The Winds of Change, 1957–67 (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
Decolonisation, 1957–63
Introduction: the rapid pace of change
Between 1957 and 1963, Britain dismantled much of its colonial empire at remarkable speed. This process transformed the political map of Africa and other territories, bringing independence to numerous colonies within just six years. The pace caught many observers by surprise, including those who had expected colonial rule to continue for decades.
Decolonisation refers to the process by which colonial territories gained independence from imperial control and established themselves as sovereign states. In Britain's case, this involved transferring political power from London to indigenous governments in former colonies.
Several pressures drove this acceleration. African nationalism had grown stronger after 1945, inspired partly by Ghana's successful path to independence. Macmillan's government faced concerns about expense, Britain's international standing, and the Cold War context, where communist influence might spread if Britain resisted nationalist movements. In French and Belgian colonies, independence movements gained momentum, creating a wider continental shift. The alternative to granting independence appeared to be costly military repression and potential insurgencies.
The Key Drivers of Decolonisation:
The rapid pace of decolonisation between 1957-63 was not inevitable but resulted from a convergence of pressures. Britain faced growing African nationalist movements, rising costs of colonial administration, Cold War concerns about communist influence, and the momentum created by independence movements in neighbouring French and Belgian territories. The choice became clear: grant independence voluntarily or face costly military repression and potential insurgencies.
Decolonisation in west Africa
The transfer of power proceeded relatively smoothly in Britain's west African territories. Ghana became independent in 1957, marking a watershed moment. Nigeria followed in 1960, despite deep ethnic and religious divisions within the colony. Sierra Leone and the Cameroons both gained independence in 1961.
Macmillan believed Nigeria and other west African territories lacked adequate preparation for self-government. However, he concluded that Britain would benefit more from granting independence than from attempting to maintain control. Continued British rule offered little advantage, whilst the risk of rebellion and the costs of suppression made a voluntary withdrawal more attractive. This pragmatic calculation shaped British policy across west Africa.
Macmillan's Pragmatic Approach
Although Macmillan personally doubted whether west African territories were ready for independence, he recognized the political reality: Britain stood to gain little from maintaining control, while facing significant risks of rebellion and the high costs of suppression. This cost-benefit analysis became a template for British decolonisation policy across the empire.
Decolonisation in east Africa
Britain initially hoped to create an east African federation comprising Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya, with the white minority in Kenya exercising substantial control. By the late 1950s, developments in these three territories convinced British policymakers that such a federation was impractical.
Tanganyika
By 1959, the Tanganyikan African National Union, under Julius Nyerere's leadership, commanded widespread African support. Nyerere pressed for self-government, threatening strikes and boycotts if demands were refused. Britain recognised that Tanganyika held limited economic or strategic value and promised independence by December 1961. In 1963, Tanganyika merged with Zanzibar to form Tanzania.
Uganda
In 1959, early independence for Uganda seemed unlikely. Serious tribal divisions raised the possibility of violence if Britain withdrew too hastily. The colony appeared either ungovernable or governable only through repression. Britain determined that rapid withdrawal offered the best course. Uganda became independent in October 1962.
The Uganda Dilemma
Uganda presented British policymakers with a difficult choice: maintain control through increasingly repressive measures or withdraw rapidly despite serious tribal divisions. The decision to grant swift independence reflected Britain's broader realization that the costs and risks of maintaining control outweighed any potential benefits, even in territories that seemed unprepared for self-government.
Kenya
Kenya represented Britain's most valuable east African possession. A white population of 50,000 controlled the best agricultural land and dominated the Kenyan legislative council, blocking African political advancement. Despite some liberal reforms in the late 1950s, majority rule or independence appeared remote.
Old colonial attitudes persisted stubbornly. Little had been done to reconcile Mau Mau detainees. Jomo Kenyatta, the suspected Mau Mau leader arrested in 1953 and convicted after a rigged trial, remained imprisoned. In March 1959, guards at Hola Camp beat eleven prisoners to death. When it emerged that no prosecutions would follow, outrage erupted in Britain.
The Hola Camp Incident: A Turning Point
In March 1959, a shocking event exposed the brutal realities of British colonial rule in Kenya:
What happened: Guards at Hola Camp beat 11 prisoners to death during a forced labour incident involving Mau Mau detainees.
The official response: British authorities announced that no prosecutions would follow the killings.
The impact: When news reached Britain, public outrage erupted, fundamentally changing the political debate about Kenya's future. The incident made it impossible for the government to maintain the fiction that colonial rule was benign and undermined support for continued white minority dominance in Kenya.
