The Winds of Change, 1947–57 (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
Imperial Concerns, 1951–5
Between 1951 and 1955, Britain's approach to its colonial territories showed marked regional differences. While some areas moved towards independence with relative ease, others experienced violent conflict and complex political negotiations. The period demonstrated both the limits of British power and the varied responses to nationalist pressures across the empire.
West Africa
Churchill's Cabinet reached an important decision regarding West Africa by 1955. Both the Gold Coast and Nigeria were expected to gain independence in the near future. Most experts judged that losing these territories would have minimal impact on Britain's economic position or strategic interests. This relatively relaxed attitude contrasted sharply with Britain's determination to maintain control elsewhere in Africa.
The contrast between Britain's willingness to grant independence to West African territories and its determined resistance to nationalist movements in other regions (particularly East and Central Africa) reveals the pragmatic, case-by-case nature of British colonial policy during this period. Economic and strategic considerations, rather than consistent principles, drove decision-making.
East Africa
Demographics and political challenges
The situation in East Africa differed considerably from West Africa. In Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya, several factors complicated any transition to independence:
- Few Africans had received advanced education
- Serious tribal divisions existed within the African population
- Large numbers of Asians lived in the region, brought by Britain earlier in the century
- Kenya contained thousands of white settlers who held local political power and enjoyed social and economic privileges
White settlers in Kenya formed a powerful interest group determined to resist black rule. Many British Conservatives supported these settlers, hoping Kenya would remain what they termed a 'white man's country'. This alliance between settler interests and Conservative politics created a major obstacle to peaceful decolonization in the region.
The East African Federation plan
Britain attempted to create an East African Federation that would link Tanganyika (where Europeans numbered one for every 430 Africans) and Uganda (where white people were even fewer) with white-dominated Kenya. African opposition proved too strong, and the plan was soon abandoned.
The Federation plan represented Britain's attempt to dilute African majority power in Kenya by linking it with territories where white settlers were far less numerous. The swift abandonment of this scheme demonstrated the growing strength of African political opposition and the limits of British ability to impose constitutional arrangements.
The Mau Mau emergency
The Kikuyu tribe formed the largest ethnic group in Kenya. They protested against multiple grievances: rising prices, European ownership of the best agricultural land, and various forms of racial discrimination. When peaceful protest failed to produce results, violence erupted.
Between 1952 and 1956, Kenya experienced what became known as the Mau Mau emergency, a complex uprising combining Kikuyu conspiracy, peasant revolt and criminal gang activity. The movement adopted revolutionary terror tactics. Its supporters killed 95 Europeans and 13,000 black people, many of whom had worked for white employers.
British response
Britain dispatched thousands of troops to Kenya to suppress the rebellion. Rather than applying the principle of legality (paying lip service to legal standards) that they had introduced in many territories, the British turned Kenya into a police state characterised by racist terror:
Brutal Repression Tactics:
- Security forces formed 'strike squads' to carry out assassinations
- Civilians were shot in cold blood
- Both innocent and guilty people were massacred
- Between 1952 and 1958, 1,090 Africans were hanged (some on a travelling gallows built at the governor's request)
- Mau Mau suspects were routinely tortured to extract information
- Tens of thousands of the Kikuyu population were resettled in hundreds of gaol-villages
- A regime of searches, curfews, restrictions and forced labour was imposed
These measures represented a fundamental departure from the legal principles Britain claimed to uphold in its colonial territories, revealing the willingness to abandon legal standards when facing serious threats to colonial control.
Outcome and consequences
These measures effectively destroyed much of the Mau Mau organisation. Over 20,000 Mau Mau fighters died during the emergency. Britain benefited from the fact that many black Kenyans showed little desire to support a movement that would replace British supremacy with Kikuyu supremacy. The British government sponsored welfare programmes to help ethnic groups who remained loyal.
The Mau Mau emergency revealed the costs of maintaining colonial control through force. While Britain succeeded in suppressing the uprising, the brutal methods employed damaged Britain's international reputation and ultimately proved unsustainable as a long-term strategy for managing nationalist movements.
Central Africa
In central Africa, particularly Southern Rhodesia, growing numbers of white settlers enjoyed substantial local autonomy. Like their Kenyan counterparts, these settlers believed they represented a superior civilisation and had no intention of sacrificing power to the black majority.
Both Attlee and Churchill supported establishing a Central African Federation that would comprise Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Federation was finally formed in 1953. White people entirely controlled this new political entity, which had almost complete powers of self-government. However, the British government maintained a veto over any legislation that might worsen the position of black people.
The Central African Federation represented an attempt to create a viable white-dominated state in central Africa. The structure gave white settlers nearly complete autonomy while providing minimal protection for black African interests through a largely symbolic British veto power.
Egypt and the Suez Canal
British control in 1951
In 1951, Britain continued to control the Suez Canal zone in Egypt, a complex of bases housing approximately 40,000 troops. This arrangement was highly unpopular among Egyptians, but the Egyptian government's efforts to force Britain out failed. Churchill regarded the Suez base as being of vital importance.
The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 was due to expire in 1956. After this date, Britain could not lawfully maintain troops anywhere in Egypt without Egyptian government consent, which would certainly not be granted.
Relations deteriorate, 1952
In early 1952, Anglo-Egyptian relations, already strained, deteriorated further. Riots occurred in Cairo and large numbers of British business premises were destroyed. Churchill remained confident that British troops in the canal zone could hold the military situation, but Britain could not control the political situation. In 1952, a group of Egyptian army officers seized power, forcing King Farouk into exile.
