International Relations, 1933–41 (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes

US Response to the European War, 1939–41

Background: American isolationism and the neutrality legislation

Following the First World War, American public opinion strongly favoured avoiding entanglement in future European conflicts. Between 1935 and 1939, Congress passed a series of Neutrality Acts designed to prevent the circumstances that had drawn the USA into the 1914-18 war. The First Neutrality Act (1936) prohibited arms sales to belligerent nations. This was followed by the Second Neutrality Act (1937), and the Third and Fourth Neutrality Acts (1938), each reinforcing restrictions on American involvement in foreign wars.

However, President Franklin D. Roosevelt grew increasingly concerned about the rise of fascist aggression in Europe and Asia. In October 1937, he delivered what became known as the Quarantine Speech in Chicago. Roosevelt characterised international aggression as an "epidemic of world lawlessness" spreading across the globe. He argued that innocent peoples and nations were being sacrificed to a "greed for power and supremacy which is devoid of all sense of justice and humane considerations". Roosevelt warned that war operated like a contagion, capable of engulfing states and peoples far removed from the original fighting. While insisting on America's determination to remain outside the conflict, he acknowledged that complete protection was impossible in a disordered world where "confidence and security have broken down". He called for "positive endeavors to preserve peace", suggesting that international action might be necessary to contain aggressor states.

The speech provoked immediate criticism. The Boston Herald, writing the day after Roosevelt's address, invoked the memory of Woodrow Wilson to warn against repeating the mistakes of 1917. The editorial insisted that Americans would not be "stampeded into going 3,000 miles [5,000 km] across water to save" Europe and advised Roosevelt to "confine your crusading to the continental limits of America". This response illustrated the strength of isolationist sentiment and the domestic political constraints facing Roosevelt. The America First Campaign, established by isolationists, actively worked to keep the USA out of war. Its prominent supporters included aviator Charles Lindbergh. Much of the campaign's financing came from the German Embassy, and an American Nazi Party, the Volksbund, alienated many Americans through its paramilitary activities and anti-Semitic attacks. As war approached, out-and-out isolationists increasingly appeared, whether fairly or not, as supporters of Germany, which diminished their influence.

September 1939: War in Europe and the repeal of the arms embargo

When Britain and France declared war on Germany in September 1939 following the invasion of Poland, Roosevelt immediately summoned Congress into special session. His objective was to repeal the arms embargo provisions of the existing Neutrality Acts. Most Americans sympathised with the Allied cause and wanted to see Germany defeated, primarily because they disliked Nazi aggression. Many feared that if Germany conquered the European continent, it would threaten the USA next. However, this sympathy did not translate into willingness to enter the war directly.

In November 1939, Congress agreed to modify the neutrality legislation through what became known as the Fifth Neutrality Act. This permitted the "cash-and-carry" export of arms and munitions to countries at war, provided two conditions were met: belligerents had to pay immediately in cash, and they had to transport the weapons in their own ships. The president could also designate areas where US citizens and ships were forbidden to travel. Roosevelt used this authority to proclaim the North Atlantic a combat zone because German U-boats were attacking British shipping and bringing the war dangerously close to American waters. He ordered the US Navy to patrol the western Atlantic and reveal the location of German submarines to the British.

Congress had not, however, anticipated the threat that German U-boats would pose to British merchant shipping, which would create new pressures for American intervention.

1940: The fall of France and increased American support for Britain

Most Americans wanted Britain and France to win, but as German successes mounted through late 1939 and early 1940, this outcome seemed increasingly unlikely. The situation became critical in the summer of 1940 when France was defeated and Britain stood alone against Germany. Britain had placed substantial orders for 14,000 aircraft and 25,000 aero-engines from American manufacturers but was increasingly unable to pay. Roosevelt had overestimated Britain's wealth and financial reserves. He began to understand that the USA would have to provide considerably more help if Britain was to remain in the war.

In September 1940, Roosevelt negotiated what became known as the destroyers-for-bases deal. The USA "traded" Britain 50 elderly destroyers in exchange for 99-year leases on six Caribbean bases, plus bases on Bermuda and Newfoundland. For Roosevelt, this represented good business—the USA obtained valuable strategic bases while disposing of some obsolete destroyers. Nevertheless, the arrangement marked a substantial shift toward active support for Britain in the war, allowing her to continue defending her merchant shipping against German U-boat attacks. The destroyers provided much-needed naval capacity at a moment when Britain's survival was precarious.

The 1940 presidential election

The November 1940 presidential election took place against this backdrop of international crisis. The Republican candidate, Wendell Willkie, was perceived as representing the party of non-involvement, although support for neutrality actually crossed party lines. Roosevelt decided to stand for an unprecedented third term, partly because no suitable successor existed within the Democratic Party who could handle the international situation. During the campaign, he repeatedly assured audiences of his hatred of war. In Boston in September, Roosevelt delivered a famous speech in which he promised American voters that their "boys were not going to be sent into any foreign wars". This reassurance helped maintain his traditional electoral base, particularly among supporters whose sons would be the ones fighting.

However, Roosevelt was simultaneously beginning to appeal more strongly to businessmen who would profit from war production and less to his traditional working-class supporters whose boys would do the fighting. Despite his public assurances, the USA was moving steadily closer to war. Roosevelt won the election, although his margin of victory was smaller than in 1936: 27 million votes to 22 million. After securing his third term, Roosevelt felt empowered to act more boldly in supporting Britain.

