British Withdrawal from Palestine (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes

British Withdrawal from Palestine

Background to the Palestine problem

Palestine had been under British control as a mandate territory throughout the interwar period. By 1939, Jews comprised approximately one-third of the population, whilst Arabs made up the indigenous majority. This demographic reality created tension, as Jews opposed British restrictions on Jewish immigration whilst resenting Britain's stated intention to create an Arab-dominated Palestine.

The situation in 1945

The Second World War transformed the Palestine problem from a difficult issue into an insoluble one. Several factors contributed to this deterioration:

By mid-1945, approximately 200,000 displaced Jews were living in Europe, many of whom wished to settle in Palestine. The Holocaust (Hitler's attempt to eliminate all Jews in Europe after 1941) had generated enormous international sympathy for Jewish refugees, particularly in the United States.

Within Palestine itself, Britain confronted a well-organised Jewish militia, the Haganah, which was led by two terrorist organisations: the Stern Gang and the Irgun. The Stern Gang had previously advocated an alliance with Hitler against Britain. Jewish attacks on British officials had occurred throughout the war and continued into 1945.

Palestinians opposed both Jewish immigration and the establishment of a Jewish state. Their cause received support from all Arab states, which added a regional dimension to what might otherwise have been a local dispute.

Britain had its own strategic interests to protect. Military chiefs argued that Palestine held strategic importance because of its proximity to the Suez Canal, and they insisted Britain should maintain a military presence there.

British policy in 1945

In 1945, general expectations held that Attlee's government would support the Zionist cause (Jews who wished to establish a national home in Palestine). A Labour policy statement from 1944 had suggested that Jews should be allowed to become the majority in Palestine.

However, once in office, Foreign Secretary Bevin expressed doubts about large-scale Jewish immigration. He feared alienating Arab populations, given the importance of Middle Eastern oil. Bevin's main aim resembled that of previous British governments: to find a compromise that would satisfy both Jews and Arabs. He declared his willingness to stake his political future on negotiating a settlement. Yet the prospects for finding such a compromise were never high.

British problems in 1945

In September 1945, a Cabinet committee supporting Bevin recommended a monthly quota of 1,500 Jewish immigrants to Palestine. This quota failed to satisfy Jewish agencies, which demanded the immediate entry of 100,000 Jews.

Within Palestine, Zionists responded to the restrictive quota with increased acts of terrorism. British authorities found it difficult to maintain order. US President Truman, courting the Jewish vote in America whilst also genuinely sympathetic to the Jewish cause, demanded large-scale immigration and the creation of an independent Jewish state. Attlee attempted to persuade Truman that other places existed capable of receiving large numbers of Jews, but without effect.

The Anglo-American Committee

Bevin secured the appointment of an Anglo-American Committee to make recommendations on Palestine's future in November 1945. Britain hoped that two issues—the future of Palestine and the settlement of European Jews—could both be studied. However, the Americans would only agree to consider the problem of Jewish settlement within the specific context of Palestine.

The Anglo-American Committee reported in May 1946. It opposed the idea of partition but recommended the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish immigrants. The report was immediately rejected by both Jewish and Arab leaders. Whilst Britain disapproved of the immigrant recommendations, Truman announced his support for the admittance of 100,000 immigrants.

Attlee's Cabinet decided it would only agree to this figure if illegal Jewish military organisations in Palestine were disbanded and if the USA would accept responsibility with Britain for implementing the Committee's recommendations. Neither of these conditions was satisfied.

Jewish terror

Acts of terror increased, forcing Britain to send more troops to Palestine. Several thousand Jewish terrorist suspects were arrested. The cycle of provocation and reprisal became increasingly violent.

Britain versus the USA

Britain's main plan in mid-1946 was for Palestine to be divided into Arab and Jewish provinces under a central administration presided over by a British high commissioner. However, this plan was opposed by Truman, Arabs and Jews.

In January 1947, a new round of talks began. By this point, Truman accepted the idea of partition. Bevin, however, remained aware that Arab leaders were totally opposed to a Jewish state in Palestine and that neither side would accept boundaries agreeable to the other. He opposed the partition idea, recognising that no room for compromise existed. Bevin admitted to being "at the end of my tether".

