Problems in Southern Africa, 1890–7 (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
Problems in Southern Africa, 1890–7
Background to tension in southern Africa
Britain claimed nominal sovereignty over Transvaal and the Orange Free State following earlier conflicts, but by the early 1880s had effectively restored independence to both Boer republics. This arrangement maintained relative stability until economic factors dramatically altered the regional balance of power.
In 1886, gold was discovered in Transvaal. This transformed the territory into the wealthiest nation in southern Africa virtually overnight. The discovery threatened to shift regional dominance away from Britain and towards the Boers, creating new tensions that would define Anglo-Boer relations for the next fifteen years.
The gold discovery fundamentally changed the power dynamics in southern Africa. What had been a relatively poor Boer republic suddenly became an economic powerhouse, challenging British supremacy in the region and setting the stage for future conflicts.
The uitlanders problem
Uitlanders were white foreigners, predominantly British and German, who lived in Transvaal and the Orange Free State.
Transvaal lacked sufficient skilled workers and technical expertise to develop its newly discovered gold mines independently. Large influxes of foreign workers – uitlanders – poured into Transvaal hoping to make their fortunes. Many succeeded. Within a decade, much of Transvaal's newfound wealth had passed into the hands of a relatively small number of British and German mine-owners.
By the mid-1890s, uitlanders outnumbered the Boer inhabitants of Transvaal and contributed nine-tenths of the territory's tax revenue. Despite their economic dominance, uitlanders possessed no political rights. President Kruger's government, determined to maintain Boer supremacy, enacted legislation requiring uitlanders to reside in Transvaal for fourteen years before they could apply for full citizenship.
The uitlanders created a paradox: they were the economic backbone of Transvaal, paying 90% of taxes, yet had no political voice. This situation gave Britain a convenient justification for interfering in Transvaal's internal affairs, claiming to defend the rights of British subjects.
Kruger's railway proposal
Kruger's denial of voting rights to uitlanders, combined with taxation policies some considered oppressive, provided the British government with justification for interference in Transvaal's internal affairs. Britain grew increasingly anxious to curtail Transvaal's independent behaviour.
British concerns intensified between 1894 and 1895 when Transvaal's government proposed constructing a railway through Portuguese East Africa (modern Mozambique). This railway would bypass British-controlled ports at Natal and Cape Colony entirely. Beyond freeing Transvaal from British economic control, the railway would severely damage the prosperity of Britain's own colonies in the region.
Economic Strategy Behind the Railway
The proposed railway was more than just infrastructure – it was a deliberate challenge to British economic dominance. By creating an alternative trade route through Portuguese territory, Transvaal would:
- Escape dependence on British ports
- Reduce British customs revenue
- Undermine the economic viability of British colonies in the region
- Assert its independence from British economic control
British policy responses
Salisbury's aims
In 1895, Lord Salisbury returned as Conservative prime minister, simultaneously holding the position of foreign secretary. His objectives centred on protecting Britain's core imperial interests: security, India, and control of world sea lanes through preserving peace.
Salisbury's tenure at the Foreign Office became associated with 'splendid isolation' – the policy that Britain need not enter binding alliances with other powers. Parliament exercised limited influence over Salisbury's foreign and imperial policy. Where disagreements occurred within the Liberal Party, Little Englanders denounced Britain's imperial ambitions as necessitating excessive military expenditure. Liberal leaders generally supported Salisbury's policies, however.
Salisbury disliked allowing democratic pressures to influence diplomatic processes, particularly fearing popular excitements fuelled by newspaper coverage. Nevertheless, he recognised that public opinion could not be entirely ignored. Occasionally he found himself pushed toward actions he would have preferred to avoid. Joseph Chamberlain proved one of those applying such pressure.
Joseph Chamberlain
Chamberlain had transferred his allegiance from the Liberal Unionists to the Conservatives over his opposition to Irish Home Rule. In 1895, Chamberlain became colonial secretary, aiming to forge a more unified Empire. He rapidly enhanced his own authority whilst raising the Colonial Office's profile considerably.
Chamberlain's aggressive defence of British imperial interests, supported by jingoistic press coverage, sometimes conflicted with Salisbury's more cautious approach to policy. This tension between the prime minister's restraint and the colonial secretary's assertiveness would shape Britain's handling of southern African problems.