British officials understood that developments in Tanganyika and Uganda could not be ignored in Kenya. Moreover, Kenya's white population was far from united. Some, particularly those in government service, were prepared to accept multiracial politics rather than rigid white domination. British policymakers exploited this division. At a London conference in January 1960, attended by white and black Kenyan politicians, the ban on African political movements was lifted and a new constitution drafted. This constitution gave elected Africans a majority in the Kenyan legislature.
Once the principle of self-government under majority rule was established, full independence became inevitable. Kenyatta, released from prison, assumed leadership of the Kenyan African National Union. In December 1963, Kenya became independent under Kenyatta's premiership.
Decolonisation in central Africa
Colonial rule ended more problematically in central Africa. Britain controlled three territories with substantial white populations:
- Northern Rhodesia: 70,000 white people, 2 million Africans
- Nyasaland: 7,000 white people, 2.5 million Africans
- Southern Rhodesia: 221,000 white people, 3.5 million Africans
Britain's control was complicated by these territories' membership of the Central African Federation, created in 1953. The Federation was dominated by Southern Rhodesian white people, whose numbers had increased through post-1945 British immigration. The Federation had taken virtually no steps to give black Africans political representation. Though black people gained a modest share in the Federation's rising prosperity (generated largely by copper mining and tobacco sales), they earned less than one-tenth of white incomes.
The Central African Federation: A Failed Experiment
The Central African Federation represented Britain's attempt to create a multiracial dominion in central Africa. However, it was fundamentally flawed from the start. Dominated by Southern Rhodesian whites with no meaningful black African representation, the Federation was bitterly opposed by the African majority. The vast economic inequality - with black Africans earning less than one-tenth of white incomes - created deep resentment that would ultimately prove impossible to overcome.
Problems in Nyasaland
In 1957, Macmillan's government remained committed to the Federation, though most black people opposed it bitterly. British policymakers hoped white domination would gradually be offset by greater black representation, but the prospect of black majority rule seemed distant.
By 1959, politics in central Africa became increasingly troubled. White people worried about growing disorder and rising support for Dr Hastings Banda in Nyasaland and Kenneth Kaunda in Northern Rhodesia. Nyasaland's government declared a state of emergency in March 1959, supposedly to prevent an armed coup. Banda and 100 other Nyasaland African Congress activists were imprisoned. In subsequent police and military operations, 51 Africans were killed.
These measures proved counter-productive. An independent inquiry, headed by Lord Devlin, condemned the Nyasaland government's actions and accused it of operating a 'police state'. No previous British colonial government had faced such savage official criticism. Although Macmillan's government rejected Devlin's report, it was reluctant to support more repressive policies. Macmillan understood the extent of black hostility towards the Federation and feared Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland might become another Algeria, requiring costly military intervention.
The Nyasaland Crisis and Devlin Report
The Nyasaland crisis of 1959 exposed the contradictions in British colonial policy:
Step 1: The Crackdown - In March 1959, Nyasaland's government declared a state of emergency, imprisoned Dr Hastings Banda and 100 other activists, and killed 51 Africans in subsequent operations.
Step 2: The Investigation - An independent inquiry led by Lord Devlin was established to investigate the government's actions.
Step 3: The Damning Verdict - The Devlin Report delivered unprecedented criticism, condemning the Nyasaland government for operating a 'police state' - criticism no British colonial government had faced before.
Step 4: The Policy Shift - Although Macmillan rejected the report publicly, he privately recognized that continued repression was unsustainable. By July 1960, Nyasaland received a constitution ensuring a black majority in its legislative council.
Torn between desires to conciliate black leaders and fears that white people controlling military forces might declare independence unilaterally, Macmillan and Macleod remained uncertain about how to proceed. Both harboured doubts about rapid power transfers. As rioting and violence in Nyasaland continued, the danger of complete breakdown loomed large. Accordingly, in July 1960, Nyasaland received a constitution ensuring a black majority in its legislative council.
The Monckton Commission
A Royal Commission established to advise on the Federation's future reported in October 1960. The Commission, headed by Walter Monckton, concluded that African distrust of the Federation had reached 'almost pathological' proportions and that sweeping structural changes were necessary. It recommended devolving more power to individual territories and introducing parity of representation for white and black people immediately into the Federation's assembly.
The Monckton Commission's Findings
The Monckton Commission provided an official acknowledgment of what African leaders had been saying for years: the Central African Federation was fundamentally broken. Its description of African distrust as 'almost pathological' in intensity revealed the depth of opposition to white minority rule. The Commission's recommendations for structural reform represented Britain's last attempt to save the Federation, but by 1960, the momentum towards dissolution had become unstoppable.
