The Soviet Union and Eastern and Southern Europe, 1945–48 (AQA A-Level History): Revision Notes

The Soviet Union and Eastern and Southern Europe, 1945–48

Stalin's consolidation of control in Eastern Europe

Following the percentages agreement and the Yalta Conference, Stalin understood Eastern Europe to be within the Soviet sphere of influence, particularly those nations liberated from Nazi control by the Red Army. In 1945, there appeared to be little concrete evidence that Stalin intended to create a communist bloc across Eastern Europe. His initial focus centred on security and influence rather than ideological expansion. However, Stalin's actions in Eastern Europe were driven by a determination to do whatever proved necessary to safeguard Soviet international interests and Soviet territory.

The creation of a buffer zone

By 1948, Stalin had achieved his objective of establishing a defence zone west of the USSR consisting of satellite states. The Soviet Union succeeded in establishing communist regimes across Eastern Europe, including Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and eventually Czechoslovakia. These pro-Soviet communist governments formed a buffer zone of allies designed to reinforce the defensive capability of the USSR against any possible future threat from the West.

Stalin's method of imposing communist regimes on Eastern European states reveals his underlying motives. Communist regimes were not simply imposed forcibly across Eastern Europe through direct military occupation. Instead, it became common practice for communists to form alliances with other left-wing parties and then take control of them. Opposition candidates were often intimidated, and election results were manipulated to ensure a communist victory.

Communist appeal in post-war Eastern Europe

Communists had participated prominently in anti-fascist wartime resistance movements and emerged as committed patriots. There existed genuine compliance towards communism in post-war Eastern Europe, especially in Czechoslovakia. For instance, the Communist Party emerged as the largest single party and secured 38 per cent of the vote in the relatively free elections held in Czechoslovakia in May 1946. The war had left these states with mass unemployment and economic chaos. For many workers in these states, communism offered superior prospects to capitalism, and the dominant political and economic elite associated with it. Many perceived the communists as freedom fighters due to their struggle against Nazism. Communism promised employment and social mobility.

However, this view was not shared by all sectors of Eastern European society. The rural peasants looked to the pro-agrarian parties (political parties that focused on representing the interests of farmers and peasants, prioritising the redistribution of land) to deliver land redistribution and to be responsive to the particular needs of the very large numbers of rural peasants.

Stalin's ideological commitment and pragmatism

Although Stalin remained committed to the ideological imperative of communism, he believed that the ideology could only be fulfilled if both the USSR was powerful and he, as its leader, was all-powerful. Stalin was committed to power before his commitment to ideology. Initially he was even willing to tolerate other political parties, albeit temporarily, and this was purely a means to an end. The communist regimes that were established could not be independent of Soviet influence. Loyalty to Moscow was a prerequisite of their survival. The purity of communist ideology operating in Eastern European states was not a high priority for Stalin. The leaders of these states had to function as Stalinist puppets. This level of commitment and loyalty gave Stalin, and the Soviet Union, power, and power gave Stalin control. One by one the Eastern European states were gradually brought into the Stalinist fold.

Poland

The case of Poland reveals Stalin's forward planning and tactical flexibility. Despite the fact that a Polish government existed in exile in London, the pro-Stalin Lublin Government was established and became Stalin's instrument of political control. The agreements at Yalta had partly facilitated this process, but Stalin simply failed to conform to the full range of Yalta agreements as far as Poland was concerned.

By agreeing to free elections at Yalta, Stalin was able to preserve the role of the Lublin Government. The Provisional Government of National Unity was formed in June 1945 and it contained parties from both ends of the political spectrum. This became typical of Stalin's pluralist approach. He did not simply impose a pro-Soviet communist regime on Poland.

His tactics focused on using several approaches such as appearing to allow free multi-party elections but with a clear intent to ensure that the result he wanted would eventually emerge. To some extent Poland became a testing ground for Stalin's methodology, but it was a model that he was prepared to deviate from if necessary.

Poland had a Peasant Party led by Stanisław Mikołajczyk. The communists weakened this group by strengthening their own links with the Polish socialists. In January 1947, these two groups merged and the communists became the dominant group within this merger. Some Polish communists were not fully pro-Moscow. Deputy Prime Minister Władysław Gomułka was one such individual. He declared that because the Poles had fought for their own liberation they should have the right to determine their own future. Gomułka opposed Soviet policies, which he felt were irrelevant to Poland. In 1948, he was accused of 'nationalist deviation' and replaced by a compliant pro-Stalinist, Bolesław Bierut. Poland was safely under Soviet influence.

Key figure: Władysław Gomułka (1905–82)

Gomułka was a communist who believed in the notion of different national versions of socialism. He worked, after 1945, to crush any opposition to communism in Poland. In 1947 he supported the rigged elections, which succeeded in finally eliminating opposition. He became a victim of the factional rivalry within the Polish communist movement. He supported the so-called 'home' faction and stood against the pro-Moscow faction. He was expelled from the Polish Communist Party in 1951 as Stalinisation gripped Poland, but in 1956 was seen as a national hero who could deliver change.

Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary

Romania

In Romania the communists were popular because they offered an alternative to the pre-war regime. Moreover, the Red Army occupied Romania. These two factors made it relatively easy for Stalin. Opposition was minimal.

Bulgaria

In Bulgaria the process was rather different but equally effective. Gradualism, manipulated elections and the forced removal of opponents characterised the takeover. The strongest political opponent facing the communists was the Agrarian Party, led by Nikola Petkov. Despite winning over 20 per cent of the popular vote in the October elections, Petkov was faced with trumped-up charges and was executed. His party was forcibly absorbed into the Bulgarian communist movement. By April 1947, all other political parties had been banned.

Hungary

In Hungary the communists used the tactic of allying with other political groups in order to challenge the power of their greatest opponent, the Smallholders Party. As in Poland and elsewhere, political opponents were arrested and elections were manipulated and rigged in order to produce the desired outcome for the communists. However, as in Poland, many Hungarian communists did not display the degree of loyalty to Moscow that Stalin wanted. They formed close links with Yugoslavia, where a non-Soviet regime was in place. In 1949, the Hungarian communist leader, Laszlo Rajk, was executed for 'anti-Soviet' activities. By 1949, all political opposition to the Moscow-backed Hungarian communists had disappeared.

Czechoslovakia

Unlike much of the rest of Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia was industrialised and had a large, unionised working class. Czech communists were popular among the urban peasants because they had given them land at the end of the war.

The Czech Communist Party leader, Klement Gottwald, became prime minister. His fatal error was to show a willingness to accept Western economic aid in 1947. Also, there was growing opposition to communist leadership from non-communist groups. However, members of these groups, who were in the government, resigned in 1948. This decision advantaged the communists because it enabled them to present it as an attempt to create an alternative right-wing group. As a result, the highly respected President Edvard Beneš agreed to support a communist-dominated government. Beneš resigned in June 1948 and this left the pro-Moscow communists in complete control.

Key figure: Edvard Beneš (1884–1948)

Beneš led the Czechoslovak government in exile in London during the war. He was not a communist but he was willing to work with Stalin, having decided that there was more to gain from such cooperation than an alliance with Poland. He returned as Czech president in 1946. He tried, and failed, to resist a communist-dominated government.

Yugoslavia

Initially Yugoslavia was firmly embedded in the Soviet camp. Its leader, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, was a committed Stalinist. Unlike in many other Eastern European states, the communist movement in Yugoslavia was firmly in place when the war ended and its leader was seen as an iconic nationalist.

By 1948, it was apparent that Soviet influence over Yugoslavia was limited. This conflict between Stalin and Tito was based on Stalin's determination to impose Soviet control over Southern and Eastern European states, particularly through their economic and foreign policies. These had to conform to Soviet policies and clearly be seen to be in line with Soviet interests. The Yugoslavs simply refused to become Soviet puppets. In June 1948, Yugoslavia was expelled from Cominform. Its leaders were accused of abandoning Marxist-Leninism and thereby no longer conforming to an acceptable political position. Yugoslavia was able to survive because the USA was willing to offer economic aid. Essentially, any state that the USSR opposed was seen by the USA as its friend.

Key figure: Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980)

Tito was the communist leader of Yugoslavia and one of the founder members of Cominform, but also the first to reject Soviet dominance. His Cold War stance was one of non-alignment with East or West. This enabled Yugoslavia to flourish and it contributed to holding together national unity in a very disparate state.

Kennan's 'Long Telegram' and developing US policy

The 'Long Telegram', 22 February 1946

George Kennan, the chargé d'affaires (a second-ranking officer) in the US embassy in Moscow, sent a lengthy despatch to the US State Department in Washington. It became known as the 'Long Telegram'. Many historians, such as John Gaddis, regard this message as being fundamental in the shaping of US policy towards the Soviet Union and ultimately determining the USA's role as a global power.

Kennan had long favoured the USA adopting a hard line against the USSR. Before Yalta he had supported the idea of splitting Europe into spheres of influence and thereby defining a line across which Soviet and communist influence could not cross. After Yalta he came to recognise the failings of Franklin D. Roosevelt's grand plan for international cooperation and the creation of a democratic post-war world structure. For Kennan, communism was uncompromising in its ideological threat to the free world.

He also believed that Stalin wanted to replace, in the minds of the Soviet people, the fear of Germany and Japan with the fear of the USA and Britain. This would legitimise the Stalinist regime but it meant that any attempt at compromise with Stalin would be futile. For Kennan there was almost an inevitability about the collapse in East-West relations. Moreover, he believed that the primary culprit for this was the Soviet Union due to its intent to demonise the West for domestic political reasons.

Content of the Long Telegram

Kennan's telegram warned that the Soviet apparatus would be utilised to:

• Undermine general political and strategic potential of major Western powers
• Spread discord and weaken Western unity
• Exploit fears and suspicions within Western societies
• Make Soviet power appear invincible to discourage Western resistance

Key figure: George Kennan (1904–2003)

Kennan is often attributed with the responsibility for persuading Truman to commit the USA to the containment of communism and to controlling the international power of the USSR. He later rejected this link, arguing that his message had been misinterpreted and that he had advocated political rather than military containment.