Salisbury vs. Chamberlain: Two Approaches to Empire
The relationship between Salisbury and Chamberlain reveals a fundamental divide in British imperial policy:
- Salisbury: Cautious, diplomatic, preferring minimal interference and avoiding commitments
- Chamberlain: Aggressive, interventionist, actively promoting imperial expansion and unity
This tension would repeatedly influence British decision-making in southern Africa.
Cecil Rhodes and territorial expansion
Cecil Rhodes dreamed of bringing the whole of Africa under British rule. The Boer republics stood directly in the path of his ambitions.
The British South Africa Company
Through the British South Africa Company, Rhodes dispatched men north of the Limpopo river into Mashonaland in 1890. He hoped they would discover gold deposits substantial enough to overshadow Transvaal's advantage. Rhodes' actions led to annexation of territories later designated Southern Rhodesia (modern Zimbabwe) and Northern Rhodesia (modern Zambia). No significant gold fields materialised, however.
By 1893, following a brief but decisive war against the Matabele people, the company's political authority was firmly established. Britain, having taken control of the Nyasa area, permitted the South Africa Company to administer it. Rhodes' company thus controlled an area covering approximately 750,000 square miles.
The Jameson Raid, December 1895
During the early 1890s, Rhodes encouraged uitlanders to agitate for voting rights in Transvaal. President Kruger's government correctly identified this as a calculated attempt to undermine the republic's independence.
In 1895, Rhodes developed a plan to seize control of Transvaal. An uprising by uitlanders would be supported by men from his company's mounted police force. Rhodes delegated planning to Dr Jameson, a company administrator. Rhodes anticipated Jameson would wait for a revolt to break out in Johannesburg before his forces crossed the border to assist.
However, in December 1895, Jameson led 600 armed men into Transvaal prematurely. Boer authorities had received warning of the raid and were prepared. Jameson's men were rapidly surrounded by Boer forces. After a brief skirmish, they were compelled to surrender. The planned uitlander uprising never materialised.
The Fatal Flaw in Rhodes' Plan
The Jameson Raid failed because Jameson acted before the uitlander uprising had begun. This premature action meant:
- Boer forces had time to prepare a response
- The raid lacked the internal support it needed
- British involvement became obvious and indefensible
- The operation transformed from a 'rescue mission' into an unprovoked invasion
Consequences of the Jameson Raid
The raid produced several far-reaching consequences:
Instead of weakening President Kruger, the raid strengthened his position and made him less willing to compromise with British demands. His government emerged with enhanced legitimacy.
The raid's spectacular failure caused severe embarrassment for both Salisbury and Chamberlain. Both denied any prior knowledge of the operation, though this denial strained credibility in many quarters.
Rhodes, heavily censured at both a Cape inquiry and a London parliamentary investigation, was compelled to resign as Cape prime minister and as chairman of the South Africa Company. His reputation suffered lasting damage.
Transvaal's government handed captured raiders to British authorities. They were tried in Britain. Jameson, regarded as heroic by the British public, received a fifteen-month prison sentence. For a period, his wax model occupied a place of honour at Madame Tussaud's wax figures museum in London.
Public Perception vs. Political Reality
The contrast between Jameson's treatment at home and abroad reveals the power of nationalism and imperial sentiment. While the raid was a diplomatic disaster that embarrassed the British government, the British public celebrated Jameson as a hero defending British interests. His relatively light sentence and lionisation in popular culture demonstrated how public opinion could protect even those who had committed serious political blunders.
The raid alienated many Cape Boers from Britain, generating widespread resentment that would have lasting political effects.
The British government recognised it could no longer pursue southern African policies by relying on capitalists like Rhodes to act on its behalf. Direct governmental control would be necessary.
The raid drew Transvaal and the Orange Free State together in opposition to the British threat. In 1897, the two Boer republics signed a military pact, creating a defensive alliance.
Kruger, convinced that war with Britain was increasingly probable, equipped Transvaal's army with modern European rifles and artillery, preparing for potential conflict.
The Raid's Counterproductive Outcomes
Rather than advancing British interests, the Jameson Raid achieved the opposite:
- Strengthened Kruger's position and legitimacy
- United the two Boer republics in military alliance
- Prompted Transvaal's military modernisation
- Alienated Cape Boers who might have supported Britain
- Made Kruger less willing to compromise on uitlander rights
The raid transformed a manageable diplomatic situation into a crisis that made war increasingly likely.
