Alliances and Shifts (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
Eisenhower, Dulles and 'Brinkmanship'
Continuity and change in US foreign policy
When Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed the presidency in 1953, his administration inherited and accepted substantial elements of Harry Truman's approach to Cold War strategy. Eisenhower's national security policy (the policy that defines the actions that a state deems necessary in order to protect itself from external threats) rested on several established principles:
- America needed to preserve its dominant position in Western Europe and establish a collective Western defence strategy that incorporated West Germany and its economic and military resources
- The United States had to maintain its influence across Asia
- The Soviet threat represented a genuine and substantial danger to American security interests, making the containment of Soviet territorial expansion a primary objective
- A robust nuclear arsenal and conventional forces (military resources that are non-nuclear, normally consisting of ground troops and air and sea forces without nuclear technology) remained necessary to deter and counter Soviet opportunism
Despite this continuity, Eisenhower fundamentally disagreed with Truman's strategic emphasis. He rejected Truman's commitment to a large-scale expansion of conventional forces, arguing that containment doctrine was restricted in scope and insufficient as the foundation of American foreign policy. Eisenhower viewed Truman's interpretation of the Soviet threat and the appropriate response as flawed. His alternative vision, revealed in October 1953, became known as the New Look policy.
The transition from Truman to Eisenhower represented both continuity and significant change in American Cold War strategy. While accepting the fundamental premise of Soviet threat and the need for containment, Eisenhower sought a more cost-effective and assertive approach that would reduce reliance on expensive conventional forces.
The New Look policy
Rollback
Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, articulated a more aggressive stance towards Soviet communism. In an early 1952 article for the influential Life magazine, Dulles criticized Truman's containment approach:
"If you think back over the last six years, you will see that our policies have largely involved emergency action to try to 'contain' Soviet communism by checking it here or blocking it there. We are not working, sacrificing and spending in order to be able to live without this peril – but to be able to live with it. Our present negative policies will never end the type of sustained offensive which Soviet communism is mounting. Liberation from the yoke of Moscow will not occur for a very long time unless the United States makes it publicly known that it wants and expects liberation to occur."
Containment had merely produced stalemate. Dulles advocated for reversing communist gains and diminishing Moscow's power as part of a broader strategy to achieve a successful conclusion to the Cold War for the United States. Dulles maintained that American national security and the preservation of international peace depended upon reducing Soviet communist dominance globally. This approach formed a central component of Eisenhower's New Look policy, appearing to abandon the static position that Truman's restrictive containment model had imposed upon American strategy.
The Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality
Despite Eisenhower's acceptance of the principle of liberation, he maintained that this objective could only be achieved through peaceful methods. Notably, Eisenhower never attempted to undermine the USSR's sphere of influence or 'liberate' any pro-Soviet communist states. This represents a significant contradiction between the aggressive rhetoric of rollback and the cautious reality of Eisenhower's actual foreign policy actions.
Massive retaliation
The containment strategy had required expensive and extensive military intervention in Korea. Under Eisenhower, nuclear weapons assumed far greater importance as the foundation of American national security strategy and Cold War posture. The administration implemented an increased reliance on nuclear weapons, which appeared considerably less costly than maintaining large conventional forces during Truman's presidency.
This redefinition of nuclear weapons' role and significance was presented as the most economical method of guaranteeing American security and the most effective approach to actually winning the Cold War. The NSC 162/2 report of October 1953 emphasized that the most effective deterrent against aggression towards Western Europe was for America to demonstrate unambiguously its determination to use nuclear weapons and its nuclear superiority against any aggressor.
Economic Rationale for Nuclear Emphasis
The shift towards nuclear weapons was driven partly by economic considerations. Eisenhower believed that maintaining large conventional forces globally was financially unsustainable and could lead to what Lenin called 'practical bankruptcy'. Nuclear weapons offered a seemingly cost-effective alternative that could provide security without the enormous expense of deploying conventional forces worldwide.
