Anthony Eden (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
Anthony Eden
Eden's background and character
Anthony Eden assumed the role of prime minister in 1955. Unlike many of his predecessors, Eden entered office with an exceptional reputation as an international statesman, built over decades of diplomatic service. In his late fifties, he possessed considerable charm, intelligence, energy and striking appearance, earning respect from political figures across the spectrum.
However, Eden was not without flaws. He struggled with poor health and exhibited a temperamental nature, often displaying irritability and pettiness. A self-described workaholic, he found delegation difficult and lived perpetually on edge. These personal characteristics would later influence his decision-making during the Suez Crisis.
Eden's aims as prime minister
Continuity with Churchill
On first inspection, Eden's foreign policy objectives appeared similar to Churchill's. He acknowledged that Britain was attempting to maintain influence across too many regions simultaneously. Nevertheless, Eden remained committed to preserving British power globally. His extensive travels had reinforced his conviction that Commonwealth unity formed the essential basis of British strength.
Differences from Churchill
Despite surface similarities, Eden diverged from Churchill on one important matter: relations with the United States. Churchill had maintained unwavering faith in Anglo-American cooperation. Eden, whilst recognising the necessity of working alongside the Americans, harboured doubts about their judgement and reliability. He believed Britain retained sufficient power to act independently when required.
Britain's Middle East position in 1955
Eden focused particularly on maintaining Britain's standing in the Middle East, which appeared robust in 1955. Earlier disagreements with Egypt seemed resolved, and Turkey remained linked to the West through NATO.
SEATO — The South-East Asian Treaty Organisation, established in 1954, connected Pakistan to the West. Iraq and Jordan maintained pro-British governments, and Britain continued exercising considerable influence across parts of the Arabian peninsula.
In February 1955, Turkey and Iraq (with British backing) formed a military alliance termed the Baghdad Pact. Britain formally joined this arrangement in April 1955, followed by Pakistan and Iran. Although designed primarily to contain Soviet influence, the Pact's main consequence was antagonising Egyptian leader Nasser.
The threat of Nasser
Nasser opposed Western (especially British) influence throughout the Middle East. Presenting himself as the champion of Arab nationalism, Nasser encouraged nationalist movements across north Africa and the Middle East.
Initial British attempts at appeasement
Eden initially hoped to placate Nasser through concessions:
- British forces withdrew from the Suez Canal zone according to the 1954 agreement
- Britain and the United States offered financial assistance to construct the Aswan Dam, a massive infrastructure project designed to provide Egypt with water resources and hydroelectric power from the River Nile
Signs of Nasser's hostility
Events during 1956 demonstrated that Nasser could not be 'bought'. In March 1956, King Hussein of Jordan dismissed Glubb Pasha, the British commander of his military forces. Glubb had personified British influence in the Middle East, and his removal represented a serious blow to British prestige. Eden held Nasser responsible for Glubb's dismissal.
Providing substantial loans to Nasser now appeared equivalent to rewarding an adversary, particularly as Nasser had recognised communist China and seemed prepared to align with the USSR. Consequently, the Anglo-American Aswan loan offer was withdrawn in July.
Nationalisation of the Suez Canal
Nasser retaliated on 26 July 1956 by nationalising the Suez Canal Company. Under this action, the British government and British and French financial interests, who held substantial stakes in the company, would receive the market value of their shares. However, henceforth the canal would belong entirely to Egypt.
Eden's response
British trade, particularly oil imports, depended heavily on the canal. Its seizure provided Nasser with opportunities to blackmail Britain. Moreover, Nasser had directly challenged Britain and the international order. Allowing him to succeed would enhance his standing throughout the Arab world whilst British prestige collapsed.
Eden determined that Nasser must be stopped immediately rather than later. Nasser's government exhibited characteristics of totalitarian rule: suppression of civil liberties, inflammatory speeches, and organised subversion in neighbouring countries. Eden was not isolated in wanting to bring about Nasser's removal. Churchill remarked: "We can't have this malicious swine sitting across our communications." Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell condemned Nasser, and a Commons debate on 2 August created the impression of virtual consensus supporting firm action.
French support
Eden could rely on French backing. France, which also held financial stakes in the Suez Canal Company, regarded Nasser as responsible for much of the unrest they confronted in Algeria. French leaders viewed the Suez Crisis as an opportunity to stop Nasser from spreading his dangerous appeal throughout the Arab world. French officials demonstrated readiness to employ force.