Northern Rhodesia
Macmillan's government, which supported the Monckton Commission's findings, attempted to persuade Rhodesian white people to reach agreement with black leaders. Following this policy, Macleod announced a conference to discuss Northern Rhodesia's constitution. Sir Roy Welensky, the Federation's prime minister, with support from most Rhodesian white people, was determined to resist any move towards black majority rule in Northern Rhodesia.
Complex and bitter negotiations on Northern Rhodesia's future followed. Hopes of creating a genuinely multiracial state foundered on the intransigence of both white and black politicians. In Northern Rhodesia, Kaunda organised a campaign of civil disobedience, extending to sabotage and murder. He warned this would soon make the Mau Mau insurgency look like 'a child's picnic'. Fearing racial conflict, Macmillan was uncertain whether to support white settlers or black majority rule. To appease right-wing Conservative pressure, he removed Macleod from the Colonial Office, replacing him with R.A. Butler. This made little difference. In March 1962, Macmillan's government, convinced that increased black representation was irresistible, accepted majority rule in Northern Rhodesia.
The end of the Central African Federation
The British government hoped that granting majority rule in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would end objections to the Federation. Instead, black leaders now occupied stronger positions to campaign for independence from the Federation. Nyasaland moved first. In October 1962, elections in Northern Rhodesia under the new constitution resulted in victory for African parties, the two largest of which united to demand secession. The Federation's days were numbered.
In December 1962 elections, pro-Federation supporters in Southern Rhodesia were defeated by a new white party, the Rhodesian Front. This new government was determined to achieve independence under white rule and regarded the Federation as an obstacle. R.A. Butler presided over negotiations which began at Victoria Falls in June 1963. The Victoria Falls Conference agreed that the Federation should be dissolved on 31 December 1963 and that Nyasaland (becoming Malawi) and Northern Rhodesia (becoming Zambia) should be given full independence in 1964.
The Irony of the Federation's Collapse
The Central African Federation's dissolution revealed a striking irony: by 1962-63, all major parties wanted it gone. Black African leaders opposed it as a vehicle for white minority rule. White Southern Rhodesians, represented by the new Rhodesian Front party, saw it as an obstacle to achieving independence under white rule. The Federation, created in 1953 to preserve British influence and white dominance, had by 1963 become an institution that satisfied no one.
The problem of Southern Rhodesia
The Federation's collapse ended Britain's aspiration for multiracial rule. It also created another problem: Southern Rhodesia, where white people refused to concede black majority rule. Macmillan's government was divided on whether to grant Southern Rhodesia independence. Some Conservatives supported white rule, believing it would prove more efficient than black rule. Others opposed giving independence to a white minority government. Southern Rhodesia thus remained unresolved.
Southern Rhodesia: The Unfinished Business
Southern Rhodesia represented the major failure of British decolonisation policy in Africa. Unlike other territories where Britain successfully transferred power to majority rule governments, Southern Rhodesia's large white population (221,000 people) refused to accept black majority rule. The Conservative government remained divided: some supported white rule as 'efficient,' while others opposed granting independence to a white minority government. This unresolved situation would lead to a unilateral declaration of independence in 1965 and years of international sanctions and civil war.
Decolonisation elsewhere
Britain also decolonised in other regions beyond Africa.
The West Indies
In the West Indies, Britain's main concern was ensuring that new units of government were economically and politically viable. In 1958, Britain persuaded ten West Indian islands to form the West Indian Federation. However, local jealousies and problems of distance conspired to make the Federation unworkable. In 1962, Jamaica and Trinidad (coupled with nearby Tobago) decided to leave. Together they contained 83% of the land, 77% of the population and 75% of the Federation's wealth. Accordingly, the Federation collapsed. The larger islands became independent; the smaller islands became Associated States with Britain retaining responsibility for their diplomacy and defence.
Cyprus and Malta
As opposition to British rule in Cyprus mounted again in 1958, some 30,000 British servicemen were sent to the island. They arrested almost 2,000 EOKA suspects. 'Black October' 1958 saw 45 people killed. Macmillan, deciding that the island was not worth fighting for, opened new talks with Archbishop Makarios. After prolonged negotiations an agreement was hammered out:
- Cyprus was to become independent within the Commonwealth in 1960
- Its Greek and Turkish communities were each to have almost complete autonomy
- Britain retained sovereignty over two bases
Though this seemed a masterly solution, trouble between Greek and Turkish Cypriots continued, reaching civil war proportions by 1963.
Cyprus: A Pyrrhic Victory?
Cyprus demonstrated both the achievements and limitations of British decolonisation. Britain successfully extricated itself from a violent colonial conflict, retained strategic military bases, and created an independent state. However, the constitutional arrangement - giving Greek and Turkish communities separate autonomy - failed to resolve underlying ethnic tensions. By 1963, the island had descended into civil war, revealing that Britain's 'masterly solution' had merely postponed rather than resolved Cyprus's fundamental problems.
