Harold Macmillan and Empire (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes

Harold Macmillan and Empire

Context: Britain's empire in 1957

When Harold Macmillan replaced Anthony Eden as prime minister in January 1957, Britain still governed substantial territories across Africa, Asia and the West Indies. The pace of decolonization since 1945 had been relatively measured. Between 1948 and 1957, only three British colonies had gained independence: Sudan in 1956, Ghana in 1957, and Malaya in 1957. Macmillan entered office declaring his intention to preserve Britain's imperial position. However, by the time he left office in 1963, most of the Empire had been dismantled. By 1967, very little remained.

Understanding his role requires examining both his stated aims and the practical constraints that shaped British policy.

Macmillan's background and priorities

Macmillan inherited the premiership from Eden, whose government had been humiliated by the Suez Crisis of 1956. His immediate priority was to restore Britain's international standing and revive the Conservative Party's electoral fortunes. He achieved both objectives with considerable skill. In the 1959 general election, the Conservatives increased their parliamentary majority. This electoral triumph appeared to vindicate 'Super Mac's' leadership, with Macmillan himself claiming that the British people had 'never had it so good'. The phrase captured the mood of rising prosperity on the domestic front and suggested political confidence.

Macmillan's imperial aims

Macmillan entered office determined to maintain Britain's status as a major world power. In 1957, he stated that 'we are a great world power, and we intend to remain so'. His vision did not initially include wholesale imperial withdrawal. Rather, he envisaged a managed transfer of power to colonial territories only when they had achieved sufficient political maturity and administrative capacity to govern themselves effectively. This reflected the traditional Colonial Office approach of gradual constitutional development.

Macmillan's approach involved careful evaluation of the Empire's value. He established a Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee to assess the costs and benefits of maintaining imperial possessions. The committee's findings proved mixed. Economic considerations appeared evenly balanced, with expenditure savings in some areas offset by reduced commercial advantages elsewhere. The committee concluded that 'The United Kingdom has been too long connected with its colonial possessions to sever ties abruptly without creating a bewilderment which would be discreditable and dangerous'. This statement reflected a cautious approach to constitutional change and suggested that any decolonization should proceed gradually.

Iain Macleod and the acceleration of decolonization

In October 1959, Macmillan appointed Iain Macleod as colonial secretary. This appointment is widely interpreted as marking a turning point toward more rapid decolonization. Unlike his predecessors in the Colonial Office, Macleod actively sympathized with African nationalist aspirations. Fearing that continued British resistance would provoke widespread bloodshed, he advocated accelerated constitutional advancement for African colonies.

The historiographical debate centers on whether Macleod acted primarily on his own initiative or implemented policies already decided by Macmillan. Before becoming colonial secretary, Macleod had shown minimal interest in colonial affairs, suggesting he was not appointed for his expertise. Those historians who emphasize Macmillan as the directing force behind decolonization point to the 1959 general election as the decisive turning point. They argue that the election brought into Parliament a cohort of younger, more progressive Conservative MPs who lacked emotional attachment to Empire. These newer members had no sentimental ties to imperial possessions and were more willing to contemplate their loss. This parliamentary shift allegedly provided Macmillan with the political support necessary to pursue decolonization more aggressively, giving him the opportunity to implement a policy he had already decided upon.

The extent of Macmillan's influence

By autumn 1959, Macmillan exercised considerable authority over all aspects of British foreign and colonial policy. Nevertheless, historians caution against exaggerating his personal impact on decolonization. Multiple Cabinet members, Foreign Office officials, and Colonial Office administrators held similar views about the need for constitutional change in Africa. Distinguishing who convinced whom proves difficult. Nor does clear evidence exist that either Macmillan or Macleod possessed a comprehensive colonial strategy or blueprint for dismantling the Empire.

However, the speed of constitutional change after 1959 and the consistency of its direction suggest that more than merely ad hoc responses to isolated colonial crises were occurring. Some coordinating understanding must have guided British policy, even if never formally articulated. The question remains: what caused Macmillan's government to change direction so decisively?

The acceptance of rapid decolonization

By 1960, Macmillan, Macleod, and most Cabinet members had concluded that rapid imperial withdrawal would prove less damaging than a protracted campaign to retain control of colonial possessions. This calculation reflected both practical considerations and recognition of changing political realities in Africa and Asia.

The costs of suppressing such movements appeared prohibitive to British policymakers who recognized that attempting to resist these pressures would likely result in costly conflicts that Britain could not sustain politically, militarily, or economically in its weakened post-war condition.

Key figure: Harold Macmillan

Year	Event
1894	Born into the Macmillan publishing family
1914–18	Served in the Grenadier Guards during the First World War; wounded in combat
1919	Worked in the family publishing business
1924	Elected as a Conservative MP
1929	Lost his parliamentary seat
1931	Re-elected as a Conservative; during the 1930s, criticized his party for appeasement policies and advocated greater state intervention for unemployment relief
1951	Became a successful minister of housing
1954	Appointed minister of defence
1955	Served as foreign secretary, then chancellor of the exchequer
1957	Succeeded Eden as prime minister
1959	Won the general election with increased Conservative majority, claiming the British people had 'never had it so good'
1963	Failed to secure British entry into the European Economic Community (EEC); resigned as prime minister due to ill-health
1984	Created first earl of Stockton
1986	Died

Macmillan presented a complex personality, combining sensitivity with cynicism, compassion with ruthlessness. Privately shy but publicly self-confident, he mixed professional political skill with qualities of the gentleman and accomplished performer, particularly on television, which was rapidly developing as an essential means of communication. Although often appearing nervous and highly strung, he possessed the ability to seem cool and unflappable. Unlike Eden, Macmillan was never overwhelmed by work pressures, for which he maintained considerable enthusiasm. He quickly established authority over Cabinet colleagues and enjoyed exercising power in Parliament.

Evaluating Macmillan's premiership presents difficulties. Critics emphasize his constant policy reversals, the surrender of Empire, attempts and failures to enter the EEC, and inability to identify a viable world role for Britain. Supporters highlight particular successes including his constructive relationship with American Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, and Britain's relatively smooth withdrawal from Africa. Given Britain's weakened post-war position, retreat and policy redirection had to be the order of the day. Macmillan attempted to manage this process and achieved some success, though not without costs.