British policy: July to October 1956
Immediate military action was ruled out because British forces required at least six weeks to prepare. Furthermore, US President Eisenhower opposed armed intervention. Whilst Eisenhower agreed that Nasser threatened Western interests, he preferred covert operations to overthrow him. The US government was reluctant to associate itself with actions that resembled colonialism and might benefit communism.
During the gradual build-up of British forces in the eastern Mediterranean, Eden made a virtue of necessity and agreed to negotiate. Britain's stated objective was not restoring the Suez Canal Company but instead placing the canal under international control. Eden's private aim, however, remained toppling Nasser, whether through force or diplomatic defeat so damaging that he would fall. The USA and the Labour Party hoped that a negotiated settlement could be arranged through the United Nations.
In October, Britain submitted several resolutions to the UN, but the USSR and Yugoslavia vetoed Britain's proposals.
Growing pressure for action
Unfortunately, prolonged negotiations made justifying military action increasingly difficult. The USA continued refusing to support force. By now the Labour Party had clarified that it would only support British action with United Nations consent. By October, Eden recognised that negotiations with Nasser were achieving nothing. Many members of his own party were pressing for strong action, and the British force in the eastern Mediterranean could not remain idle indefinitely. Eden was anxious to force the issue. However, if Britain was to attack Egypt, a justification acceptable to British and international opinion seemed essential.
The Sèvres plan
Israel, like Britain and France, was alarmed by Nasser's growing prestige and his self-portrayal as the Arab champion who would lead Arabs to victory against Israel. Nasser ensured that Israeli ships were prohibited from using the Suez Canal, and Egyptian commandos mounted attacks on Israel. Israel was determined to take retaliatory action. However, the Israeli government wanted Britain as a military ally before launching operations against Egypt.
In mid-October, Britain agreed to a French-Israeli plan (termed the Sèvres plan). Under this arrangement, Israel would attack Egypt across the Sinai, providing Britain and France with a pretext to occupy the canal under the justification of protecting it from damage.
Flaws in the Sèvres plan
The Sèvres plan, whilst providing Britain with a pretext for intervention, contained several major defects which should have been apparent with minimal foresight:
- Imagining that collusion between Britain, France and Israel could remain secret was extremely naive
- Britain's Arab allies were unlikely to view favourably a British attack arranged in advance with Israel
- The USA remained opposed to military intervention. This posed a serious problem because Eden had been warned by the Treasury that the strength of the pound sterling was too fragile for Britain to proceed without American backing
The Suez invasion
Timeline of military action
On 29 October, the Sèvres plan was implemented. Israeli forces invaded the Sinai, rapidly overwhelming Egyptian forces. The following day, Britain and France issued ultimatums requiring Israel and Egypt to cease hostilities and withdraw to positions ten miles from the Suez Canal. Egypt was additionally required to permit Anglo-French forces to occupy positions along the canal.
Egypt and Israel received twelve hours to comply; otherwise Britain and France would intervene. Israel naturally agreed. As anticipated, Egypt refused. Consequently, the Royal Air Force bombed Egyptian airfields on 31 October. The Anglo-French invasion force, which had assembled at Malta, sailed towards Egypt (though it would not arrive until 6 November). In retaliation, Nasser blocked the Suez Canal.
International reactions
The Anglo-French attack provoked enormous controversy. In Britain, most Conservative MPs and most British citizens (according to opinion polls) supported Eden's action. However, Labour MPs condemned it, as did the USSR.
Eisenhower's condemnation carried far greater weight. His anger was understandable. He had clearly stated his opposition to using force and resented being deceived by his closest ally. At the United Nations, most countries, including several Commonwealth members, expressed similar criticism. An American resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire passed by 64 votes to five (Britain, France, Israel, Australia and New Zealand). Only by exercising its veto power on the Security Council could Britain block United Nations' demands for an immediate ceasefire.
On 5 November, Anglo-French paratroopers landed in Egypt. The same day, the USSR issued threats that it might launch missile attacks on London and Paris if the invasion proceeded. Eden's government suspected that the Russians were bluffing. More significantly, in early November, US financial pressure triggered a run on the pound and a rapid drain on Britain's gold and dollar reserves.
Key Points to Remember:
- Eden entered office in 1955 with a strong international reputation but possessed personal weaknesses including poor health and difficulty delegating
- He aimed to maintain British influence through the Commonwealth and was more sceptical of American judgement than Churchill had been
- Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956 prompted Eden to seek Nasser's removal, believing British prestige was at stake
- The secret Sèvres plan arranged with France and Israel in mid-October 1956 provided a pretext for invasion but was deeply flawed, particularly given American opposition
- US financial pressure and widespread international condemnation, combined with domestic Labour opposition, undermined the military operation despite initial Conservative and public support