In his address to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on 12 January 1954, Dulles explained the new strategy of 'massive retaliation':
"It is not sound military strategy permanently to commit US land forces to Asia to a degree that leaves us no strategic reserves (military forces, both conventional and nuclear, held back in order to be deployed according to where the greatest need is deemed to be at any point in a conflict). It is not sound economics to support permanently other countries; nor is it good foreign policy, for in the long run, that creates as much ill will as good will. Also, it is not sound to become permanently committed to military expenditures so vast that they lead to what Lenin called 'practical bankruptcy'. If our policy was to remain the traditional one then we had to be ready to fight [anywhere]. Our basic decision was to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate instantly by means and at places of our choosing."
Eisenhower and Dulles regarded containment as a strategy that required, potentially, a global response to any communist expansion that might occur. Massive retaliation represented a deliberate shift towards relying on the threat of overwhelming nuclear response rather than committing conventional forces everywhere.
Brinkmanship
Brinkmanship is a strategy designed to convince one's opponent that there is a risk of war or actual conflict; one side shows no sign of backing down and this is used to force the other side into having to back down or face the prospect of actual conflict.
For Dulles, America's nuclear arsenal functioned not merely as a deterrent against Soviet attack but also as a diplomatic instrument. The United States could exploit its nuclear strength to attempt to force agreements with its communist opponents, particularly when a nuclear war might erupt. Dulles described this form of nuclear diplomacy as brinkmanship. He remained convinced that the capacity to reach the verge of war, without actually engaging in combat, was essential to effective foreign policy and diplomacy against a potentially aggressive adversary. He believed that failure to demonstrate this willingness would result in defeat.
This approach meant that nuclear weapons became central to American diplomatic strategy during the Eisenhower administration. The policy relied on the assumption that by demonstrating an unwavering readiness to use nuclear weapons, the United States could compel Soviet concessions without actually having to resort to nuclear conflict.
The Inherent Risks of Brinkmanship
The strategy carried inherent risks – it required convincing adversaries that America would genuinely use nuclear weapons whilst simultaneously maintaining sufficient control to prevent accidental escalation into actual nuclear war. This delicate balancing act meant that a miscalculation by either side could potentially trigger catastrophic nuclear conflict. Critics argued that brinkmanship was reckless and increased the danger of nuclear war rather than reducing it.
Key figure: John Foster Dulles
John Foster Dulles (1888-1959) served as Secretary of State under President Eisenhower from 1953 to 1959. A deeply religious and intensely anti-communist figure, Dulles exercised considerable influence over American foreign policy during the 1950s. He advocated for a more assertive and morally framed approach to confronting Soviet communism than his predecessors, characterizing the Cold War as a moral struggle between freedom and tyranny. His policies of rollback, massive retaliation, and brinkmanship reflected his belief that the United States needed to take a more aggressive stance against communist expansion. Dulles remained in office until shortly before his death from cancer in May 1959.
Dulles's Influence on Policy
Dulles was one of the most influential Secretaries of State in American history. His personal convictions and ideological approach to the Cold War shaped not just the rhetoric but the substance of American foreign policy throughout the 1950s. His vision of the Cold War as a moral crusade gave American strategy a more aggressive and uncompromising tone than it had possessed under Truman's administration.
Remember!
Key Points to Remember:
- Eisenhower accepted substantial elements of Truman's national security policy but rejected the emphasis on conventional forces and the limitations of containment
- The New Look policy (October 1953) represented Eisenhower's alternative strategy, emphasizing nuclear weapons as a cost-effective foundation for American security
- Rollback, advocated by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, aimed to reverse communist gains rather than merely contain them, though Eisenhower insisted this could only occur through peaceful means
- Massive retaliation involved threatening overwhelming nuclear response to communist aggression, as outlined in the NSC 162/2 report (October 1953) and Dulles' January 1954 address
- Brinkmanship was Dulles' strategy of using nuclear threats as a diplomatic tool, pushing to the verge of war to force opponent concessions without actually engaging in conflict