United Nations' action

By early 1947, 100,000 British troops occupied Palestine (a territory the size of Wales), the equivalent of one soldier for every eighteen inhabitants, at an annual cost of £40 million. Despite this military presence, British authorities remained unable to keep order in the face of Jewish resistance. Even Churchill could see no merit in remaining in Palestine. He questioned the value of keeping conscript soldiers there when they "might well be at home strengthening our depleted industry".

In February 1947, as Britain's economic situation worsened with bread rationing and fuel shortages, Bevin referred the Palestine problem to the United Nations. This referral was as much an admission of defeat as a gamble. Bevin believed the United Nations would create a single state in Palestine with Britain as the overseer, which would strengthen Britain's hand and reduce, if not end, American and other international criticism.

In September 1947, a United Nations special committee finally reported. Against Bevin's expectations, it proposed that:

• Independence should be granted to Palestine as soon as possible
• Palestine should be partitioned
• Jerusalem was to remain under United Nations' control
• The proposed Jewish state was to cover 55 per cent of Palestine (although Jews numbered only one-third of the population)
• 150,000 Jewish immigrants were to be admitted over the two years during which British responsibility as a mandatory power would continue to be exercised

The creation of Israel

Bevin, outraged by the United Nations' proposals, claimed they were "manifestly unjust to the Arabs" and predicted an Arab rising in Palestine. When the proposals were passed in November 1947, the British government declared it had no intention of implementing a settlement with which it so strongly disagreed. It announced that Britain would quit Palestine in mid-May 1948.

Despite American pressure to stay, Bevin adhered to his determination to leave Palestine. As Jewish-Arab hostilities intensified, Britain washed its hands of the conflict.

The new state of Israel was proclaimed in May 1948 and immediately recognised by the USA. Neighbouring Arab states—Egypt, Transjordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq—soon invaded. However, by January 1949, against the odds and British expectancy, the Israelis had defeated the invaders and gained territory. The United Nations' partition plan did not come into effect and many Palestinians found themselves within Israel. Britain belatedly recognised Israel in January 1949.

British policy in Palestine: conclusion

It is possible to attribute the tragedy of the Palestine situation to British misrule. Many Arabs blame Britain for allowing Jewish immigrants into Palestine in the first place. Jews have accused Bevin of being anti-Semitic and opposing the creation of Israel. It is possible to make out a case against the 1917 Balfour Declaration which encouraged Jews to settle in Palestine, but this was a decision made many years before Attlee's government came to power.

It is possibly fairer to blame the USA (as Bevin himself did) for promoting the Zionist cause and not accepting more responsibility in Palestine. To charge Bevin with being anti-Semitic is also unfair. He hoped to treat Arab and Jew alike, but he was also determined to preserve Britain's influence in the Middle East. A pro-Jewish policy in Palestine would have seriously damaged Britain's standing among all Arabs.

Although Britain emerged with little credit from the Palestine debacle, at least Bevin managed to isolate Palestine from the overall development of Anglo-American relations, and Britain continued to dominate the Middle East and retain alliances with many Arab states.

Labour policy: conclusion

Attlee's government had hoped to preserve Britain's world power status. By 1948, this hope had been shattered. It was clear that Britain was no longer in the same superpower league as the USA and the USSR. Churchill told the Commons in March 1947, "It is with deep grief I watch the clattering down of the British Empire with all its glories". Many on the left were more critical of Britain's increasingly subservient relationship to the USA.

However, given the enormous problems Britain faced, Attlee and Bevin perhaps deserve more praise than blame. Britain had little option but to accept Indian independence and even Churchill supported withdrawal from Palestine. Given its economic position, the notion that Britain might become a "third force" was a pipe dream. Britain was far closer to the democratic USA than to the totalitarian USSR. The Labour government had little option but to accept Britain's world-wide commitments. For any British government to have embarked on a policy of precipitate withdrawal everywhere would have been regarded as a premature act of abdication which would almost certainly have resulted in regional chaos, communist gains and disastrous economic consequences for Britain.