner's stubbornness at Bloemfontein and feared that overly aggressive action might provoke a Boer attack rather than facilitate a negotiated settlement. Nevertheless, Salisbury ultimately shared Milner's assessment that what was at stake was ensuring 'we not the Dutch are Boss' in southern Africa.
The path to war: ultimatums
In September 1899, Chamberlain sent an ultimatum demanding full equality for British citizens resident in Transvaal. Britain simultaneously began bringing additional troops from India to reinforce its position. Kruger, now viewing war as unavoidable, responded with his own ultimatum on 9 October. He demanded that Britain withdraw all troops from Transvaal's border within 48 hours, threatening that otherwise Transvaal and the Orange Free State would declare war.
News of Kruger's ultimatum reached London on the day it expired. Newspaper editorials reflected the prevailing mood, with the Daily Telegraph declaring: 'there can only be one answer to this grotesque challenge. Kruger has asked for war and war he must have'. The Boers formally declared war on 11 October 1899.
Salisbury later remarked that Kruger's action 'liberated us from the necessity of explaining to the people of England why we are at war', suggesting that the government welcomed having a clear casus belli rather than needing to justify intervention on more complex grounds.
Who was responsible? Historiographical perspectives
The question of responsibility for the Second Boer War has generated considerable historical debate, with scholars offering different interpretations of the relative importance of various actors and interests.
The rand millionaires controversy
Rand millionaires were British and German mining magnates who accumulated substantial wealth from Transvaal's gold resources. The war became the Boer currency denomination.
Radical Liberal J.A. Hobson argued at the time that the war resulted from a 'conspiracy of financiers' for whom the uitlander issue merely provided cover for their real aim: increasing profits. Writing in 1991, historian Thomas Pakenham supported this view, asserting that mine owners acted as 'active partners' with Milner in engineering the conflict.
However, historian Andrew Porter challenged the notion that the British government served as a puppet of mining interests. Current scholarly consensus suggests that Salisbury's government pursued its own strategic, political and economic objectives in southern Africa. Moreover, many Transvaal mine owners actually preferred maintaining peace and profitable relations with Kruger rather than risking the uncertainties of war.
Salisbury's responsibility
Salisbury did not desire war and misjudged Milner's intransigence at the Bloemfontein conference. Nevertheless, he ultimately concurred with Milner's view that the fundamental issue was determining whether Britain or the Boers would dominate southern Africa. In this final analysis, Salisbury chose to support a confrontational policy, even if he hoped to avoid actual military conflict.
Chamberlain's role
Chamberlain had long expressed concern about the dangers an independent Transvaal posed to British interests. After 1895, he worsened Anglo-Boer relations through several actions, including appointing Milner as high commissioner. However, most historians consider it unlikely that Chamberlain orchestrated these moves as part of a deliberate plan to instigate war. His unease about Milner's aggressive stance at Bloemfontein suggests he retained some reservations about confrontation.
Milner's culpability
The strongest candidate for the label of 'warmonger' is Milner himself. He believed that more was at stake than simply addressing uitlander grievances: 'our supremacy in South Africa ... and our existence as a great power in the world is involved'. Despite this conviction, Milner did not actually expect war, assuming Kruger would ultimately accept British terms.
Kruger's responsibility
Kruger must also bear responsibility for the war's outbreak. Convinced that Britain sought to end Transvaal's independence and unwilling to grant rights to uitlanders, he regarded war as inevitable. Consequently, he prepared for conflict. His determination was reinforced by confidence among his senior generals that the Boers would prevail and that a unified South Africa would emerge under Transvaal leadership following victory.
Key figures
Alfred Milner (1854-1925)
After serving in Egypt and other colonial posts, Milner became chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue (1892-97) before his appointment as high commissioner in southern Africa (1897-1906) and governor of Cape Colony (1897-1901). His inflexible stance at the Bloemfontein conference (1899) contributed to bringing about the Second Boer War. Milner subsequently proved himself an accomplished administrator as governor (1902-6) following the Transvaal's annexation and during his tenure overseeing the Orange Free State.
Paul Kruger (1825-1904)
A farmer of Dutch descent, Kruger settled with his parents in Transvaal after participating in the Great Trek. He led the successful campaign to regain independence for the Transvaal from Britain, achieved in 1881. Elected president of the Transvaal in 1883, he remained in office until 1902. As president, Kruger resisted uitlander demands for political equality, viewing this policy as essential to preserving Boer identity and independence, which ultimately contributed to the Second Boer War. Following initial Boer successes, he fled to Europe in 1900 seeking support for the Boer cause but was unsuccessful. He eventually settled first in the Netherlands and then in Switzerland, where he died.
Key Points to Remember:
- Milner's appointment as high commissioner in 1897 marked a decisive shift toward confrontation, as he adopted an uncompromising stance toward Kruger and championed uitlander rights as a means of securing British supremacy in southern Africa.
- The Bloemfontein Conference (31 May 1899) represented the final failed attempt at negotiation, with Milner's walkout on 5 June demonstrating that diplomatic compromise had become impossible.
- Historical debate continues over whether economic interests (rand millionaires) or political-strategic concerns primarily drove Britain toward war, though current scholarship emphasises the government's own imperial objectives rather than serving as puppets of mining magnates.
- Responsibility for the war was shared: Milner proved the most aggressive advocate for confrontation, Salisbury ultimately prioritised maintaining British dominance despite initial reservations, Chamberlain contributed to deteriorating relations without necessarily seeking war, and Kruger's refusal to compromise and his own military preparations made conflict increasingly inevitable.
- The exchange of ultimatums in September-October 1899 represented the final escalation, with Kruger's ultimatum on 9 October providing Britain with a clear justification for war that simplified domestic political complications.