"The arsenal of democracy"

On 29 December 1940, Roosevelt delivered one of his famous fireside chats to the American people. He declared that the USA must become "the arsenal of democracy", meaning the supplier of arms to Britain. Roosevelt explained that the Europeans defending themselves "do not ask us to do their fighting. They ask us for the implements of war, the planes, the tanks, the guns, the freighters which will enable them to fight for their liberty and for our security". He insisted emphatically that America must provide these weapons "in sufficient volume and quickly enough so that we and our children will be saved the agony and suffering of war which others have had to endure". This marked a clear articulation of Roosevelt's evolving position: the USA would provide material support to prevent Britain's defeat, but would not formally enter the war.

1941: From cash-and-carry to Lend-Lease

The limitations of the cash-and-carry system became increasingly apparent during 1940. Britain's dollar reserves were running out, and she would soon be unable to purchase American weapons under existing arrangements. Roosevelt needed a mechanism to continue supplying Britain without requiring immediate payment, but he had to overcome both legal restrictions and political opposition.

The Lend-Lease Act

In March 1941, after prolonged Congressional debate, Roosevelt secured approval for Lend-Lease. Britain would be "loaned" the means to continue fighting. Roosevelt used a homely analogy to explain the policy to the American public: if your neighbour's house was on fire and they needed your garden hose to fight it, you would lend it to prevent the fire spreading to your own property. However, everyone understood that you did not actually lend weapons—they would be used, destroyed, or consumed. The USA was effectively giving Britain the means to remain in the war without requiring payment.

This represented a major shift in American policy. Roosevelt had been reluctant to provide Britain with weapons in 1940 because he feared that if Britain was defeated, Germany would subsequently use America's own weapons against her. By 1941, Roosevelt had concluded that supporting Britain was worth the risk. Moreover, a Gallup Poll in May 1941 showed that while the majority of Americans still wished to remain outside the conflict, only 19 per cent of respondents thought Roosevelt had gone too far in helping Britain. This gave him political room to manoeuvre.

The Atlantic Charter

In August 1941, Roosevelt travelled to meet British Prime Minister Winston Churchill aboard the British battleship Prince of Wales, anchored off the Newfoundland coast of Canada. After three days of discussions, they issued the Atlantic Charter. This document represented a powerful expression of Anglo-American vision for the post-war world. It articulated shared aims including international peace, national self-determination, and freedom of the seas, all to be achieved after "the final destruction of Nazi tyranny". The Charter served multiple purposes: it demonstrated Anglo-American solidarity, outlined war aims, and implicitly committed the USA to supporting Britain's continued resistance.

Roosevelt also agreed to extend American aid to the USSR, which Germany had invaded in June 1941. In November 1941, Lend-Lease was formally extended to the Soviet Union. This decision reflected Roosevelt's pragmatic calculation that any nation fighting Germany served American security interests, regardless of ideological differences with the Soviet communist system.

Roosevelt's position by late 1941

Roosevelt was clearly providing Britain with "all aid short of war", but he remained unprepared to formally declare war on Germany. He had no wish to be the president who took his country into war. Throughout his career, he had emphasised how much he hated war, and he understood that while the majority of Americans supported Britain, they still preferred to remain outside direct military conflict. Nevertheless, through measures including cash-and-carry, the destroyers-for-bases exchange, and particularly Lend-Lease, Roosevelt had effectively abandoned neutrality even while maintaining the fiction of non-belligerence. The USA was providing the material foundation for Britain's continued resistance and had articulated, through the Atlantic Charter, a vision of the post-war international order that presupposed Germany's defeat.

Relations with Japan, 1937–41

While Roosevelt focused primarily on the European war, relations with Japan were simultaneously deteriorating. In the late 1930s, Japan moved closer to alliances with the fascist dictators in Europe. The US government became alarmed as it observed Japan's military expansion into China and subsequently into Indochina (the French colony in South-east Asia). Roosevelt demonstrated his displeasure by applying economic pressure, hoping that such actions would force Japan to halt its aggressive expansion. However, the Japanese military held such power within the government that it effectively dictated foreign policy. Its primary objective was to eliminate any possibility of American interference with Japan's imperial and economic expansion.

Worsening relations

US-Japan relations had been deteriorating since the Japanese invasion of China, which began in 1937. Japan declared the American-supported "open door" policy in China obsolete, insisting on exclusive Japanese influence. Roosevelt retaliated by providing funds to China to purchase weapons and by asking American manufacturers not to sell aircraft to Japan. Japan depended heavily on supplies of industrial goods from the USA, and when these supplies dried up, Japan recognised the need to secure alternative sources—by force if necessary.

In July 1940, Congress imposed restrictions on American supplies of oil and scrap iron to Japan. After Japan signed the Rome–Berlin–Tokyo axis, Roosevelt banned the sale of machine tools to Japan. These economic sanctions represented America's primary tool for pressuring Japan without resorting to war, but they also increased tensions and pushed Japan toward more desperate measures to secure resources.

Failed diplomacy

In spring 1941, Secretary of State Cordell Hull met with Japanese Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura to attempt resolving differences between the two countries. Hull presented clear demands: Japan must withdraw from China and promise not to attack Dutch and French colonies in South-east Asia. However, Japan did not respond positively because the USA offered nothing in return. The USA demanded Japanese withdrawal from territories Japan had fought to control, without offering Japan access to the raw materials and markets it sought. This diplomatic impasse would remain unresolved through the remainder of 1941, with relations continuing to deteriorate.