Road to the Missile Crisis (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes
Road to the Missile Crisis
Historical background: US-Cuban relations before 1959
The Caribbean held exceptional importance for the USA, which regarded the region as its own sphere of influence. American policymakers were determined to maintain stability there to protect national interests. The Cuban constitution granted the USA rights of intervention and required Cuba to provide land for naval bases, which explains the presence of the US base at Guantanamo Bay today. The USA exercised enormous influence over Cuba's affairs, despite the island's apparent independence.
This relationship appeared benign on the surface but was characterised by American dominance. The US effectively controlled Cuba economically and politically while maintaining the façade of Cuban independence—a pattern that would create significant tensions once nationalist leaders like Castro came to power.
Cuban nationalist Fidel Castro refers to a revolutionary leader who, after a period of exile, returned to Cuba in December 1956 with his brother Raul Castro, Ernesto 'Che' Guevara (an Argentine revolutionary), and 79 supporters. Castro and his followers became known as 'los barbudos' (the bearded ones). They conducted a guerrilla campaign against President Fulgencio Batista's regime. Batista had ruled Cuba as dictator from 1952, running an anti-communist stronghold whilst ruthlessly suppressing opposition to his corrupt regime. He received both economic and military aid from the USA.
Castro's supporters grew in number throughout the campaign. On 1 January 1959, Batista's regime collapsed and Castro entered Havana triumphantly. The immediate question facing Washington was how the USA would respond to this revolution, and what impact the American response would have on international relations more broadly.
In 1943, the American historian Samuel Flagg Bemis observed that the American attitude towards Cuba represented a source of pride but also self-denial. He argued that whilst the USA had once urged annexation of Cuba for a century, this ambition had been 'bridled, curbed and halted by a great and historic self-denial, checked by the common people of the United States and their opposition to imperialism.'
US response to Castro's revolution, 1958-60
America had shown minimal support for the Batista regime during Castro's revolution. Initially, the uprising appeared to be a home-grown, nationalist, non-communist movement with no direct external aid from communist states. The USA was willing to let the revolution run its course.
In May 1958, Vice President Richard Nixon had conducted a goodwill visit to several Latin American states. This visit prompted a shift in US policy towards the region. Economic stability became a target for American action. The USA supported the creation of a regional banking institution, the Inter-American Development Bank, and promoted regional common markets. President Dwight D. Eisenhower also decided not to offer unconditional American support to dictators, and he imposed an embargo on further arms shipments to Batista.
Castro needed support from a great power to manage the inevitable US response to his plans to reduce American economic and political influence in post-revolutionary Cuba. He aimed to maintain Cuban authority over national independence and avoid creating powerful internal and external enemies.
Agrarian reform and American property
In May 1959, Castro introduced an extensive programme of agrarian reform. This led to substantial amounts of American-owned property being seized by the Cuban state. These early reforms were moderate rather than revolutionary, and they did not immediately generate hostile American reactions. However, US concerns about Cuba becoming a Soviet satellite in the Caribbean grew, particularly given fears that pro-communist regimes could be managed across Latin America from such a base.
These concerns intensified when Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan visited Cuba in February 1960 and arranged $100 million in credits with Castro. This development tied Cuba into both an economic relationship with the Soviet Union and a political one—marking a critical turning point in the escalation of tensions.
Economic confrontation and escalation
The first shipment of crude oil from the USSR arrived in Cuba in April 1960. When American and Western-owned oil companies in Cuba refused to refine it, Castro nationalised them. America immediately imposed economic sanctions on Cuba and reduced imports of Cuban sugar by 95 per cent. This downward spiral in US-Cuban relations continued when Castro seized $1 billion worth of US assets on Cuba in October 1960.
Castro needed the Soviet Union for both foreign and domestic reasons. By 1961, the USA had decided that the time had come to remove Castro and his regime from Cuba.
Key figures in the Cuban Revolution
Fidel Castro (Ruz) (born 1927) was a nationalist revolutionary. Following the successful revolution of 1959, he assumed the title of prime minister until 1976, when he became president of Cuba. He developed Cuba as a communist state once it became clear that the USA was unwilling to cooperate with him, and he needed external support. He is credited with raising the standard of living for many Cubans, but his regime is largely seen as a dictatorship.
Ernesto 'Che' Guevara (1928-67) trained as a medical student but became committed to social revolution and communism. He joined Castro and formed the '26 July Movement' in Cuba. After a period in Castro's government, he resigned in 1965 and became a guerrilla leader in Bolivia. He wrote a book entitled Guerrilla Warfare. A committed communist and freedom fighter, he was executed in 1967.
Fulgencio Batista (1901-73) was the dictator of Cuba from 1952 until he was overthrown in 1959. He ran the country as an anti-communist stronghold and ruthlessly suppressed opposition to his corrupt regime. He received economic and military aid from the USA.
Anastas Mikoyan (1895-1978) was a close ally of Stalin from early on in the Bolshevik revolution. He supported Castro's revolution, stating it reminded him of his youth. He remained in office under Khrushchev's successor, Leonid Brezhnev, who allowed him to stay on in government. He was influential in forging strong relations between the USSR and Cuba.