Malta, once a vital naval base, lost its importance as Britain's naval presence in the Mediterranean decreased. Plans to make Malta (with a population of 300,000) part of the UK collapsed because Britain was unwilling to give the island sufficient financial assistance to bring the standard of Maltese welfare to that of Britain. Instead, many Maltese demanded independence, which was granted in 1964.
Conclusion: the nature and speed of decolonisation
In 1965, Gambia became independent. Bechuanaland (Botswana) and Basutoland (Lesotho) followed suit in 1966. Thus, by 1966 Britain had granted independence to all its African colonies, except Southern Rhodesia.
Britain divested its Empire far more rapidly than planned. This meant that most colonies were less prepared for self-rule than Britain had hoped. It also meant that Britain disposed of its Empire without experiencing the bitter struggles that France endured in Algeria.
Most white people in Africa believed that Macmillan caved in far too easily to African nationalist pressure. Most historians, however, suggest that Britain divested itself of Empire with some dignity and skill. Remarkably little bloodshed occurred and no major political crisis erupted in Britain. Britons watched the process of disintegration with detachment. In Africa, Britain retained the appearance of power up to the point of departure. This was not the reality. Given that Britain was unprepared to fight, it had few cards to play against determined opponents. Britain displayed some skill in masking this weakness and in devising institutional machinery that allowed peaceful withdrawal.
For African leaders, constitutional legitimacy and the symbolic inheritance of colonial authority were valuable prizes. Thus, the transfers of power were invariably amicable, stately affairs. 'It was a pleasing pantomime in which all could delight', writes historian John Darwin (2012).
Historical Debate: Success or Surrender?
The speed of British decolonisation has generated contrasting interpretations. Contemporary white settlers saw Macmillan as surrendering too easily to African nationalist pressure. Most historians, however, view the process more positively, noting that Britain avoided the bloodshed of French Algeria while maintaining relatively orderly transfers of power. John Darwin's characterization of decolonisation as 'a pleasing pantomime' captures this ambiguity: both Britain and African leaders cooperated in staging dignified ceremonies that masked Britain's fundamental weakness and gave African leaders the legitimacy they needed.
| Territory | Year of independence |
|---|---|
| Ghana | 1957 |
| Nigeria | 1960 |
| Cyprus | 1960 |
| Sierra Leone | 1961 |
| Cameroons | 1961 |
| Tanganyika | 1961 |
| Jamaica | 1962 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 1962 |
| Uganda | 1962 |
| Kenya | 1963 |
| Zanzibar | 1963 |
| Malawi (Nyasaland) | 1964 |
| Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) | 1964 |
| Malta | 1964 |
| Gambia | 1965 |
| Botswana (Bechuanaland) | 1966 |
| Lesotho (Basutoland) | 1966 |
Key Points to Remember:
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Between 1957 and 1963, Britain granted independence to most of its African colonies at remarkable speed, driven by African nationalism, economic considerations, and Cold War concerns.
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West African decolonisation (Ghana 1957, Nigeria 1960) proved relatively straightforward, whilst east African decolonisation was complicated by white settler populations, particularly in Kenya.
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The Central African Federation crisis (1959-63) involving Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia proved most difficult, with the Devlin Report exposing harsh colonial practices and the Monckton Commission recommending substantial reforms.
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Britain also withdrew from the West Indies, Cyprus and Malta during this period, with varying degrees of success in creating stable successor states.
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Britain managed decolonisation with relatively little violence or political crisis at home, though many colonies were less prepared for self-rule than originally planned, and Southern Rhodesia remained unresolved.
Key Figures:
- Harold Macmillan - Prime Minister who oversaw rapid decolonisation
- Iain Macleod - Colonial Secretary who pushed for African majority rule
- Jomo Kenyatta - Kenyan nationalist leader, first Prime Minister of independent Kenya
- Julius Nyerere - Tanganyikan nationalist leader
- Hastings Banda - Nyasaland nationalist leader
- Kenneth Kaunda - Northern Rhodesian nationalist leader
- Sir Roy Welensky - Prime Minister of Central African Federation
Critical Events:
- Hola Camp incident (March 1959) - 11 prisoners killed, sparked British outrage
- Nyasaland state of emergency (March 1959) - Led to Devlin Report
- Devlin Report (1959) - Condemned colonial government as 'police state'
- Monckton Commission (October 1960) - Found African distrust 'almost pathological'
- Victoria Falls Conference (June 1963) - Agreed to dissolve Federation