The Sudan agreement, 1953
Discussions between the new Egyptian government and Britain concerning the Sudan and the canal zone proceeded. Somewhat surprisingly, given the ardently nationalist nature of the new regime, a more conciliatory atmosphere seemed to emerge.
In 1953, Britain and Egypt reached agreement on the Sudan. The country would have a three-year period of virtual home rule. Afterwards, it would be allowed to choose between complete independence or union with Egypt. Britain and Egypt both attempted to influence the elections of a Sudanese Constituent Assembly, which would make the eventual decision. The Sudanese chose independence, which commenced in 1956, to Britain's satisfaction.
Suez Canal negotiations
The Suez Canal presented greater difficulties. Britain suggested numerous compromises, but since all involved British troops remaining in the canal zone, the Egyptians rejected them all.
In 1953, Eden determined to change approach. He received support from Britain's military leaders, who now agreed that the Suez base was no longer essential. Churchill's conviction that the thermonuclear age had made large bases obsolete helped reconcile him to losing Suez. The crippling cost of remaining in the canal zone (over $50 million annually) provided another compelling reason for withdrawal. Although one-third of ships passing through Suez were still British, the canal no longer held the imperial importance it had possessed during the Raj period.
Economic Reality of the Suez Base:
The cost of maintaining the Suez Canal zone exceeded $50 million per year, an enormous expense that Britain could ill afford in the post-war period. Combined with military reassessment of the base's strategic value in the thermonuclear age, these economic pressures made withdrawal increasingly inevitable regardless of political considerations.
The 1954 agreement
In July 1954, agreement was reached. British troops would be withdrawn from the canal zone within twenty months. In the event of an attack on Egypt, Britain could reoccupy the base. Eden's conciliatory diplomacy appeared to have resolved Anglo-Egyptian differences at last.
Key figure: Gamal Nasser (1918–70)
Gamal Nasser was an army officer who helped establish the nationalist Free Officers group, which overthrew the Egyptian monarchy in 1952. He became prime minister and then president of Egypt. His nationalisation of the Suez Canal led to an unsuccessful Anglo-French attack on Egypt in 1956, after which he was established as a leader of the Arab world.
However, in November 1954, Gamal Nasser, a nationalist army officer determined to throw off all vestiges of British imperialism, won power in Egypt. This development boded ill for future relations.
Cyprus
Churchill and Eden hoped that Cyprus (British since 1878) would become a suitable alternative base from which Britain could sustain its dominance in the Middle East. By 1954, however, it was evident that most Greek Cypriots (80 per cent of the island's population) wanted union with Greece, a move strongly opposed by the Turkish minority.
The Foreign Office made clear that the island was to remain British. Greek Cypriots, frustrated by their demands being ignored, formed a guerrilla organisation called EOKA (led by Archbishop Makarios and Colonel Grivas), which waged a terrorist campaign. This resulted in approximately 200 deaths.
Britain declared a state of emergency and ultimately sent 25,000 British troops to maintain order. By 1957, British forces had gained the upper hand and Grivas announced a truce.
The Cyprus crisis demonstrated a pattern repeated across the empire: Britain's attempt to maintain control of a strategically valuable territory despite strong local nationalist sentiment, leading to insurgency, military deployment, and eventual compromise. Cyprus revealed that even small territories could impose significant military and political costs on Britain.
Churchill: conclusion
In 1955, Churchill, aged 80, decided to resign. Historians have offered differing assessments of his peacetime administration. Some are critical, claiming he lacked drive and energy and had exaggerated ideas about Britain's position in the world.
However, it is also possible to argue that Churchill provided leadership and sense of purpose, then stood back and allowed others, like Eden, to handle the actual detail. Churchill did not overestimate Britain's strength. Rather than attempting to cling to Empire, he accepted Britain's withdrawal from Sudan and Suez and supported moves towards independence in the Gold Coast and Nigeria. Churchill arguably pursued pragmatic colonial policies, not dissimilar to those of Attlee.
Reassessing Churchill's Colonial Policy:
Churchill's reputation as an imperialist has often obscured the pragmatic nature of his actual colonial policies between 1951 and 1955. While he valued the empire rhetorically, in practice he accepted withdrawals and moves toward independence when they made strategic and economic sense. This pragmatism, rather than rigid imperialism, characterized his approach to decolonization.
Remember!
Key Points to Remember:
-
Britain's approach to colonial territories varied significantly by region between 1951 and 1955, with West Africa moving towards independence whilst East Africa experienced violent conflict.
-
The Mau Mau emergency (1952–56) resulted in brutal British repression: 1,090 Africans hanged, over 20,000 fighters killed, tens of thousands resettled, and systematic use of torture and collective punishment.
-
Britain withdrew from the Suez Canal zone through the 1954 agreement, influenced by high costs (over $50 million yearly), military reassessment, and recognition that the canal no longer held its former imperial importance.
-
The Central African Federation (1953) and Cyprus both demonstrated Britain's difficulty managing territories with significant white settler populations who resisted black rule or local nationalist movements.
-
Churchill's colonial policy (1951–55) was more pragmatic than imperialistic, accepting withdrawals from Sudan and Suez and supporting West African independence, contrary to the image of him clinging to Empire.