The Bay of Pigs invasion, April 1961
The Bay of Pigs invasion had been planned during the Eisenhower administration, and it was President John F. Kennedy who inherited the plan. The objective was to enable approximately 1,500 anti-Castro exiles to land on Cuba and carry out a military coup to remove Castro from power.
Kennedy chose to support the CIA-inspired attack, which involved landing these exiles at the Bay of Pigs. The operation was an unmitigated disaster and a profound humiliation for Kennedy. The invasion also confirmed Soviet and Cuban fears about American intentions for Cuba.
The affair ensured that Castro's power in Cuba was affirmed and consolidated, as he had successfully protected Cuba from American imperialism. This failure had far-reaching consequences: it strengthened Castro's domestic position, confirmed Soviet suspicions about US aggression, and pushed Cuba further into the Soviet sphere of influence. The humiliation also made Kennedy more determined to remove Castro, setting the stage for further confrontation.
Operation Mongoose, November 1961
On 30 November 1961, Kennedy authorised Operation Mongoose. Its aim was to overthrow Castro and his regime, primarily through the use of covert operations within Cuba. These operations involved gathering intelligence information, forms of economic sabotage and psychological intimidation through propaganda. Such acts take place secretly and are designed to damage the state against which they are applied.
The operation sought to destabilise the regime and facilitate an anti-Castro revolt from within. Kennedy appointed General Edward Lansdale to head the operation. Kennedy's military advisers developed an air strike plan known as OPLAN 312 and a land-based invasion plan known as OPLAN 314.
The Soviet Union had been supplying Castro with arms shipments for some time, but the USA did not intervene because there was no suggestion that such action could threaten the USA. By March 1962, US military manoeuvres, known as Operation Quick Kick, started in the Caribbean. Nikita Khrushchev's Defence Minister, Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky, concluded that in the face of a determined US attack, Cuba would stand for no more than a week.
Khrushchev adopted a new stance: he decided to deploy Soviet nuclear missiles on Cuba in 1962.
The Soviet decision to deploy nuclear missiles: Operation Anadyr
The Soviets were willing to support Castro politically, economically and militarily. The installation of nuclear weapons in the mountains of Cuba was only one aspect of military support. The Soviets also provided fighter planes, bombers and 14,000 ground troops. The nuclear weapons were both short- and medium-range, meaning they could reach between 1,100 and 2,800 kilometres from their launch sites.
Geostrategic considerations
Geostrategically, Cuba was an opportunity that Khrushchev could not ignore. The term geostrategic refers to the geographical factors that influence a nation's political and military power. Khrushchev acknowledged that it would take at least a decade for the Soviet Union to establish parity with the USA's long-range missile capability.
Soviet missiles on Cuba would redress this imbalance. Reducing the missile gap would also have been a supplement to Khrushchev's wider aims for military planning. A more developed strategic status would have contributed to Khrushchev's objective of reducing spending on conventional military forces.
Furthermore, the deployment would have enabled Khrushchev to direct more resources into the expansion and modernisation of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, whilst still having resources left to invest in the non-military civilian economy.
The linkage strategy
Khrushchev may have hoped to develop a linkage strategy between Cuba and Berlin. In the diplomatic sense, linkage means connecting one set of concessions related to one issue with concessions related to a different issue. In effect, diplomacy becomes a package of issues rather than simply focused on a single issue.
Despite considerable efforts between 1958 and 1961, Khrushchev had failed to remove the Western power from Berlin. Not only was this Western presence a political embarrassment to Khrushchev, but it also had substantial implications for the security of the communist bloc in Eastern Europe.
Historiographical debate on Soviet motives
Some historians argue that Khrushchev could have used a protective force of conventional Soviet forces, configured purely for defensive purposes. This would have posed no substantial threat to the USA. Others present the USA as the primary causal factor in determining Soviet actions. According to this interpretation, the USSR's actions were purely defensive in order to address the potential for US aggression against Cuba. The nuclear option was purely defensive.
Discovery of the missiles: the beginning of the 13 days
The Soviet deployment had depended on a major nuclear build-up taking place without the USA realising it had happened. This secrecy ended on 14 October 1962 when a U-2 spy plane flight produced unmistakable evidence of an R-12 missile site at San Cristobal. The 13-day crisis period had begun, running from 16-28 October.
Key Points to Remember:
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The USA viewed Cuba as part of its sphere of influence, but Castro's 1959 revolution challenged American dominance in the Caribbean.
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Castro's agrarian reform and seizure of American assets, combined with growing Soviet-Cuban ties (particularly Mikoyan's 1960 visit), prompted harsh US economic sanctions and plans to remove Castro.
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The Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 was a humiliating failure for Kennedy, which strengthened Castro's position and confirmed Soviet fears about American aggression.
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Operation Mongoose (November 1961) aimed to destabilise Castro through covert operations, leading Khrushchev to conclude that Cuba needed stronger protection.
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Khrushchev's decision to deploy nuclear missiles on Cuba in 1962 was driven by geostrategic calculations (closing the missile gap), potential linkage with the Berlin issue, and the need to defend Cuba from US attack.