Rhodesian rebellions, 1896
In 1896, both the Mashona and Matabele tribes rebelled against the South Africa Company's rule in Rhodesia. They killed more than 370 Europeans, representing approximately ten per cent of the white population. White settlers, assisted by British soldiers, possessed superior firepower to defeat the rebels, who retreated to strongholds in the Matopo Hills.
Rhodes salvaged his damaged reputation by riding forward alone to meet the Matabele leaders. He managed to bring the rebellion to a quicker and less violent conclusion than had initially appeared possible, demonstrating the diplomatic skills that had contributed to his earlier successes.
Rhodes' personal courage in meeting the Matabele leaders unarmed helped restore some of his reputation after the Jameson Raid disaster. This act of individual diplomacy shortened the rebellion and reduced casualties on both sides, showing that Rhodes possessed genuine negotiating abilities when he chose to use them.
Summary table: Key developments 1890–7
| Year | Development | Significance |
|---|---|---|
| 1886 | Gold discovery in Transvaal | Shifted regional economic power towards Boers |
| 1890 | Rhodes' expansion into Mashonaland | Extended British territorial control northward |
| 1893 | War against Matabele people | Consolidated company control over 750,000 square miles |
| 1894–5 | Railway proposal through Portuguese East Africa | Threatened British economic dominance in region |
| 1895 | Salisbury returned as PM; Chamberlain became colonial secretary | Intensified British imperial policy |
| December 1895 | Jameson Raid | Failed spectacularly, strengthened Kruger, embarrassed British government |
| 1896 | Rhodesian rebellions | Rhodes restored some reputation through diplomacy |
| 1897 | Military pact between Boer republics | Created unified opposition to British pressure |
Key figures
Lord Salisbury (Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, 1895)
Salisbury pursued a cautious foreign policy prioritising peace, security, and protection of India and sea lanes. Associated with 'splendid isolation', he preferred avoiding binding international alliances. He resisted allowing public opinion or press excitement to dictate diplomatic decisions, though he recognised their influence could not be entirely dismissed. His restrained approach sometimes clashed with Chamberlain's more aggressive imperial advocacy.
Joseph Chamberlain (Colonial Secretary, 1895)
Former Liberal Unionist who joined the Conservatives over Irish Home Rule opposition. As colonial secretary from 1895, Chamberlain aimed to create a more coherent Empire. He rapidly expanded the Colonial Office's authority and profile. His aggressive defence of British imperial interests, often supported by jingoistic newspapers, pushed Salisbury towards more interventionist positions than the prime minister naturally preferred. His denial of knowledge regarding the Jameson Raid damaged his credibility.
Cecil Rhodes
Mining magnate and imperialist who dreamed of placing all of Africa under British rule. Through the British South Africa Company, he extended British control northward into territories that became Northern and Southern Rhodesia. His company administered 750,000 square miles by 1893. The Jameson Raid, which Rhodes orchestrated, destroyed his political career. He was forced to resign as Cape prime minister and as company chairman, though he partially restored his reputation by negotiating an end to the 1896 Rhodesian rebellions.
Key Points to Remember:
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Gold discovery in Transvaal (1886) fundamentally altered the regional power balance, making the Boer republic the wealthiest nation in southern Africa and creating new tensions with Britain.
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Uitlanders (foreign workers, mainly British and German) outnumbered Boers and paid nine-tenths of Transvaal's taxes by the mid-1890s, yet President Kruger denied them voting rights, providing Britain with justification for interference.
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The Jameson Raid (December 1895) failed catastrophically, strengthening rather than weakening Kruger, embarrassing Salisbury and Chamberlain, and forcing Rhodes to resign from his positions.
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Rather than resolving Anglo-Boer tensions, the raid's consequences intensified them: the two Boer republics signed a military pact in 1897, Kruger modernised Transvaal's military, and many Cape Boers became alienated from Britain.
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British policy reflected tension between Salisbury's cautious 'splendid isolation' approach and Chamberlain's aggressive imperial advocacy, with the colonial secretary often pushing for more interventionist actions than the prime minister preferred.